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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
(DTPA), 1 enacted in 1973, is a fearsome weapon in the arsenal of
attorneys representing commercial plaintiffs. 2 The Texas DTPA
prohibits a wide variety of false or misleading acts in connection with the
sale of goods or services, permits treble damages for "knowing" viola-
tions,3 eliminates most common law defenses,4 and authorizes the recov-
ery of attorneys' fees.5 While a number of other states have enacted
deceptive trade practice legislation, the Texas statute is unique both in
the amount of litigation it has spawned 6 and in the frequency of legisla-
tive amendment. 7
In the 1980s, the collapse of the Texas oil economy and depressed real
estate market ushered in an era of lender liability suits. A number of
headline cases ensued, prosecuted on both traditional8 and innovative 9
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994). In keep-
ing with common Texas practice, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protec-
tion Act will be referred to in this Article as the "DTPA" rather than the "DTP-CPA."
This has the potential for occasional confusion, however, as the DTPA's predecessor stat-
ute, TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-10.01-10.08 (repealed 1973), was also titled the
"Deceptive Trade Practices Act."
2. See, e.g., Robert A. Rowland, III & Evelyn Jo Wilson, The DTPA as an Offensive
Weapon for Businesses, 20 Hous. LAW., Dec. 1982, at 28.
3. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
4. See, e.g., Richard M. Hunt, Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Common Law Defenses
to DTPA Claims, 52 TEX. B. J. 633, 635 (1989) (claiming that only the defense of a dis-
claimer of implied warranties survives).
5. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987).
6. According to one 1984 survey, about half of all reported deceptive trade practices
decisions nationwide involve the Texas statute. Anthony P. Dunbar, Comment, Consumer
Protection: The Practical Effectiveness of State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 59
TUL. L. REv. 427, 449 (1984).
7. The Texas DTPA has been amended or supplemented in some respect at every
legislative session since its adoption in 1973. See Steven R. Selsberg, Judicial Activism and
the DTPA: How Should Courts Compensate for a Poorly Drafted Statute?, 31 Hous. LAW.,
July-Aug. 1993, at 16 (commenting on the DTPA's "evolving nature" and stating that
"[s]ince 1973 the statute has undergone eight amendments"); see also Richard M. Alder-
man & Melanie P. Rosenthal, A Consumer Update: Recent Developments Under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 495, 497 n.4 (1989) (stating that "[tihe
legislature has amended the Act in each of the legislative sections [sic] following its
enactment").
8. One case in which recovery was obtained on long-standing theories of liability has
also been credited as being the first major "lender liability" suit in the nation. In State
Nat'l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1984,
writ dism'd by agr.), a group of lenders was held liable for approximately $19 million on
theories of fraud, duress, and interference with business governance. The case settled
while the parties were awaiting a decision in the Texas Supreme Court, a circumstance that
detracts considerably from any precedential value of the case. See James W. Paulsen, An
Uninformed System of Citation, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1780, 1789 (1992) (reviewing THE
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION).
9. In 1983, the Texas Supreme Court rejected imposition of a common law good faith
duty in a lender setting. Four years later, a Texas district court awarded some $59 million
to a borrower, based on failure to act in good faith. Texas Commerce Bank-McAllen v.
Robinson, 48 Banking Report (BNA) 1004 (206th Dist. Ct., May 12, 1987). The case was
settled confidentially on appeal.
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theories of liability. From the beginning of the "lender liability crisis" to
the present day, however, the role of the Texas DTPA as a borrowers'
weapon has been unclear. While expanded use of the DTPA has been
termed "[t]he most dramatic development in lender liability under Texas
law,"'10 this development also has been described as "probably [leading]
to more confusion, on the part of courts and practicing attorneys, than
may be found in any other DTPA area.""
In 1980, in Riverside National Bank v. Lewis,12 the Texas Supreme
Court decided that the borrowing of money was neither a "good" nor a
"service," and that an aggrieved debtor therefore lacked standing to bring
a consumer claim under the Texas DTPA.' 3 The decision initially was
interpreted as precluding lender liability under the DTPA.' 4 In the years
that immediately followed, however, a succession of further decisions cre-
ated significant exceptions to this rule, culminating in the Texas Supreme
Court's observation that Riverside has been "limited .. to its facts.' 5
Many DTPA claims against lenders now are based on "collateral serv-
ices" provided to a borrower in the course of a lending relationship' 6 or
on the theory that a loan is "inextricably intertwined" with a consumer
transaction.17
As these judicially-developed exceptions have begun to swallow up the
seemingly clear rule of Riverside, commentators have criticized the River-
Another notorious decision issued in LeMaire v. MBank Abilene, No. 52,567 (240th
Dist. Ct., Fort Bend County, Tex., Aug. 12, 1986). The $69 million decision grew out of a
$3 million supposed loan commitment and included claims of breach of contract, fraud,
promissory estoppel, tortious interference with contract, libel, slander, and DTPA viola-
tions. The plaintiffs obtained a trial recovery on all counts. The amount of the recovery
was reduced somewhat on appeal. MBank Abilene v. LeMaire, No. C14-86-00834-CV
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], Apr. 6, 1989). The decision never became final, how-
ever, because the bank failed and the case was removed to federal court while a rehearing
was still pending. The background of the case was presented by the bank's lawyers in Jeff
Joyce & W. Mike Baggett, A Review of LeMaire and Patton v. MBank Abilene, N.A.,
TEXAS Ass'N OF BANK COUNSEL, 1lam ANN. CONVENTION (Nov. 2-4, 1986).
10. John 0. Tyler, Jr., Emerging Theories of Lender Liability in Texas, 24 Hous. L.
REV. 411, 449 (1987).
11. Ralph L. Alexander & Terry L. Leonard, Suits Against Financial Institutions:
Emerging Liability, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, SUING AND DEFENDING UNDER THE DECEP-
TIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT E-1 (1985); see also Charles A. Gall & James W. Bowen,
Lender Liability, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ADVANCED BUSINESS LITIGATION 1994 0-1
(characterizing lender liability law as "somewhat confused").
12. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980).
13. Id. at 175-76.
14. Professor John Krahmer, a long-time observer of Texas banking law, has charac-
terized the Riverside holding as a "seemingly broad exception to bank liability." John
Krahmer et al., Banks and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1, 8 (1987).
15. La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 566 (Tex.
1984).
16. See, e.g., Herndon v. First Nat'l Bank of Tulia, 802 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1991, writ denied); Fortner v. Fannin Bank in Windom, 634 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
17. See, e.g., Knight v. Int'l Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Tex. 1982).
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side court's rationale as "superficial' 8 or simply "incorrect,"'19 and the
Riverside rule as "continually limited and narrowed" 20 to the point that it
is "almost extinct."'21 Lower courts, emboldened by an apparent Texas
Supreme Court trend to read Riverside more and more strictly, now issue
opinions plainly inconsistent with its holding. In a 1989 ruling on a $70
million appeal, for example, a Houston court of appeals effectively repu-
diated Riverside.22 Because the bank failed while a rehearing was pend-
ing, the decision never became final. 23 In 1990, the Amarillo Court of
Appeals initially permitted a debtor to sue a bank on a DTPA theory
based on pleadings that appeared to assert nothing more than "services"
necessarily incident to a loan.24 The court reversed its ruling as a result of
a spirited rehearing motion, 25 but then reversed its ruling again on further
rehearing,26 coming close to setting a rather embarrassing appellate
record.27
18. John D. Marziotti & Steve E. Couch, Borrowing Money From A Lending Institu-
tion: Should the Borrower be a 'Consumer' Under Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act?,
28 Hous. LAW. 34, 38 (July-Aug. 1990).
19. Krahmer, supra note 14, at 36.
20. Id. at 35.
21. Joel W. Reese, Note, "Consumer" Status Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
Requires a Borrower to Base its Claim on the Underlying Goods or Services, 23 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 593, 612 (1992).
22. MBank Abilene v. LeMaire, No. C14-86-00834-CV, 1989 WL 30995 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1989) (removed to federal court while rehearing pending).
23. A Texas intermediate appellate court has jurisdiction to modify its judgment for at
least 30 days, or longer, if a timely motion for rehearing or motion to extend time to file a
motion for rehearing is filed. See, e.g., TEX. R. App. P. 100(a), (g). Thus, a mandate is not
issued until at least 45 days after judgment, or longer, if a timely rehearing motion is filed.
TEX. R. App. P. 86(a). West Publishing Company typically does not print a Texas court of
appeals opinion until all timely motions for rehearing have been overruled. For this rea-
son, the MBank Abilene opinion has never been published. Ordinarily, an unpublished
Texas court of appeals opinion cannot be cited as authority. TEX. R. App. P. 90(i). The
MBank Abilene court, however, made a Rule 90 determination to publish the opinion.
Compare MBank Abilene Slip op. at 90 with TEX. R. App. P. 90(c). Accordingly, while the
precedential value of the opinion is doubtful, there should be no formal prohibition on
citation. Accord David M. Gunn, "Unpublished Opinions Shall Not Be Cited as Author-
ity": The Emerging Contours of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 90(i), 24 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 115, 132 (1992) (stating that the "better view would appear to be that the case has the
dignity of published status").
24. Herndon v. First Nat'l Bank of Tulia, No. 07-88-0240-CV, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS
1173 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, May 18, 1990), modified on reh'g, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS 2372
(Tex. App.-Amarillo, Sept. 18, 1990), withdrawn on further reh'g, 802 S.W.2d 396 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied).
25. Herndon v. First Nat'l Bank of Tulia, No. 07-88-0240-CV, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS
2372 (Tex. App.-Amarillo, Sept. 18, 1990), withdrawn on reh'g, 802 S.W.2d 396 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied).
26. Herndon v. First Nat'l Bank of Tulia, 802 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991,
writ denied).
27. The current winner in the "most frequently withdrawn majority opinions by a sin-
gle court on a single appeal" sweepstakes is apparently Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107
(Tex. 1984), with three different opinions. See James W. Paulsen, Jensen III and Beyond:
Exploring the Community Property Aspects of Closely Held Corporate Stock in Texas, 37
BAYLOR L. REv. 653, 657 n.13 (1985). Herndon falls short of Jensen only in the fact that




The Texas Supreme Court does not appear to relish the prospect of
resolving the conflict. Early in 1991, for example, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals, citing the "limited nature" of the Riverside holding, decided
that borrowers could make a DTPA claim for supposed lender miscon-
duct based simply upon the fact that the loan proceeds were used to
purchase goods or services. 28 A few months later, the Houston Court of
Appeals (Fourteenth District) ruled that an inventory loan did not fall
within the DTPA's ambit in the absence of some complaint regarding the
quality of the inventory.2 9 The Texas Supreme Court denied writ, despite
this clear conflict between the two opinions.30 Moreover, in an opinion
issued the last day before the Supreme Court of Texas took its 1991 sum-
mer recess, the high court specifically declined an opportunity to issue
further guidance on the question of lender liability for DTPA violations. 31
The current situation was summed up concisely by the United States Fifth
Circuit in an opinion issued late in 1992, when the court observed that
"[the Texas courts of appeal are obviously split on this issue."'32 The
Fifth Circuit declined to impose DTPA liability on a lender "[b]ecause
Riverside has yet to be expressly overruled. '33
This article suggests, contrary to the apparent trend of authority, that
the Riverside decision is correct. Moreover, the Riverside court's reason-
ing barely scratches the surface of legal and policy arguments that ought
to be considered before borrowers, as a class, could ever be considered as
DTPA "consumers." Thus, while the author would readily concede to
critics of the decision that the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Riverside
is "limited," that limitation is simply a demarcation of legal territory that
has not yet been explored fully in a judicial opinion or otherwise.
Perhaps the best proof that a few new things remain to be said about
lender liability under the Texas DTPA is the fact that no reported lender
decision since Riverside has examined the underlying statutory language
at any length, despite the fact that the DTPA has undergone some legisla-
tive revision at each of the nine succeeding legislative sessions. 34 Nor, for
28. Security Bank v. Dalton, 803 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ
denied).
29. Central Texas Hardware v. First City, Texas-Bryan N.A., 810 S.W.2d 234, 237
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). This decision has been criticized in a
student note. See Reese, supra note 21.
30. Accord Reese, supra note 21, at 615 (noting Central Texas Hardware's "general
inconsistency with prior Texas cases" and arguing that this inconsistency "should have
mandated" the granting of an application for writ of error "in order to avoid further confu-
sion and inconsistency").
31. In Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 935 n.6 (Tex. 1991), the
Texas Supreme Court declined to address a DTPA claim against a lender "[a]s a result of
the disposition of the other issues." The lender was found liable for tortious interference
with contract, presumably for the same conduct forming the basis of the DTPA claim,
rendering the DTPA point moot.
32. Walker v. FDIC, 970 F.2d 114, 123 n.16 (5th Cir. 1992).
33. Id.
34. A handy listing of the legislative revisions enacted at each session may be found in
Appendix B to RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE TEXAS DECEP-
TIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1993). In DTPA jurisprudence, the version of the act which
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that matter, did the Riverside court ever examine the legislative debate
leading up to enactment of the DTPA, despite the fact that the decision is
grounded entirely on statutory construction. 35 In addition, to the au-
thor's knowledge, no DTPA lender decision has looked for guidance to
"relevant and pertinent decisions of courts in other jurisdictions," 36 de-
spite the fact that a 1979 amendment to the DTPA37 now permits such
inquiries.
This article will demonstrate that the current Texas DTPA, by its own
language and under settled rules of statutory construction, does not ap-
ply, and was never intended to apply, to loan transactions. This reading
of the statute is eminently reasonable because consumer rights in loan
transactions are already protected by an impressive array of state and
federal statutes. In addition, a decision to apply the DTPA to ordinary
lender-borrower relationships will only hurt average Texans and damage
the Texas economy, while having little or no beneficial effect on lending
practices. The article concludes by examining the current state of the
Riverside rule and its exceptions, and by suggesting resolutions of these
issues that will balance judicial decisions with the legislature's apparent
intentions.
II. THE RISE AND RUMORED FALL OF
THE RIVERSIDE RULE
A wealth of case law and secondary authority has grown up around the
Texas DTPA in the twenty years or so that it has been in existence. Since
the DTPA's application to lenders is one of the most litigated of all issues
arising under the statute, a sizable body of case law exists on this limited
topic alone. While a review of these decisions is critical to understanding
the current state of near incoherence in the law, a complete discussion of
the development of these doctrines inevitably runs the risk of verging on
incoherence. Therefore, of necessity, the discussion that follows is selec-
tively comprehensive, in the sense that some cases or legal developments
are not mentioned, while others are treated in excruciating detail.
A. THE BIRTH OF THE TEXAS DTPA
The DTPA, when enacted in 1973, was recognized as a major accom-
plishment of the so-called "reform legislature," spurred to action by the
"Sharpstown scandal."' 38 For such an important piece of legislation, the
governs is that which was in effect at the time of the alleged deceptive acts or practices.
Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1977); see also infra note 64.
35. This debate will be discussed in some detail later in this article. See infra notes
265-304 and accompanying text.
36. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(2) (Vernon 1987).
37. Act of May 16, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 603, § 3, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1327, 1329.
38. The Sharpstown scandal, for those not steeped in Texas political lore, was a major
political disaster arising from the failure of Sharpstown State Bank. The Texas Legislature
passed legislation setting up a state insurance fund, permitting Sharpstown State Bank to
withdraw from federally insured and regulated programs. The bank's failure and subse-
1995]
494. SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
DTPA's origins are remarkably unclear. Nonetheless, it safely can be
said that the language of the Texas DTPA was derived from at least three
sources: prior Texas consumer law, a California statute,39 and bits and
pieces of one or more uniform laws.40 While a complete genealogy of the
Texas DTPA is beyond the scope of this article, and may not be possible
in any event, some of the legislative history4' and statutory analogies42
will be discussed later.
Even at the outset, however, it is useful to take a moment's look at the
DTPA's Texas roots. A predecessor statute was enacted in 1967 and codi-
fied as Chapter 10 of the Texas Consumer Credit Code.43 In some re-
spects, this 1967 "Deceptive Trade Practices Act" was simply carried
forward in the 1973 Texas DTPA. Both the 1967 legislation and the 1973
DTPA contained a general prohibition on "false, misleading, or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce" 44 and both set
out a "laundry list"45 of specifically proscribed business practices.46 Both
statutes provided for enforcement by the Texas Attorney Genera 4 7 and
for injunctions and civil penalties in the event of violations.48
The 1973 legislation, however, differed from the earlier statute in sev-
eral critical respects. The new Texas DTPA created a private cause of
action for "consumers," 49 restricted common law defenses,50 and offered
the powerful incentive of statutory treble damages.51 In addition, while
quent revelations of wrongdoing and political favors is credited with causing a wave of
voter revulsion that swept away a number of prominent Texas legislators. See generally
CHARLES DEATON, THE YEAR THEY THREW THE RASCALS OuT (1973).
39. See infra notes 449-58 and accompanying text.
40. One commentator has traced portions of the DTPA to the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, as imported into Texas through former Chapter 10 of the Consumer
Credit Code. See David F. Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to
the Consumer Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3 (1976).
41. See infra notes 265-369 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 432-61 and accompanying text.
43. Act of May 8, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 274, § 2, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 608, 658,
repealed by Act of May 10, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 342.
44. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon 1987). Cf Texas Consumer
Protection Act, 60th Leg. R.S., ch. 274, § 2, ch. 10, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 608, 658, repealed
by Act of May 11, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 342.
45. The phrase "laundry list" commonly refers to a list of specifically proscribed prac-
tices, currently numbering 23. See, e.g., M. Keith Dollahite, Comment, Whirlpool and
DTPA Rescission Under the 'Laundry List': A 'New and Improved' Way to Wash-Out Con-
tracts?, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 656 (1983) (an article that deserves some sort of notoriety, if
only for the sheer number of bad puns in the title).
46. Compare Act of May 8, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 274, § 2, ch. 10, 1967 Tex. Gen.
Laws 609, 658 (repealed 1973) with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon
1987). While there is considerable overlap between the two "laundry lists," a number of
additions and deletions were also made in enacting the Texas DTPA in 1973.
47. Compare Act of May 8, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 274, § 2, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws
608, 612-14 (repealed 1973) with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47 (Vernon 1987 &
Supp. 1994).
48. Compare Act of May 8, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 274, § 2, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws
608, 658-59 (repealed 1973) with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.47(a), (c) (Vernon
1987).
49. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987).
50. Id. § 17.506(a).
51. Id. § 17.50(b) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
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the 1967 statute required both the Texas Consumer Credit Commissioner
and the Texas Attorney General's office to cooperate in enforcing its pro-
visions,52 the 1973 act eliminated the Consumer Credit Commissioner's
enforcement authority, vesting sole administrative responsibility in the
Consumer Protection and Antitrust Division of the Attorney General's
office.53 This change in responsibility was reflected in statutory arrange-
ment: Prior deceptive trade provisions were removed from the Con-
sumer Credit Code and placed in the Texas DTPA, part of the Texas
Business and Commerce Code. 54
A private cause of action under the DTPA is available only to a "con-
sumer," as specially defined in the act.5 5 The definition of "consumer,"
and of the terms within that definition, have been some of the most
amended and fought-over sections of the Texas DTPA. 56 Likewise, most
of the legal battles over application of the DTPA to loan transactions
have been fought over the threshold question of whether borrowers are
DTPA "consumers." The opening salvo was fired in Riverside National
Bank v. Lewis. 57
B. THE RIVERSIDE DECISION
The facts in Riverside are deceptively commonplace. In February 1975,
James Lewis bought a new Cadillac El Dorado, financing the purchase
through Allied Bank.58 When the check for Lewis's first car payment
bounced, Allied requested that Lewis obtain a loan from a different bank.
Lewis contacted Riverside National Bank and applied for a loan to refi-
nance the car. According to Lewis, a junior loan officer told him that the
loan had been approved. In fact, a more senior loan officer at Riverside
52. Act of May 8, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 274, § 2, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 608, 658
(repealed 1973). The Deceptive Trade Practices Act was amended in 1969 to permit either
the Attorney General or the Consumer Credit Commissioner to bring enforcement ac-
tions. Art. 5069-10.04(b). Act of June 10, 1969, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 452, § 1, 1967 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1504.
53. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(8) (Vernon 1987).
54. Act of May 21, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 342.
55. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987).
56. As enacted in 1973, a "consumer" was defined in the DTPA as "an individual who
seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." Act of May 21, 1973, 63d
Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 323. The definition of "goods" was re-
stricted to "tangible chattels bought for use," and "services" definitionally excluded "com-
mercial and business use." Id. During the 1975 legislative session, partnerships and
corporations were added to "individuals" in the definition of "consumer," and real prop-
erty was included as a DTPA "good." Act. of Apr. 10, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 62, § 1,
1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 149. In 1977, governmental entities became potential consumers and
the requirement that "services" could not be leased for commercial or business purposes
was dropped. Act of May 10, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 216, § 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 600.
Finally, in 1983, "business consumers" with assets of $25 million or more were excluded
from the DTPA's ambit. Act of May 19, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 883, 1983 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4943-44.
57. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980).
58. The facts are summarized in Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 171-72. Since Lewis won a
jury verdict and the Texas Supreme Court has no fact jurisdiction, all fact disputes were
resolved in Lewis's favor. To some extent, the recitation of facts in this article follows the
same pattern.
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already had reviewed and denied the loan. The car was repossessed and
sold by Allied Bank for less than the loan balance. Lewis was forced to
pay the remaining deficiency. At trial, Lewis admitted that he had mis-
represented his payment history and net income when he applied for the
Riverside loan but claimed the junior loan officer had told him to do so.
A jury found Riverside National Bank liable for fraud and DTPA
violations.
On appeal, the Houston Court of Appeals (First District) affirmed
Lewis's DTPA recovery.59 While recognizing that the question of
whether the DTPA applies to a bank's agreement to extend credit was "a
case of first impression in Texas," 60 the court of appeals decided the issue
in Lewis's favor with remarkably little substantive discussion. 61 The
Texas Supreme Court's five-to-four decision that Lewis was not a DTPA
"consumer" is considerably more informative. Both the majority and dis-
senting opinions focused on the language and legislative intent of the
DTPA.62 Both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that the Texas
DTPA is to be construed liberally to protect consumers. 63 Both opinions
also emphasized that only the 1973 version of the DTPA was at issue, and
that the statute had been amended since.64
The court's unanimity began to unravel with the dissenting opinion's
claim that "[i]t is undisputed that the deceptive trade practices provisions
of the Consumer Credit Code applied to lenders before 1973" and that
the decision to carry over these provisions into the DTPA therefore
should mandate a similar result.65 Reasoning from the DTPA's broad
prohibition of "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the con-
duct of any trade or commerce" 66 and the equally broad definition of
"trade and commerce" contained in the act,67 the dissenting opinion con-
59. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 572 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1978), rev'd in relevant part, 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980).
60. Riverside, 572 S.W.2d at 560.
61. The court simply decided: "We consider that by seeking to obtain the extension of
credit from a bank, Lewis was seeking to purchase services and was, under the provisions
of § 17.45, a consumer." Id. at 561.
62. The majority and dissenting opinions join issue over the question of whether a loan
of money is a "service," under the statutory definition contained in TEx. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.45(2) (1975 Version). Compare Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 174-76 with Riv-
erside, 572 S.W.2d at 178 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
63. Compare Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 173 with Riverside, 572 S.W.2d at 177 (Camp-
bell, J., dissenting).
64. The majority opinion opens its discussion of the DTPA by observing that "the
statutory provisions that govern this case are those that were in effect at the time that the
alleged deceptive acts occurred," i.e., May 1975. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 172 (emphasis
added). The dissent carefully notes 1979 amendments affecting the availability of con-
sumer remedies and interaction with FTC regulations. Id. at 179 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
65. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 178 (Campbell, J., dissenting). No authority is offered in
the dissenting opinion for the conclusion that the pre-1973 deceptive trade practices provi-
sions of the Consumer Credit Code applied to lenders, nor do the authors know of any.
66. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon 1987).
67. In 1973, as today, "trade and commerce" are defined as:
the advertising, offering for sale, lease, or distribution of any good or service,
of any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, and any
other article, commodity, or thing of value, wherever situated, and shall in-
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cluded that these provisions "leave[ ] no doubt the Legislature intended
the [DTPA] to apply to lending practices or the extension of credit." 68
The majority opinion neither agreed nor disagreed with the dissenters'
contention that it is "undisputed" 69 or that there is "no doubt" 70 the
DTPA was intended to cover loan transactions. Instead, the majority
opinion correctly observed that, whatever the scope of the Attorney Gen-
eral's enforcement authority, the private cause of action created by the
1973 DTPA is not unfettered. While the Consumer Protection Division
of the Attorney General's office indeed was given carte blanche to inves-
tigate and enjoin false, misleading, or deceptive acts "in the conduct of
any trade or commerce," 71 language that surely could include banking,
72
the private cause of action is restricted to "consumers."'73 To the majority
of the Texas Supreme Court in Riverside, then, the real question was
whether a borrower qualified as a "consumer. 74
The majority opinion implicitly concluded that, so far as the threshold
question of "consumer" status is concerned, the DTPA's rule of liberal
[construction] simply does not come into play.75 The relevant provision
of the DTPA states only that:
This subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against false,
misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions,
elude any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this
state.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(6) (Vernon 1987); see also Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at
177 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
68. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 177 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 178.
70. Id at 177.
71. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a), 17.47(a) (Vernon 1987 & 1994 Supp.);
see also Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 173.
72. See infra notes 473-74 and accompanying text.
73. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987); see also Riverside, 603
S.W.2d at 173.
74. The Texas Supreme Court stated emphatically that "a person who brings a private
lawsuit under section 17.50 must be a consumer, as defined in section 17.45(4)." Riverside,
603 S.W.2d at 173 (court's emphasis). It is worth noting that the Montana Supreme Court
has since adopted the Texas Supreme Court's Riverside analysis in determining whether a
similar definition of "consumer" should be a threshold standing requirement under Mon-
tana's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. See Doll v. Major Muffler
Centers, Inc., 687 P.2d 48, 52-53 (Mont. 1984).
75. The majority opinion states that "the rule of liberal [construction] should not be
applied in a manner that negates the statutory definition of the word 'consumer.' " River-
side, 603 S.W.2d at 173. The opinion also notes that the interpretation favored by the
dissenters would "constitute a judicial deletion" of the specific DTPA definition of "con-
sumer." Id.
Some might argue that the courts have not always observed this distinction, and have
exercised liberality in expanding the basic definition of "consumer." See, e.g., Kennedy v.
Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex. 1985) (stating third party beneficiaries qualify as consum-
ers); Big H Auto Auction, Inc. v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1984) (stating
purchasers for resale qualify as consumers).
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and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection. 76
This rule of liberal construction, though designed "to protect consumers,"
does not logically expand the definition of "consumer." To read the legis-
lature's mandate in this way would be equally as illogical as concluding
that, if fond grandparents decide upon a policy of liberality toward their
grandchildren, they also have decided to be liberal in defining whom they
will consider to be their grandchildren.
Under the 1973 version of the DTPA, a "consumer" was defined as "an
individual who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or serv-
ices."'77 James Lewis was certainly an "individual. ' 78 The question of
whether the act of borrowing money was a "purchase or lease" was ap-
parently not raised. 79 The remaining question, and the focus of the opin-
ion, was whether money is a "good" or "service."
The Texas Supreme Court had little trouble dismissing the notion that
money could be considered as a DTPA "good." The 1973 definition of
"good," not amended in any relevant respect since, was "tangible chattels
bought for use." o80 The court observed that the Texas Uniform Commer-
cial Code, part of the same statutory code as the Texas DTPA, repeatedly
excludes "money" when defining "goods."'' l
The question of whether money or similar intangibles can be consid-
ered "goods" for purposes of the DTPA seems to be well settled. In addi-
76. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added). When
this language was quoted by the Texas Supreme Court in Riverside, the word "consumer"
was also emphasized by the Court, giving some credence to the idea that the Court may
have been reasoning along the same lines employed by the author in the text immediately
following this footnote. See Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 172.
77. Act of May 10, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 323.
78. A 1975 amendment added "partnerships" and "corporations" to "individuals" in
the DTPA definition of "consumer." Act of Apr. 10, 1975,64th Leg., R.S., ch. 62, § 1, 1975
Tex. Gen. Laws 149, 149. This amendment was not effective until September 1, 1975, after
the operative events in Riverside. See also supra note 56.
79. This element of the definition, although apparently not discussed in a Texas case to
date, will be discussed later in this article, as a strong hint of the Legislature's intent to
exclude lending from the DTPA's ambit. See infra notes 370-430 and accompanying text.
80. Act of Apr. 10, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 62, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 149, 149; see
also Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 172. The current version defines "goods" as "tangible chat-
tels or real property purchased or leased for use." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.45(1) (Vernon 1987).
81. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 174. The dissenting justices in Riverside argued that
money could be considered personal property under the DTPA's general definition of
"trade and commerce," and that it could certainly be considered as "any other article,
commodity or thing of value" under the same definition. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 177(Campbell, J., dissenting) (referring to Act of May 10, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, 1973
Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 323). While the observations in the dissenting opinion are arguably
correct, see infra note 441 and accompanying text, this only would prove that the Attorney
General has potential enforcement authority, not that James Lewis was a DTPA consumer
entitled to bring a private cause of action. The majority opinion makes precisely this point:
"[Tihe scope of 'trade' and 'commerce' defines the acts that are illegal; it does not purport
to say who may maintain a private cause of action." Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 173 (empha-
sis added).
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tion to money, accounts receivable, 82 stock certificates,83 securities, 84
certificates of deposit,85 savings certificates, 86 insurance policy pro-
ceeds, 87 franchises,88 limited partnerships,89 and trust interests 90 have all
been excluded by court decision from the definition of DTPA "goods." If
the Texas Legislature was dissatisfied with these consistent interpreta-
tions of the act, the DTPA could have been amended at a subsequent
session to include intangible property, as some other states have done9x
and as has specifically been suggested to the Texas Legislature on at least
one occasion.92
Thus, the pivotal question in the Riverside opinion boiled down to
whether a simple loan of money could be considered a "service." The
statutory definition of "services" was, and still is today,93 partially circular
and generally not enlightening. 94 The 1973 version of the DTPA defined
"services" as "work, labor and services for other than commercial or busi-
ness use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair
of goods. '95 The court determined that "[m]oney, as money, is quite ob-
viously neither work nor labor, '96 and "services," as part of the same
legislative list, should be viewed similarly.97 Moreover, since "services"
82. Snyders Smart Shop, Inc. v. Santi, Inc., 590 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, no writ).
83. Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980).
84. Allais v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 532 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Portland
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bevill, 619 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no
writ).
85. Grass v. Credito Mexicano, S.A., 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 934 (1987).
86. Kilgore Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Donnelly,. 624 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-yler
1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
88. Meineke Discount Muffler v. Jaynes, 999 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1993).
89. Marshall v. Quinn-L Equities, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Tex. 1988). But see
Hennessey v. Skinner, 698 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ)
(holding that partnership interest subject to DTPA is actually a percentage interest in an
identifiable good).
90. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Heard, No. 88 Civ. 19 (LLS), 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16562 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1990).
91. See infra note 442 and accompanying text.
92. In 1988 interim hearings before the Joint Committee on the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act, Mr. Tom Smith, director of Public Citizen of Texas, recommended that the
DTPA be amended to include nontangible goods, such as money. See Joint Committee on
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Summary of Testimony 11 (Aug. 12, 1988) (transcript on
file at Texas Bankers Association, Austin).
93. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(2) (Vernon 1987) (" 'Services' means
work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use, including services furnished in connec-
tion with the sale or repair of goods.").
94. Accord DAVID F. BRAGG ET AL., TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION 24 (Michael
Curry ed., 2d ed. 1982) ("It is apparent that the statutory definition of 'services' is of little
value.").
95. Act of May 10, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 323 (empha-
sis added), amended by Act of Apr. 10, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 62, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen.
Laws 149, 149; Act of May 10, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 216, § 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 600.
96. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 174.
97. The Texas Supreme Court cited the principle of statutory construction that words
grouped in a list should be given similar meanings. Id. at 174 n.2.
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ordinarily are thought of as involving some sort of activity, and money is
not an activity, the Texas Supreme Court held that "Lewis' attempt to
acquire money, or the use of money, was not an attempt to acquire
services." 98
The Riverside court carefully limited this definition-bound holding in
three respects, each of which has created ample opportunities for judicial
activism. First, the Texas Supreme Court noted the possible presence of
"collateral services" 99 such as financial counseling, loan processing or bill-
paying which, if they became "the subject of the complaint,"'100 might
give rise to a DTPA claim. This observation has resulted in a host of
"collateral service" decisions from intermediate courts.10 1 Second, after
emphasizing that "there [was] no evidence that Lewis sought to acquire
anything other than [the] use of money,"'1 2 the court dropped a footnote
comment: "Nor do we have before us a case where in connection with a
sale of tangible personal property on credit, the seller misrepresents to
the buyer the terms of the credit."'01 3 This limitation on Riverside has
been explored, confused, and possibly even explained, in a number of
later Texas Supreme Court decisions.10 4 It commonly is described as the
"inextricably intertwined" doctrine. 10 5 Finally, the court rejected the no-
tion that services necessarily exist in the lending of money because the
argument was "not supported by the evidence adduced at trial" and
therefore was "merely hypothetical." 10 6 This hypothesis has since be-
come the subject of a substantial law review article and at least a little
judicial discussion. 10 7
Borrowers, lenders, and their attorneys surely would have been spared
a lot of uncertainty if the Riverside decision had not left so many trouble-
some questions unanswered. One should not, however, judge the River-
side court too harshly. The case involved only $3,277.50 in actual
damages, 0 8 the deficiency following the sale of a used car. Even good
attorneys-and the briefs in Riverside were quite good-will be limited
in the amount of in-depth research expense that can be justified for a
comparatively small case. It therefore may have been wise judicial policy
for the Texas Supreme Court to write a very limited decision in Riverside,
reserving other questions for cases presenting the issues more directly,
and perhaps with more money at stake.
98. Id. at 175.
99. Id
100. Id. at 175 n.5.
101. See infra notes 109-42 and accompanying text.
102. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
103. Id. at 176 n.5.
104. See infra notes 143-251 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Robert Brooks Gilbreath, Comment, Consumer Standing Under the
DTPA: The Inextricably Intertwined Standard, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 431 (1988).
106. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
107. See Krahmer, supra note 14; see also infra notes 252-63 and accompanying text.
108. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 172.
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C. WHITTLING AWAY AT RIVERSIDE
After Riverside, courts often have found particular lending transactions
to fall within one of the three possible exceptions to the Riverside rule
just discussed. The principal exceptions are situations in which the lender
offers "collateral services," not simply a loan, or in which the lender is
"inextricably intertwined" with the underlying consumer transaction. A
substantial body of authority has grown up around each. While there has
been comparatively less discussion of the third, or "loans as services" ex-
ception, such exception merits examination because adoption of the doc-
trine would mean the practical reversal of Riverside.
1. The "Collateral Services" Doctrine
In Riverside, as just discussed, the Texas Supreme Court noted the bor-
rower's argument that "services" exist in the process of determining
whether to loan money, but rejected the argument as "merely hypotheti-
cal" because no evidence was presented on the point at trial. 10 9 In a foot-
note, however, the court carefully reserved the point for a possible
further decision.
Accordingly, we do not pass upon the question whether a bank's
misrepresentation concerning its activities, such as the availability of
financial counseling, the cost of processing a loan or the ability to
pay a customer's monthly bills, could constitute a deceptive act in
connection with a sale of "services." We only hold that where those
activities are not the subject of the complaint, then the presence of
such collateral activities in a transaction otherwise not covered by
the DTPA does not subject the parties to liability under the
DTPA.110
Unfortunately, despite this broad hint that the "collateral services" ques-
tion was an appropriate subject for future discussion, the Texas Supreme
Court has not revisited the issue in the context of a lending transaction
since Riverside.
One clue of the Texas Supreme Court's position on the scope of "col-
lateral services" is found in Thompson v. First Austin Company,"' a case
that in some respects is Riverside's shadow. In Thompson, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals ruled that a lender was not liable under the
DTPA for failure to follow through on a supposed promise to delay fore-
closure on a home loan. 1 2 The Thompson borrowers argued that they
had purchased "services" from their lender, the services being various
actions taken by the lender in the process of administering the loan and
foreclosing on the deed of trust. 1 3 The Fort Worth court rejected this
contention out of hand:
109. Id. at 175.
110. Id. at 175 n.5.
111. 572 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
112. Id. at 81.
113. As stated in the court of civil appeals opinion, "[s]ervices detailed in Thompson's
brief were: Receipt of credit for loan payments, application of proceeds of condemnation,
1995]
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We hold that Thompsons did not purchase a service; "a note and
deed of trust." Rather, it is the reverse: Thompsons purchased the
use of money with the "note and deed of trust." The provisions in
the deed of trust are for the benefit of First Austin in securing repay-
ment of its loan and the options provided therein are First Austin's.
Such provisions apply to Thompsons only in the sense that they pro-
vided for them to perform their duties in return for what they had
already received in full-the money to pay for their house. 1
14
The Texas Supreme Court declined to grant the Thompsons' applica-
tion for writ of error with an "n.r.e." or "no reversible error" notation. In
Texas, an "n.r.e." decision is precedential, but often of uncertain mean-
ing.115 In this particular case, however, the Texas Supreme Court's nota-
tion probably carries more weight than usual. The initial decision to deny
the application was accompanied by a per curiam opinion to the effect
that the DTPA issue was reserved for decision in Riverside,116 on which
an application for writ of error had been granted the preceding week.
117
The rehearing motion in Thompson was not formally overruled by the
Texas Supreme Court for some sixteen months, the same day the high
court also overruled the rehearing motion in Riverside. 1 8 Given this ap-
parent link between the two cases, and the fact that the merits of the
Thompson court's reasoning were argued to the Texas Supreme Court in
the Riverside briefs, it probably is safe to assume that the Thompson deci-
sion was scrutinized with great care before the "n.r.e." label was finally
attached.
Modern financial institutions do many things other than simply lend
money, and they have been held liable under the DTPA for such activi-
ties. The Texas Supreme Court has held that mishandling a checking ac-
count can result in DTPA liability. 19 Texas intermediate courts also have
classified some activities that were or easily could be "collateral" to lend-
ing as subjecting a lending institution to DTPA liability. The list currently
payment of taxes and insurance through First Austin, an extension of time for payment of
debt.., and application of payment and posting of notices in case of foreclosure of deed of
trust lien." Id.
114. Id. at 81-82.
115. See Ted Z. Robertson & James W. Paulsen, Rethinking the Texas Writ of Error
System, 17 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1, 30-41 (1986).
116. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 229, 232 (Mar. 3, 1979).
117. Riverside, 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 213, 215 (Feb. 10, 1979).
118. See Riverside, 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 497, 498 (July 16, 1980). Both rehearing motions
were denied on the same day; the Thompson rehearing was denied with a notation that the
previous per curiam opinion was withdrawn. Id.
119. La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex.
1984); see also McDade v. Texas Commerce Bank, 822 S.W.2d 713,719 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (finding similar result with IRA trustee actions); Thomas
C. Cook, Inc. v. Rowhanian, 774 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1989, writ denied) (find-
ing similar result with travelers checks); Plaza Nat'l Bank v. Walker, 767 S.W.2d 276, 278
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied) (finding similar result with savings account);
Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 605 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1980), reformed and aff'd, 617 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1981) (finding similar result with
checking account).
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includes preparation of documents, 120 processing title documents, 121 pro-
viding or promising to provide insurance, 122 brokering loans, 23 and pro-
viding advice about certificates of deposit. 24 Conversely, some activities
that could have been considered "collateral" to lending, including appli-
cation of proceeds of insurance 25 and activities surrounding foreclo-
sure 26 or sales of mortgaged property, 127 have been held not subject to
the DTPA. Financial institutions also have been held not subject to the
DTPA for issuing a certificate of deposit, 28 or for making and accepting
ordinary deposits 29 or savings certificates. 30
Clearly, "there is somewhat of a flux presently,' 131 so far as the ques-
tion of what "collateral services" might be subject to the DTPA is con-
cerned. In Riverside, the Texas Supreme Court observed that there was
no evidence that Lewis "sought to acquire anything other than [the] use
of money.' 32 Banks and thrifts do provide a myriad of "services," and
are even commonly referred to as the "financial services" industry. 133
Commentators therefore recognized very early that the high court's re-
fusal to treat loans per se as goods or services "may not present as great
120. First Tex. Say. Ass'n v. Stiff Properties, 685 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, no writ).
121. Fortner v. Fannin Bank in Windom, 634 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982,
no writ); see also Garry A. Offerman, Note, Borrower Paying Interest for Loan is a Con-
sumer of Bank's Collateral Lending Services Under Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 14
TEX. TECH L. REV. 867 (1983).
122. Irizarry v. Amarillo Pantex Fed'l Credit Union, 695 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1985, no writ); Juarez v. Bank of Austin, 659 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tex. App.-Austin
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McNeill v. McDavid Ins. Agency, 594 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ). But see English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.
1983).
123. Merchantile Mort. Co. v. University Homes, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 45, 47-48 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ); Lubbock Mort. & Inv. Co. v. Thomas, 626
S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
124. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ritenour, 704 S.W.2d 895,899 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But cf First State Bank v. Chesshir, 613 S.W.2d 61,62 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 620 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1981), on re-
mand, 634 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that pur-
chaser of a certificate of deposit not purchaser of a service).
125. English, 660 S.W.2d at 524.
126. Thompson, 572 S.W.2d at 81-82.
127. Longview Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Nabours, 673 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1984), aff'd by, 700 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1985).
128. Chesshir, 613 S.W.2d at 62. But cf. Ritenour, 704 S.W.2d at 899 (holding that pro-
viding advice about a certificate of deposit did not fall under DTPA).
129. Genico Distrib., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 616 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But cf La Sara Grain Co., 673 S.W.2d at 564 ("The
services provided by a bank in connection with a checking account are within the scope of
the DTPA.") and Ferguson, 605 S.W.2d at 324 (holding DTPA does apply to banks).
130. Kilgore Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Donnelly, 624 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tex. Civ.
App.-'Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
131. Karen M. Neeley, Consumer Counterclaims, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, SUING, DE-
FENDING & NEGOTIATING WITH BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS G-15
(1984).
132. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
133. See generally, MONEY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, MONEY AND CONSUMER: AN IN-
TERNATIONAL CONSUMER VIEW ON THE REVOLUTION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES (1988);
KAREN M. NEELEY, BANK PRODUCTS FOR THE 80's: STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS (1984).
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an obstacle as it seems, if the plaintiff is creative in pleading his case."'134
Today, creative pleadings may make the difference between having a
DTPA "collateral services" cause of action or not.
The present flux in the law can be demonstrated by considering two
decisions which, though beginning with very similar facts, manage to ar-
rive at very different conclusions. In First State Bank, Morton v.
Chesshir,135 Mr. and Mrs. Chesshir assigned a $10,000 certificate of de-
posit as security for a loan to their son, though they claimed the assign-
ment was limited to $4,000. After the son defaulted and the bank cashed
the entire CD, the Chesshirs sued, claiming DTPA consumer status "on
the theory that their purchasing of the certificate of deposit was a
purchase of services from the bank."'1 36 The Amarillo appeals court de-
clined to hold the bank liable, noting that "[t]he Chesshirs do not contend
that they sought or acquired, or that the bank provided, any other service
in the transaction.' '1 37
In the second case, First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Ritenour,138
Mr. Ritenour asked First Federal to place a "hold" on a jointly-held cer-
tificate of deposit (CD) so that his wife could not withdraw funds without
his approval. After Mrs. Ritenour managed to withdraw some money,
Mr. Ritenour sued, claiming that First Federal misrepresented its services,
i.e., that the "hold" would protect the money. The Corpus Christi ap-
peals court acknowledged that the CD, like the loan in Riverside or the
CD in Chesshir, was neither a good nor a service. Mr. Ritenour, how-
ever, presented evidence that "First Federal offer[ed] a broad range of
services to the public, paid for out of profits made from depositors.' 39
The court acknowledged that Mr. Ritenour paid no fee for the specific
advice or for the "hold," but reasoned that "the need for such services...
was contemplated by First Federal by instituting a customer service de-
partment" and that the service became available to Mr. Ritenour when
he purchased the certificate of deposit. 40 It is difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that the only real difference between the two cases is the way the
pleadings were phrased.' 41 If Ritenour is correct, then indeed "[t]he
134. Carene Smith Swanson, Note, Riverside National Bank v. Lewis: Borrower Seek-
ing Extension of Credit Excluded from Protection of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
21 S. TEX. L.J. 303, 309 (1981),
135. 613 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 634
S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1981).
136. Id. at 62.
137. Id. at n.3.
138. 704 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
139. Id. at 899.
140. Id.
141. Accord Marziotti & Couch, supra note 18, at 36. The Chesshirs certainly could
have made the argument that the bank's agreement to cash in only a portion of their CD
in the event of their son's default was a "service," just as the bank's agreement to prevent
Mrs. Ritenour from withdrawing any part of the Ritenours' CD later was held to be a
service by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals. The Ritenour court, in fact, distinguished
its holding from Chesshir on only one ground. After citing the observation in Chesshir that
"the Chesshirs do not contend that they sought or acquired, or that the bank provided, any
other services in the transaction," Ritenour, 704 S.W.2d at 899 (citing Chesshir, 613 S.W.2d
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range of possibilities [for DTPA recovery] is limited only by the skill of
attorneys who can artfully frame the transaction through pleading and
proof."'1 42 This does not, however, sound like a very rational way to run a
legal system.
2. The Inexplicably Inconsistent "Inextricably Intertwined" Standard
Borrowers' attempts to hold their lenders liable under the Texas DTPA
on a "collateral services" theory have not been the only-or even the
principal-avenue of attack on the Riverside doctrine. Since Riverside,
on at least a half-dozen occasions, the Texas Supreme Court has tried to
explain, expand upon or limit what now is known as the "inextricably
intertwined" doctrine. The difficulty of the issue is apparent from the
sheer number and procedural convolution of the cases. In the three years
immediately following the doctrine's modest debut in Knight v. Interna-
tional Harvester Credit Corporation,143 the Texas Supreme Court issued
four decisions on the subject. Of these decisions, one generated two
opinions in the court of appeals, 144 one produced two opinions in the
Texas Supreme Court,145 and one racked up a total of four opinions, two
in the court of appeals and two more in the supreme court. 146 The lan-
guage of these decisions sometimes is vague, confusing, or inconsistent
with other decisions. Nonetheless, since this dubious line of authority
represents virtually all the Texas Supreme Court's post-Riverside DTPA
jurisprudence, the cases must be studied closely for what little light they
can shed upon the subject.
a. A Doctrine is Born: Knight v. International Harvester
If the adage that "bad facts make bad law" has a corollary, it might be
that confusing facts ultimately make confused law. Knight v. Interna-
tional Harvester,47 the first major "lender" decision on the DTPA issued
by the Texas Supreme Court after Riverside, truly is a confusing case,
made worse because the facts were undisputed 48 and therefore are not
fully set out in the opinion.' 49 James Knight bought a used International
at 62 n.3), the Ritenour court concluded: "This is precisely what appellee contends in the
case before us." Id.
142. Krahmer, supra note 14, at 14.
143. 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982).
144. See Longview Bank & Trust Co. v. Flenniken, Slip Op. No. 1472 (Tex. App.-
Tyler, Sept. 30, 1982), withdrawn, 642 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982), rev'd, 661
S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983).
145. See Kish v. Van Note, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 525, 531 (July 18, 1984), withdrawn, 692
S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1985).
146. See Dickinson State Bank v. Ogden, 624 S.W.2d 214, 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1981) (withdrawing original opinion on rehearing), rev'd, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
195, 200 (Jan. 26, 1983), withdrawn, 662 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1983).
147. 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982).
148. Knight v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 613 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982).
149. To some extent, the discussion of facts that follows draws on background given in
the briefs of the parties.
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Harvester dump truck on credit. Some time later, he brought a class ac-
tion suit, based on supposedly prohibited provisions in the installment
sales contract. After suit was filed, but before trial, the chapter of the
Texas Consumer Credit Code upon which some of Knight's complaints
were based was repealed by the Texas Legislature. The principal ques-
tion on appeal was whether repeal of the statute extinguished Knight's
related claims. The Texas Supreme Court held that it did. 150
The DTPA question arose from Knight's sole surviving claim, that the
installment sales contract contained a DTPA-prohibited waiver provi-
sion.' 5 ' The Texas Supreme Court held that the waiver provision was not
permitted and that inclusion of the waiver in the installment sales con-
tract was a DTPA violation.152 The seller of the dump truck, Etex Inter-
national, certainly was liable. The critical question for later DTPA
litigation was whether International Harvester Credit Corporation also
was liable.
It is extremely important to have a clear understanding of the peculiar
nature of the transaction at issue in Knight. Knight signed an installment
sales contract with Etex; International Harvester Credit Corporation was
a simultaneous assignee of the contract. Thus, International Harvester
was not a pure lender in the transaction; to the contrary, Texas law care-
fully distinguishes between installment sales and loans.' 5 3 International
Harvester admitted that it drafted the Etex installment sales contract; the
contract contained International Harvester's logo and the assignment was
accomplished through a preprinted provision on the back of the con-
tract.' 54 The cumulation of these "realities of the transaction" meant, to
the Texas Supreme Court, that International Harvester and Etex "were
so inextricably intertwined in the transaction as to be equally responsible
for the conduct of the sale.' 55
The Texas Supreme Court gave no hint as to the origin of the "inextri-
cably intertwined" language in Knight, by citation or otherwise. 56 It cer-
150. Knight, 627 S.W.2d at 385.
151. This writer respectfully disagrees with another commentator's statement that "the
basis of the complaint [in Knight] rested on the actions of the defendant lender in the
transaction," McCormick, infra note 253, at 730, at least if the statement is meant to refer
to International Harvester's actions as a lender.
152. Knight, 627 S.W.2d at 386.
153. The statute at issue in Knight, for example, specifically states: "None of the provi-
sions of this Chapter shall affect or apply to any loans or to the business of making loans
under or in accordance with the laws of this State, nor shall any of the provisions of the
loan or interest statutes of this State affect or apply to any retail installment transaction."
TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.09 (Vernon 1987). The distinction between loans
and installment sales also is critical in other areas of DTPA analysis. See infra notes 383-90
and accompanying text.
154. Knight, 627 S.W.2d at 389.
155. Id.
156. In a later case, even the Texas Supreme Court seemed to have some uncertainty
regarding the phrase's derivation, commenting only that it "finds its recent origin in con-
nection with the DTPA" in Knight. Qantel Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Custom Controls Co., 761
S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1988).
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tainly does not derive from the statute or prior DTPA case law.' 57 The
words "inextricably intertwined" apparently were first used in a brief sub-
mitted by Knight's counsel 158 and were later picked up by the court. So
far as the attorney who drafted the brief can recall, the language was just
a nice-sounding phrase, not consciously drawn from any particular
source. 159 Indeed, the phrase "inextricably intertwined" is a favorite of
legal writers. A recent computer check of reported decisions reveals that
on any working day, an average of one appellate judge somewhere in the
United States is writing the words "inextricably intertwined" into a deci-
sion, on subjects as varied as criminal evidence, 16° federal jurisdiction, 161
or admiralty. 162
Unfortunately, the fact that the Texas Supreme Court apparently
plucked a felicitous phrase of flexible meaning from the legal aether and
plugged it into the Knight opinion may well have served to obscure the
court's intended rationale. In point of fact, International Harvester's
DTPA liability could have been predicated upon the simple fact that, as
assignee of an installment sales contract, it took the contract subject to
Knight's defenses. Although the Texas Supreme Court did not explicitly
discuss the limitations on "holder in due course" status imposed by Chap-
ter 7 of the Consumer Credit Code,163 the opinion does note the limita-
tions of "holder" status generally. 164 Alternatively, International
Harvester could have been held liable because it drafted the offending
waiver provision.165
The court's opinion, regrettably, did not explain matters so clearly. In-
stead, the Texas Supreme Court distinguished Riverside on the basis that
the Riverside borrower "sought only the extension of credit from River-
157. Accord Gall & Bowen, supra note 11, at 0-5.
158. See Post-Submission Brief of James Knight at 12, Knight v. Int'l Harvester Credit
Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982).
159. Interview with Ms. Franci Beck (May 13, 1991). Ms. Beck, a relatively recent law
graduate at the time Knight was decided, is now with the Susman, Godfrey firm in Hous-
ton, Texas.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985).
161. See, e.g., Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 299 (7th Cir. 1991).
162. See, e.g., Bunet v. Boh Bros. Constr. Corp., 715 S.W.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1983).
163. The operative events in Knight, and the filing of the suit, took place in 1978. See
Knight, 627 S.W.2d at 384. Section 7.08, until its repeal in 1979, provided in part:
No right of action or defense of a buyer arising out of a retail installment sale
which would be cut off by negotiation, shall be cut off by negotiation of the
contract to any third party unless such holder acquires the contract in good
faith and for value and gives notice of the negotiation to the buyer as pro-
vided in this Article, and within thirty days of the mailing of such notice
receives no written notice of any facts giving rise to any claim or defense of
the buyer.
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.08(4) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994), Act of Jan. 1,
1968, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 274, § 2, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 655, repealed by Act of Aug. 27,
1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 672, § 48, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1556, 1594.
164. Knight, 627 S.W.2d at 387.
165. Accord Gall & Bowen, supra note 11, at 0-5 (stating that "[i]t is, frankly, difficult
to reconcile Qantel and Knight, unless the fact that International Harvester Credit Corp.
provided the forms itself which violated the DTPA explains the Knight decision").
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side Bank, and nothing more."'166 To the Knight court, "[t]he present
case is different. Knight's objective in the transaction was the purchase of
a dump truck."'1 67 The court added:
In Riverside, the bank had nothing to do with the sale of the vehicle,
which had taken place months before the refinancing was ever at-
tempted. In our case, however, there was a single transaction-the
sale of a truck on an installment basis. The alleged DTPA violations
arose out of this transaction. Knight was a "consumer" as to all par-
ties who sought to enjoy the benefits of that sale.168
To a good number of later courts and commentators, the quoted language
has come to mean that whenever loan proceeds are used to buy a good or
service, the lender automatically is subject to possible DTPA liability. 169
The fallacy of that position will be discussed later.
170
b. The Doctrine Expands: Flenniken
The next Texas Supreme Court decision' 7 ' on the subject after Knight,
and another major contributing cause of most present-day confusion, was
Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co.172 The Flennikens entered into
a standard construction contract with their homebuilder: They signed a
mechanic's lien contract and deed of trust to the builder, who then as-
signed the note and lien to Longview Bank & Trust in return for interim
construction financing. 173 The tie-in between the transactions was
demonstrated, as is common in such transactions, by the fact that the
Flennikens' deed of trust to the builder named a Longview Bank & Trust
vice-president as substitute trustee. 174
The contractor, who abandoned the project, was convicted of misap-
propriating construction funds and sentenced to five years in prison.
175
After negotiations with the Flennikens failed, the bank foreclosed on the
property and sold it to another contractor. 176 The Flennikens then sued
the bank, claiming that the foreclosure was wrongful, and that the bank
should be held liable under the DTPA because the foreclosure was an
"unconscionable action" under the DTPA. 177 After one false start, the
Tyler Court of Appeals set aside a jury verdict favoring the Flennikens,
166. Knight, 627 S.W.2d at 389 (emphasis added).
167. Id. (court's emphasis).
168. Id.
169. See infra, e.g., notes 622 and 623.
170. See infra discussion at notes 617-649 and accompanying text.
171. Chronologically, the withdrawn opinion in Ogden v. Dickinson State Bank, 26 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 200 (Tex. 1983), opinion withdrawn and new opinion substituted, 662 S.W.2d 330
(Tex. 1983), came before Flenniken.
172. 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983).
173. Id. at 706.
174. Id.
175. Longview Bank & Trust Co. v. Flenniken, 642 S.W.2d 568, 569-70 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1982), rev'd, 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983).
176. Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Rust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1983).
177. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon 1987).
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reasoning that the Flennikens did not qualify as DTPA consumers. 178
The two court of appeals opinions reflect the fluid state of the law. The
initial opinion noted that neither party had briefed the just-issued deci-
sion in Knight;179 the revised opinion was bolstered by extensive discus-
sion of another recent Texas Supreme Court decision.' 80
The court of appeals recognized that the principal problem lay in decid-
ing between the general rule of non-liability set out in Riverside and the
Knight exception for loans "inextricably intertwined" with a consumer
transaction. The appeals court resolved the question in favor of the bank.
While acknowledging that the Flennikens qualified as consumers, the
court viewed the assignment of the Flennikens' construction contract to
the bank as "another transaction,"'181 separate from the original construc-
tion contract. In Knight, the appeals court reasoned, the sales contract
bore International Harvester Credit Corporation's logo and a preprinted
assignment form, presumably also drafted by IHCC.182 Thus, the Knight
credit sale "was not severable but was a single transaction.' 118 3
Four members of the Texas Supreme Court agreed with the Tyler Court
of Appeals and, in fact, adopted the lower court's opinion as their dis-
sent. 18 The majority of the court felt otherwise. In an opinion heavily
laced with italics for emphasis, the supreme court criticized the Tyler
panel for "erroneously suggest[ing] that the Flennikens were required to
seek or acquire goods or services from the Bank in order to meet the
statutory definition of consumer."'1 85 The court unequivocally rejected
the "two transaction" analysis, in language that has often been quoted
since:
From the Flennikens' perspective, there was only one transaction:
the purchase of a house. The financing scheme [the contractor] ar-
ranged with the Bank was merely his means of making a sale. The
Bank's unconscionable act in causing the sale of the Flennikens'
property and the partially built house arose out of the Flennikens'
transaction with [the contractor]. The Flennikens, therefore, were
consumers as to all parties who sought to enjoy the benefits of that
transaction, including the Bank.186
The Texas Supreme Court went to great pains to review the qualifying
language in Riverside that permitted it to reach this result without doing
178. Flenniken, 642 S.W.2d at 571.
179. Longview Bank & Trust Co. v. Flenniken, Slip Op. No. 1472 (Tex. App.-'yler,
Sept. 30, 1982), withdrawn, 642 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982), rev'd, 661 S.W.2d 705
(Tex. 1983).
180. The principal difference between the two court of appeals decisions in Flenniken is
the addition of the discussion of Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.
1981), in the later opinion. See Flenniken, 642 S.W.2d at 570.
181. Flenniken, 642 S.W.2d at 571.
182. Id. at 570-71; see Knight, 627 S.W.2d at 389.
183. Flenniken, 642 S.W.2d at 571.
184. Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d at 708 (Pope, C.J., dissenting).




violence to the earlier holding. In Riverside "the sole basis"'187 of the con-
sumer's DTPA claim was the bank's failure to lend. The consumer
"sought only to borrow money in an attempt to avoid repossession of his
car."'1 88 There was "nothing else for which he paid or which he sought to
acquire,"' 89 he "sought nothing else"'190 and the "sole complaint about the
transaction concerned the Bank's failure to make him the loan."' 9'
With all this use of emphasis and repeated reference to Riverside, one
might think that the issue was settled, albeit by a bare majority of the
court. One problem, however, is that the Texas Supreme Court made no
reference in Flenniken to Thompson v. First Austin Co.,' 92 the "shadow
case" to Riverside that is factually far closer in point to Flenniken than the
Riverside decision itself.'9 3 In Thompson, like Flenniken, a home mort-
gage was in question. 94 In Thompson, like Flenniken, the lender's deci-
sion to foreclose was the supposedly wrongful act. 195 In Thompson,
however, the Texas Supreme Court implicitly approved a holding that the
bank's "services" surrounding foreclosure did not give rise to a DTPA
cause of action, a decision that certainly is not at all easy to reconcile with
Flenniken.'96
c. The Doctrine Disintegrates: "Clarifying" Flenniken in the Case
Law
The difficulty in reconciling Flenniken with Thompson, however, pales
to insignificance when compared to the problems one encounters in try-
ing to square Flenniken with Ogden v. Dickinson State Bank.197 In a
sense, Ogden is the bread and Flenniken the meat of a legal sandwich:
Ogden generated two five-to-four opinions from the Texas Supreme
Court; one was released five months before Flenniken 98 and a new one
issued three months after.199
The facts in Ogden also form a striking parallel to those in Flenniken; in
fact, the Flennikens claimed Texas Supreme Court jurisdiction on "con-
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 173).
189. Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d at 708 (citing Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 173).
190. Id. (citing Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 174).
191. Id. (citing Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175).
192. 572 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
193. This decision is discussed in more detail supra at notes 111-18 and accompanying
text.
194. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
195. See Thompson, 572 S.W.2d at 81.
196. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
197. 662 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1984).
198. Ogden v. Dickinson State Bank, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 200 (Jan. 26, 1983), withdrawn,
662 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1983).
199. Ogden, 662 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1983).
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flicts" grounds 200 because their case was "on all fours" with Ogden.20 1
Both Ogden and Flenniken involved home construction contracts with as-
signments to lenders.202 Both cases involved defaults by the construction
contractors after partial performance but substantially full payment.
Both involved unsuccessful subsequent negotiations with the homeown-
ers, and both involved claims of wrongdoing in connection with the deci-
sion to foreclose. Yet, in Ogden, unlike Flenniken, the lender ultimately
won.
203
Ogden can be distinguished from Flenniken on atleast one easy basis:
In Ogden, the Texas Supreme Court decided that the bank had the con-
tract right to foreclose on the property;20 4 in Flenniken, the lender for
some reason conceded that the foreclosure was wrongful.20 5 The vehe-
mence of Justice Spears's dissent in Ogden, however, belies any such easy
distinction. Spears's dissenting opinion correctly points out the fact that
the Ogden majority failed even to mention Flenniken, despite the fact
that the facts in Flenniken were "virtually identical" 20 6 to those in Ogden.
The core of the dissenting justices' complaint was summed up in a simple,
but devastating, comparison:
In Flenniken, as here, the homeowners chose a builder to construct
a house for them, and gave him a mechanic's and materialman's lien
contract and a mechanic's lien note. In Flenniken, as here, the
builder assigned the lien contract and note to a bank as security for
interim construction financing. The builder in Flenniken failed to
finish the house, and the bank foreclosed on the buyer's property.
In Flenniken, the jury found that the foreclosure was an uncon-
scionable course of action. Hence, the Flennikens had a claim under
§ 17.50(a)(3) of the DTPA. In the instant case, the jury found that
the bank had attempted to collect the sum of $66,000 plus interest
and attorney's fees when it had no right to do so. Those acts would
be "laundry list" violations under § 17.46(b) of the Act, giving rise to
a cause of action under § 17.50(a)(1). Because a violation of either
provision gives rise to liability under the act, Flenniken and this case
are indistinguishable. Yet the majority says that the Flennikens re-
cover under the DTPA, but the Ogdens do not.20 7
In short, to the dissenting justices, the majority opinion in Ogden "effec-
tively carves out for lenders an exemption that no one else enjoys. 208
200. The Texas Supreme Court is required by statute to assume jurisdiction of an appli-
cation for writ of error in the event of a conflict between two court of appeals decisions.
TEx. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 22.001(a)(2) (Vernon 1988).
201. Application for Writ of Error at 11, Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661
S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983).
202. The facts are summarized well in Ogden, 662 S.W.2d at 331-32.
203. Id. at 333.
204. Id.
205. Longview Bank & Trust Co. v. Flenniken, 642 S.W.2d 568, 570 n.2 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1982), rev'd, 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983).
206. Ogden, 662 S.W.2d at 336 (Spears, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 337 (Spears, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 334.
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In view of the strong language employed in the dissent, it is hard to
believe that Ogden can truly be reconciled with Flenniken on the basis of
any simple factual distinction. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact
that the majority could have amended the Ogden opinion at any time
during the three and one-half months that the case was on rehearing to
mention Flenniken.209 For that matter, the Flenniken opinion also could
have been amended during this time, as the Flenniken rehearing motion
was not overruled until one week before Ogden became final.210 Neither
opinion, however, was reworked or explained.
Close on the heels of Flenniken and Ogden, the Texas Supreme Court
also decided La Sara Grain Co. v. First National Bank of Mercedes,211 a
case that should not have been very significant. La Sara Grain primarily
involved a bank's innocent involvement in an embezzlement scheme,
whereby a dishonest employee of the grain company persuaded the bank
to issue checks and honor withdrawals with less than the required number
of signatures. The Texas Supreme Court held that these actions-which
could be classified as "collateral services"-could subject the bank to
DTPA liability.212
The bank also was persuaded to make a loan in La Sara's name without
proper authorization. The Texas Supreme Court determined that no
DTPA violation had occurred, under the facts of the case. The language
the court used in reaching that modest conclusion, however, has provided
ample ammunition for borrowers suing their lenders ever since. The
court began by discussing Knight and Flenniken in some detail, stating
that the Texas Supreme Court had "twice limited [Riverside] to its facts,
emphasizing that [the borrower] sought only the extension of credit from
Riverside, and nothing more. '21 3 In the course of holding that no DTPA
cause of action was established, the opinion also stated that there was "no
evidence ... that [the dishonest employee] represented to the bank that
the loan was to purchase or lease goods or services, that the bank thought
the loan was for that purpose, or that the loan was one of a series with
which La Sara obtained goods or services."'214 As with similar language
in Flenniken, this language now is relied upon by some courts for the
conclusion that lenders are liable on an "inextricably intertwined" theory
whenever a loan's purpose is the acquisition of goods or services. The
most curious aspect of the La Sara opinion, however, is the fact that it
does not discuss the contrary Ogden holding at all, an omission that one is
tempted to explain by the fact that the La Sara majority opinion was
209. The second, ultimately final, decision in Ogden was issued October 5, 1983; the
rehearing was overruled January 18, 1984. See Ogden, 662 S.W.2d at 330.
210. While the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Flenniken was issued July 6, 1983, the
motion for rehearing was not overruled until January 11, 1984. Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d at
705.
211. 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984).
212. Id. at 564.
213. Id. at 566.
214. Id. at 567.
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written by Justice Franklin Spears, the author of the bitter dissent in
Ogden, and a philosophical foe of lenders.2
15
Kish v. Van Note,216 though not quite as critical a piece in the "inextri-
cably intertwined" judicial jigsaw puzzle, deserves mention. Factually,
the case was quite similar to Flenniken and Ogden, at least if one substi-
tutes a swimming pool for a house as the subject of the controversy. 217
The Kishes contracted for a backyard swimming pool, with bank financ-
ing. The bank paid the contractor in full before the work was ever begun.
The pool cracked, the Kishes stopped paying, and the bank's mortgage
insurer sued.
As in Ogden, the Texas Supreme Court took two runs at an opinion. In
its first opinion, the court decided, among other things, that the bank was
not a holder in due course and should have been held liable under the
DTPA.218 In the second opinion, with no direct explanation, the court
reversed course and held that "[n]either [the mortgage insurance com-
pany] nor the bank violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act."' 219 Both
Kish opinions are unanimous and written by the same author; neither
opinion contains any real explanation of the reasoning, so far as the
DTPA issue is concerned.
Home Savings Association v. Guerra220 shed some light on Kish and cut
back dramatically on the "inextricably intertwined" theory of lender lia-
bility. The facts in Home Savings were very similar to those in Flenniken,
Ogden, and Kish, except that defective rock siding, not a home or pool,
was the culprit. The Guerras signed a ten-year note to pay for the siding,
the contractor assigned the note to Home Savings and, when the siding
later crumbled, the Guerras sued the bank.221 The Home Savings opinion
focused on the fact that the original contract was subject to an FTC rule
subjecting a subsequent holder of the paper to "all claims and defenses
which the debtor could assert against the seller," providing that "recovery
... by the debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereun-
der."'222 Since the Guerras had a DTPA claim against the contractor, the
court permitted them to recover against Home Savings, but limited their
recovery to the amount that they actually had paid under the contract.
223
The court stated that its decision was "in harmony" with Kish,224 thus
intimating that Kish also may have been decided on the same grounds,
215. See infra note 495.
216. 692 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1985).
217. The facts are set out in the supreme court opinion, Kish, 692 S.W.2d at 465.
218. This is implicit in the first opinion's ruling that "[tihe Kishes should ... have been
awarded recovery on all their claims." Kish v. Van Note, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 267, 269 (Feb.
27, 1985), opinion withdrawn, 692 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1985).
219. Kish, 692 S.W.2d at 468.
220. 733 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1987).
221. Id. at 134.
222. Id. at 135 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1976)).
223. Id. at 136.
224. Id. at 137.
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despite the fact that the court in Kish "did not discuss the purpose or
intent of the FTC rule." 225
The Home Savings decision did not, however, reduce the "inextricably
intertwined" rule to equivalency with FTC limitations on the holder in
due course doctrine. The court emphasized the fact that in Home Savings
(and, presumably, Kish) the lender simply had not committed an in-
dependent violation of the DTPA.2 26 There was, to the court, no "deriva-
tive liability" under the DTPA:
Although a consumer suing under the DTPA need not establish con-
tractual privity with the defendant, he must show that the defendant
has committed a deceptive act which is the producing cause of the
consumer's damages.... The DTPA does not attach derivative liabil-
ity to a defendant based on an innocent involvement in a business
transaction.... To hold a creditor liable in a consumer credit transac-
tion, the creditor must be shown to have some connection either with
the actual sales transaction or with a deceptive act related to financing
the transaction.227
At this late point in the legal development of the "inextricably inter-
twined" doctrine, the Texas Supreme Court's relatively clear explanation
in Home Savings, and its interpretation and explanation of prior case law,
came as a breath of fresh air. Curiously, however, while the Texas
Supreme Court cited both Knight and Flenniken for the italicized conclu-
sion just quoted, and went on to explain the Knight holding in some de-
tail, there is no discussion whatever of Flenniken.2 28 In Knight, as the
Home Savings court pointed out, International Harvest Credit Corpora-
tion committed "a deceptive act related to financing the transaction" by
drafting the prohibited waiver provision.229 The issue would be much
less clear in Flenniken, however, where the bank simply was foreclosing
on a lien to collect money it had in fact paid to the contractor. Ulti-
mately, the fact that the Flenniken lender chose to concede the commis-
sion of an unconscionable act,230 possibly for strategic reasons,231 may
have served to obscure the true basis of lender liability-if any there
was-under the DTPA.
Yet another piece was added to the "inextricably intertwined" puzzle
by the Texas Supreme Court in Qantel Business Systems, Inc. v. Custom
Controls Co.2 32 Qantel was not a lender liability suit. Rather, the prob-
225. Home Savings, 733 S.W.2d at 137. The Kish decision prominently reprints the
same FTC provision that is discussed explicitly in Home Savings. Compare Home Savings,
733 S.W.2d at 135 with Kish, 692 S.W.2d at 465.
226. Home Savings, 733 S.W.2d at 136, 137.
227. Id. at 136 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
228. See id. at 136-37.
229. Id. at 136.
230. Flenniken, 642 S.W.2d at 570 n.2.
231. In fairness to the attorneys in Flenniken, it should be remembered that the deci-
sion to concede the commission of an unconscionable act was made at a time when River-
side and Thompson seemed to set out the controlling law. It thus may have made good
sense at the time to focus the appeal on a perceived "sure-fire" winning point of error.
232. 761 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1988).
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lem was a defective computer software package. The seller, Qantel's
sole Texas distributor, supposedly promised to modify a Qantel software
package to meet the buyer's particular needs. 233 The DTPA claim against
Qantel was apparently not based on anything Qantel did, but upon the
close relationship between Qantel and the distributor.
The court of appeals held that there was sufficient evidence of a close
relationship between the seller and Qantel-including common tele-
phone numbers and the appearance of Qantel's logo on the seller's letter-
head-to raise a colorable claim that Qantel was "inextricably
intertwined" with the software sale, by analogy to Knight.234 The Texas
Supreme Court did not agree. The court conceded that "[w]e are aware
that the term 'inextricably intertwined' has been urged as another
method of establishing vicarious liability under the DTPA. ' '235 The court
rejected this notion, however, explaining that the "inextricably inter-
twined" doctrine "is not an additional theory of vicarious liability under
the DTPA.''236 Again, the cases that the Texas Supreme Court chose not
to discuss in its opinion are instructive: Despite the fact that the Texas
Supreme Court chose Qantel as a vehicle to clarify the "inextricably inter-
twined" doctrine, the opinion does not cite, much less discuss, either
Flenniken or La Sara Grain.
The final piece in the puzzle, at least to date, is Colonial Leasing Co. of
New England v. Kinerd,237 a case that the Qantel court knew was in the
appellate pipeline at the time it released Qantel.238 The Kinerd case,
which provides what is still the most recent hint as to the. direction in
which the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine may be evolving,239 in-
volved a "dollar lease" agreement for radiator equipment. Kinerd could
not pay cash to the equipment supplier. Colonial Leasing, therefore,
bought the equipment from the supplier and "leased" it to Kinerd. The
lease was non-cancelable and Kinerd had the option of "buying" the
equipment for one dollar at the end of the lease term. Kinerd was un-
happy with the quality of the equipment, sued Colonial Leasing and the
supplier, and won.
A primary question on appeal was whether Colonial Leasing was act-
ing as a lender, a vendor, a lessor, or as some combination of these. Since
the court of appeals viewed the arrangement as a lease, Colonial Leasing
avoided usury penalties.240 The jury found, however, that the equipment
233. Custom Controls Co. v. MDS Qantel, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 261,262 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1987), rev'd, 761 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1988).
234. Id. at 263-64.
235. Qantel, 761 S.W.2d at 305.
236. Id.
237. 733 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1987), rev'd, 800 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1990).
238. The Kinerd case was cited in both the court of appeals and supreme court opinions
in Qantel. See Custom Controls Co. v. MDS Qantel, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987), rev'd, 761 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1988).
239. The facts appear to have been contested. This article largely draws from the Texas
Supreme Court's opinion, 800 S.W.2d at 188-89.
240. Kinerd, 733 S.W.2d at 672.
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supplier had made misrepresentations about the value of the equipment
and that Colonial Leasing had "acted together with" the supplier.241 This
finding, Kinerd argued, established DTPA liability on the "inextricably
intertwined" theory. The court of appeals did not agree, stating that "the
concept of being 'inextricably intertwined' relates to the standing of a
plaintiff to file suit under the ... [DTPA], not to a defendant's liability
under the Act."'242
Once again, the Texas Supreme Court took two tries to issue a cryptic
opinion.243 The supreme court viewed the transaction as a sale for an
unconscionably high price.2 " In addition, the court determined that Co-
lonial Leasing charged usurious interest in financing the sale.245 Accord-
ingly, Colonial Leasing was liable for treble damages under the DTPA as
a seller, and additional damages under Texas usury law as a lender.
246
Although the final determination was that Colonial Leasing was not an
"inextricably intertwined" case at all, the opinion does offer one tanta-
lizing tidbit of legal advice for lenders. Replying to an argument that
Colonial Leasing should not be subject to DTPA liability because, no
matter what the equipment was really worth, Colonial Leasing only
charged what it actually paid for it (plus interest or a finance charge), the
court stated: "Colonial's argument might have merit if it had acted only
as a lender in this transaction. Colonial, however, also sold the equip-
ment to Kinerd. ' '247
When one compares the painstaking distinctions made by the Kinerd
court between the different roles in which Colonial Leasing acted in the
transaction with the breezy lumping-together that characterizes the ex-
planations for lender liability in Knight and Flenniken, Kinerd does ap-
pear as a ray of hope for lenders. Later in this article, a restrictive
formulation of the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine, based on the de-
velopments leading to Kinerd, will be explored.248 Even at this early
point in the analysis, however, several generalizations can be safely made
about the development of Texas Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
subject. First, while it is popular to view the "inextricably intertwined"
theory of lender liability as inexorably expanding in scope, Texas
Supreme Court cases simply do not bear out this conclusion. The doc-
trine hit its high water mark to date in the 1983 Flenniken opinion. No
matter what the subsequent decisions-Ogden, La Sara Grain, Kish,
Home Savings, Qantel, and Kinerd-might say, no Texas Supreme Court
decision in more than a decade actually has held a lender liable because
241. The jury findings are summarized in the court of appeals opinion. Id. at 672-73.
242. Id.
243. The first, withdrawn, opinion can be found at 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 585 (June 20,
1990). Both opinions are discussed in some detail in Mark S. McQuality & Eliot Shavin,
Creditor and Consumer Rights, 45 Sw. L.J. 245, 245-48 (1991).
244. Kinerd, 800 S.W.2d at 191.
245. Id. at 190.
246. Id. at 192.
247. Id. at 191.
248. See infra discussion at notes 615-49 and accompanying text.
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that lender was "inextricably intertwined" in a consumer transaction.
Second, even the rhetoric of the decisions does not point to an expansion
of the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine. Language in Qante149 and
Kinerd,250 in particular, suggests a contrary conclusion. Third, the Flen-
niken decision itself should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt. Far
from proving that Riverside is "limited ... to its facts,"' 251 it may be Flen-
niken that is limited by its own facts-in particular, the fact that the
lender admitted a DTPA predicate act. Finally, the legal underpinnings
of the doctrine are not at all clear, despite the impressive outpouring of
cases over the past decade. The "inextricably intertwined" doctrine
might be a rule of standing, it might be another way of expressing the
limits of "holder in due course" status, or it might be nothing more than a
catchy phrase that just has not turned into a workable legal doctrine.
D. REPUDIATING RIVERSIDE: LOANS AS "SERVICES"
Both the "collateral services" and "inextricably intertwined" doctrines,
expanded to their logical limits, could leave very little room for operation
of the original Riverside rule. These exceptions to the general rule of
Riverside already have been criticized as reducing the question of "con-
sumer" status for DTPA purposes more to a challenge for artful pleaders
than reasoned legal distinctions.252 Additionally, though, there is senti-
ment for an even more direct assault on Riverside.
In a 1987 Texas Tech Law Review article, Professor John Krahmer ar-
gued that the Texas Supreme Court's rationale in Riverside is fundamen-
tally flawed, that the very existence of financial institutions depends on
rendering "services," and that the service of "financial intermediation"
lies at the core of a typical loan transaction.253 If this reasoning were
accepted by the courts, it would be a practical reversal of Riverside,
though on a ground explicitly left open to future discussion by the River-
side decision. 254
249. 761 S.W.2d at 305 (" 'Inextricably intertwined' is not an additional theory of vicari-
ous liability under the DTPA.").
250. 800 S.W.2d at 191 ("Colonial's argument might have merit if it had acted only as a
lender in this transaction.").
251. La Sara Grain, 673 S.W.2d at 566.
252. See, e.g., Krahmer, supra note 14, at 36 (stating that Riverside's chief current pur-
pose "is to serve as a pleading and proof guide").
253. See generally Krahmer, supra note 14; see also Clyde R. "Skip" McCormick,
Lender Liability and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 22 TEx. TECH L. REV. 719,
742 (noting the "financial intermediation" argument with apparent approval). Professor
Krahmer, who teaches banking law at the Texas Tech Law School, writes the SMU Law
Review's Annual Texas Survey contribution on commercial transaction law, and produces
the Texas Association of Bank Counsel's newsletter, is well above the average commenta-
tor on this subject.
254. The Texas Supreme Court noted in Riverside the argument that services necessar-
ily exist in the lending of money, but dismissed the question as "merely hypothetical" since
the theory had not been supported by evidence at trial. See Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
1995]
SMU LAW REVIEW
To date, judicial acceptance of the "financial intermediation" theory is
limited to one near-miss. In MBank Abilene v. LeMaire,25 5 several plain-
tiffs sued MBank for breach of an oral promise to lend money to their oil
and gas company. While the opinion of the Houston Court of Appeals
(Fourteenth District) is not particularly clear on the point, it appears that
the bank supposedly violated the DTPA by acting unconscionably in ac-
celerating indebtedness, making demands on a promissory note, foreclos-
ing on real estate, misrepresenting the quality of its own services and
disparaging the services offered by other potential lenders, warranting
that it could meet the plaintiffs' financial needs better than other lenders,
and failing to disclose material information regarding its services. 25 6
While denying a DTPA recovery on other grounds, the Houston Court
of Appeals had little difficulty in deciding the threshold issue that the
LeMaire plaintiffs had standing to sue as DTPA "consumers." The rea-
soning is brief and, though not conclusive, suggests that the court en-
dorsed Professor Krahmer's suggestion that DTPA "services" are
inherent in any lending transaction.
MBank says the plaintiffs did not seek or acquire goods or services
by purchase or lease. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.45(4). The
core of this argument is that money is neither a good nor a service;
consequently a pure loan transaction lies outside the DTPA. The
supreme court has indeed so held in Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis,
603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980). This case, however, has been limited to
its facts. Knight v. International Harvester Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382,
388 (Tex. 1982). Subsequent opinions lead to the inescapable conclu-
sion that standing is proper in this case. See La Sara Grain v. First
Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984); Flenniken v.
Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983). "The eco-
nomic realities of the banking relationship, when coupled with the
social policies embodied in the DTPA, mandate that courts turn their
emphasis away from the artificial standing issue and focus on the
merits of the customer's complaint." Krahmer, Lovell & McCor-
mick, Banks and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 18 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1, 44 (1987).257
MBank failed while a motion for rehearing was pending in the court of
appeals, so the decision never became final.258 Moreover, in a subse-
quent decision, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals seems to have retreated
from the LeMaire reasoning. In Central Texas Hardware, Inc. v. First
City, Texas-Bryan, N.A. ,259 the court addressed a claim by a borrower
that the bank breached a loan commitment for, among other things, the
purchase of seasonal inventory. The core of the complaint was that the
bank held up financing while negotiating with the Small Business Admin-
255. No. C14-86-00834-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989) (removed to fed-
eral court while rehearing pending).
256. Id. at 70-74.
257. Id. at 41.
258. See supra note 9.
259. 810 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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istration for a guarantee of a greater percentage of the proposed loan.26 °
The court denied a DTPA recovery, since there was no complaint regard-
ing the quality of inventory that would have been purchased, nor any
complaint about bank services other than those necessarily involved in
processing the loan.261 Even so, still relying on Professor Krahmer's
work, the court refused to assess "groundless suit" attorneys' fees262
against the borrowers. 263
If the "financial intermediation" theory ever were adopted by Texas
courts, it would constitute a practical reversal of Riverside and would
render both the "collateral service" and "inextricably intertwined" doc-
trines unnecessary. Indeed, this simplification of doctrine is among the
chief benefits urged by its supporters.264 In an area as convoluted and
incoherent as the application of the DTPA to lenders, simplicity may well
be seen as a worthy goal in itself, particularly if a reader has just finished
wading through the tortuous history of the "inextricably intertwined"
doctrine. No matter whether one believes that the Texas Legislature in-
tended to include or exclude lenders when it enacted the DTPA, most
anyone would agree that the lawmakers never intended the fine distinc-
tions in meaning now being made by some courts in applying the "collat-
eral services" and "inextricably intertwined" doctrines. While the
"financial intermediation" theory has at least the virtue of providing a
clear answer to the question, a far better approach might be to devote
some effort to discerning the Texas Legislature's real intent. That task
will now be attempted.
III. EXPLORING LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Perhaps the strangest aspect of DTPA doctrine, so far as its application
to lenders is concerned, is the almost complete lack of attention given by
courts to basic questions of statutory construction. If one did not know
better, a review of recent case law might lead one to conclude that the
"Riverside rule" is a common law doctrine fallen upon hard times. The
words of the Riverside decision, the exceptions, and the variations in
phrasing of the tests that have been developed in lines of cases since Riv-
erside are more typical of a common law rule in the process of redefini-
tion than the construction of a much-amended statute.
Yet the Texas DTPA is a statute, and a statute rich in clues to the legis-
lature's intent in enacting and, on several occasions, amending the act.
260. Id. at 236.
261. Id. at 236-37.
262. Under the current version of the DTPA, a successful defendant can recover court
costs and attorneys' fees on a finding that the DTPA claim was "groundless and brought in
bad faith, or brought for the purpose of harassment." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.50(c)
(Vernon 1987).
263. Central Texas Hardware, 810 S.W.2d at 237-38.
264. See, e.g., Krahmer, supra note 14, at 44 (stating, in support of this approach, that
requiring bank customers to engage in pleading maneuvers to assert a DTPA cause of
action is "a wasteful practice").
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The Texas DTPA also contains specific statutory guidance on how it
should be read, and it is surrounded by other statutes shedding considera-
ble light on the place of the DTPA in the universe of Texas consumer
protection laws. This section will explore the legislative history265 of the
statute, amendments to the statute, and relevant provisions in similar leg-
islation. Analogous decisions from other jurisdictions also will be ex-
amined, as the DTPA suggests. The conclusion, and it is a relatively clear
conclusion, is that the Texas Legislature never meant the DTPA to apply
to lending transactions.
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT OF THE DTPA: THE
ORIGINAL ENACTMENT
Any attempt to reconstruct the legislative history of the DTPA more
than two decades after the event is fraught with difficulty. 266 The fact
that the DTPA was enacted in 1973, however, is very helpful. Beginning
with the 1973 legislative session, tape recordings of floor debate and com-
265. The DTPA was enacted as a new chapter in the Texas Business and Commerce
Code. Consequently, the Texas Code Construction Act, TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§§ 311.001-.032 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1994), serves as a guide to .statutory construction.
The Code Construction Act permits a court to consider the legislative history of a statute
"whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its face." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 311.023(3) (Vernon 1988). Therefore, in at least one case, the Texas Supreme Court has
properly resorted to close analysis of the legislative history to explain aspects of the DTPA.
See, e.g., Big H Auto Auction, Inc. v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984).
This rule under the Code Construction Act stands in sharp contrast to the older Texas
rule that legislative history should control only when the words of the statute are unclear
or ambiguous. Old Article 10 of the Revised Civil Statutes, codified as Chapter 312 of the
Texas Government Code, sets out rules for the general construction of statutes. Courts are
instructed to "diligently attempt to ascertain legislative intent." TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.
§ 312.005 (Vernon 1988). Judicial decisions, however, have stated that when the language
of a statute is "plain and clear," no aids in statutory construction are necessary. Salazar v.
State, 169 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943); see also, eg., Robinson v. Steak and Ale
No. 105 Club, 607 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ) (stating that
extrinsic aids are not necessary "when the legislative intent is clearly expressed").
266. Speaking before a senate joint committee hearing in 1988, Karen Neeley (then
general counsel of the Texas Bankers Association, now general counsel of the Independent
Bankers Association of Texas) commented:
My purpose this morning is to discuss, to some extent, some of the historical
background on the intent portion of the DTPA. As I was getting ready for
this particular hearing, I was reminded of one of my grandmother's favorite
anecdotes. She was an English teacher until she was 71 and could quote
reams of different stories and poetry. One that she particularly liked con-
cerned one of the English poets. One of his readers came to him and said
"What did you mean when you wrote this particular poem?" He turned to
her and he said, "Madam, when I wrote that poem, only God and I knew.
Now only God knows." I have a funny feeling that this may be the ultimate
conclusion that we have with regard to the original intent with regard to the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
Interim Hearings before the Joint Comm. on the Deceptive Trade Practices Act 2, 70th Leg.
(Aug. 12, 1988) (tape available from Senate Staff Services Office; transcript on file at the
Texas Bankers Association, Austin).
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mittee hearings,267 as well as bill records,268 have been available to the
general public. In light of the fact that there were about twenty hours of
committee hearings and floor debate before the DTPA was enacted,269
one might expect that the statute's legislative history could offer a rich
lode of information on legislative intent. Nonetheless, neither the parties
nor the Texas Supreme Court in Riverside seem to have considered these
sources of legislative intent.
The legislative history materials available on the 1973 enactment of the
DTPA are instructive; in fact, they demonstrate almost conclusively that
the legislature meant to exclude lenders from the DTPA's reach, thus val-
idating the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Riverside. Before examin-
ing the bill record in detail, however, it is useful to give a little context for
the debate. As already mentioned,270 the DTPA did not simply spring
into existence in 1973. While some aspects of the bill were new to Texas
law,271 many features of the DTPA carry through from old Chapter 10 of
the Consumer Credit Code, specifically repealed in the process of the
DTPA's enactment. 272 Most of the Consumer Credit Code, as the title
suggests, applies specifically to credit sales. Chapter 10, which before
1973 was virtually the only piece of Texas consumer legislation directed
against deceptive trade practices, 273 prohibited generally "[f]alse, mis-
leading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce."
274
Justice Campbell's dissenting opinion in Riverside placed heavy empha-
sis on the fact that the DTPA originated in the Consumer Credit Code.
His observations deserve to be quoted at length, although this writer dis-
agrees with the correctness of the conclusion:
It is undisputed that the deceptive trade practices provisions of the
Consumer Credit Code applied to lenders before 1973 and there is
no language in the Code indicating that the amendment and move-
ment of those provisions to the Business and Commerce Code in any
way changed that result. Similarly, the DTPA as amended in 1973
and as it now exists, makes no mention of an exclusion for lenders.
This lack of specific language of exclusion takes on added signifi-
267. See KARL T. GRUBEN & JAMES E. HAMBLETON, EDS., A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
TEXAS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY 23 (2d ed. 1987).
268. Id.; see also LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY, COMPILING TEXAS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY (undated and unnumbered pamphlet).
269. John L. Hill, Foreword to the First Edition, BRAGG, supra note 94, at iii.
270. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
271. Some portions of the DTPA were drawn from a California statute. This is dis-
cussed in some detail infra at notes 449-58 and accompanying text.
272. Act of May 10, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 342.
273. See David F. Bragg, Comment, Caveat Vendor: The Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices and Consumer Protection Act, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 425, 426 (1973).
274. Art. 5069-10.02(a); Act of May 29, 1969, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 452, § 1, 1969 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1504, 1505, repealed by Act of May 10, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 1, 1973
Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 342. The language was incorporated verbatim into the 1973 version of
the DTPA. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon 1987).
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cance in view of Section 17.49 which provides for exemptions from
the Act without mentioning lenders.2 75
It may well be true that, prior to 1973, Chapter 10 of the Consumer
Credit Code theoretically applied to lenders. Unfortunately, it is hard to
tell one way or another. Before enactment of the DTPA, the Consumer
Credit Commissioner's office had been criticized for "languid enforce-
ment of the Code,' 276 caused by "insensibility to the consumer, coupled
with compassion for the lending industry. '2 77 While the author knows of
no record of enforcement of Chapter 10 against lenders, the general pro-
hibition against "false, misleading or deceptive acts, or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce" is arguably broad enough to include
lending transactions.2 78 On the other hand, the Texas Legislature simply
may have included the original Deceptive Trade Practices Act within the
Consumer Credit Code because many, perhaps most, consumer goods are
bought on credit.2 79
None of this speculation, however, would establish that the Texas Leg-
islature meant to create a private cause of action for "consumers" in lend-
ing transactions. The fact that the DTPA was excised from the Consumer
Credit Code and placed in a different statute, under different enforce-
ment authority, would argue for precisely the opposite conclusion. It
hardly would be rational for the Texas Legislature to set up two simulta-
275. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 178 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
276. Lloyd Doggett (project coordinator) et al., Comment, Consumer Credit Regulation
in Texas-The Case for the Consumer, 49 TEX. L. REv. 1011, 1075 (1971).
277. Id.
278. As discussed earlier, see supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text, Justice Camp-
bell's dissenting opinion in Riverside argues that the "trade or commerce" provision car-
ried over into the DTPA "includes loan transactions." Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 177-78.
This provision, however, applies only to enforcement actions by the Attorney General's
office, and not to private consumer actions. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.46(a), 17.50(a)(1) (Vernon 1987). The "trade or commerce" provision would also be
subject to the legislative proviso that courts should be guided "to the extent possible" by
the interpretations given to Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act.
See id. § 17.46(c)(1). This section of the FTC Act specifically excludes banking, although
the full story is somewhat more complicated. See infra notes 462-71 and accompanying
text.
The pre-1973 act generally prohibited "false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce," which certainly could include lending practices. In
1969, however, Article 5069-10.02 was amended to instruct courts interpreting the scope of
the Texas act's prohibitions to be guided by interpretations of the FTC Act. [Acts of 1969,
61st Leg., p. 1504, ch. 452, § 1]. As the dissent notes, albeit in discussion of a somewhat
different argument, the FTC Act expressly denies to the FTC any authority to regulate
national banks. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6); see Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 179 (Campbell, J., dis-
senting). This certainly would seem to indicate some legislative intent that lending transac-
tions not be included within the pre-1973 act's scope. See also infra note 441 and
accompanying text.
One observer, surveying state deceptive trade practices law, concludes that "[c]ourts
have had little trouble in finding that banking and credit activities are included within the
'scope of trade and commerce.'" James R. Cox, State Consumer Protection or Deceptive
Trade Practices Statutes: Their Application to Extensions of Credit and Other Banking Ac-
tivities, 105 BANKING L.J. 214, 215 (1988).
279. In the early 1970s, for example, it was estimated that 53% of all auto purchases
and 60% of department store sales were made on credit. Doggett, supra note 276, at 1013-
14.
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neous avenues for administrative policing of small loans, i.e., through the
Office of the Consumer Credit Commissioner under the Consumer
Credit Code 280 and through the Texas Attorney General's Antitrust and
Consumer Protection Office under the DTPA. 281 Yet this result would
occur if loan transactions were intended by the legislature to be included
within the DTPA.
The DTPA's legislative history is clear on the subject of whether loans
were meant to be included. Surprisingly, at least to those who know
something of the Texas Legislature, the issue of whether loans were to be
included within the DTPA was a question to which the legislature gave
some conscious consideration. During house hearings, for example, At-
torney General John Hill-acknowledged by the bill's sponsor to be the
real drafter282-could have laid the entire issue to rest in one exchange:
REP. ALLRED: Would this bill cover things such as small loan
companies where a person feels aggrieved or anything of that
nature?
ATTrORNEY GENERAL HILL: I'm going to defer on that to Joe
[Longley] 283 and Liz [Levatino] 284 if you don't mind, David, because
that's been greatly discussed in recent conferences, and I'm frankly
not clear on where we are. If you don't mind, I'm going to ask that
you re-ask that later.285
Unfortunately, the question was not re-asked. Fortunately, the answer to
Representative Allred's question is apparent from the legislative record.
The version of the DTPA that ultimately passed into law was not the
version originally introduced. Rather, it was a committee substitute. 286
As enacted, the DTPA provides a cause of action for consumers in four
enumerated instances: a violation of the "laundry list," breach of war-
ranty, unconscionable actions, or violations of Article 21.21 of the Texas
280. Act of May 26, 1971, 62d Leg., R.S., ch. 739, § 1, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 2379, 2380,
amended by Act of May 8, 1979, 65th Leg., R.S., § 1, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1501, 1503 (Art.
5069-2.02(4)).
281. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(8) (Vernon 1987).
282. Representative Carl Parker began committee hearings on the DTPA by stating:
"Let me confess that I have no pride of authorship in this bill; I am proud to be the House
sponsor, however. It was drafted in the Attorney General's office and has been nurtured
under their care and feeding over there." The Texas Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer
Protection Act: Hearings on Tex. H.B. 417 Before the House Comm. on Bus. & Indus., 63d
Leg. 1 (Feb. 27, 1973) [hereinafter DTPA House Hearings].
283. Joe Longley, now a plaintiffs' attorney in Austin, has maintained a continuing in-
terest in the DTPA. He is a principal author of BRAGG, supra note 94. His view of the
scope and purposes of the DTPA is, to put it mildly, expansive. In 1989, commenting on
criticisms of the breadth of the DTPA, Mr. Longley reportedly stated: "The only business-
men who have anything to fear from the DTPA are liars, cheats and thieves." Diane
Burch, Lobbyists Flock to DTPA Fight, TEX. LAW., Jan. 30, 1989, at 14, col. 1.
284. Ms. Levatino, now Elizabeth Lacey, is a justice of the Virginia Supreme Court.
When interviewed by telephone several years ago, she had no independent recollection of
the disposition of financial institution liability in negotiations surrounding enactment of the
Texas DTPA.
285. Burch, supra note 283, at 23.




Insurance Code.287 An analog provision of the superseded bill contained
substantially similar language for the first three enumerated instances,288
but contained no private cause of action for violations of the Insurance
Code.
The early bill did, however, have a fourth category, which did not sur-
vive committee action. Under the original version of the DTPA bill, a
consumer could maintain a private cause of action for "a failure by any
person to comply with the provisions of Chapter 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7" of the
Consumer Credit Code.289 Had this provision survived to final enact-
ment, consumers clearly would have had a private cause of action against
lenders: Chapter 3 of the Consumer Credit Code deals with small
loans, 290 Chapter 4 regulates installment loans,291 and Chapter 5 covers
secondary mortgage loans.292 Since the original bill also contained a rela-
tively restrictive definition of consumer,293 the inclusion of Chapters 3
through 5 of the Consumer Credit Code would have pretty well run the
gamut of "consumer" loans potentially subject to the DTPA.
The deletion of this provision from the original bill was deliberate; it
was mentioned specifically by the bill's sponsor at the beginning of House
committee hearings.294 While the exact reasons for this shift in philoso-
phy are not readily apparent from the legislative record, deletion of con-
sumer loans from the DTPA's umbrella would be in line with the Senate
Interim Study Committee's earlier observation that "there is a definite
distinction between deceptive acts and practices and regulation of
credit. 295 It is perhaps worth mentioning that the vice-chair of that com-
287. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987).
288. The language of the relevant section of the superseded bill is as follows:
Sec. 17.52. RELIEF FOR CONSUMERS. (a) A consumer may maintain
an action if he has been adversely affected by any of the following:
(1) the use or employment by any person of an act or practice declared to
be unlawful by Section 17.46 of this subchapter or regulations issued under
this subchapter;
(2) a failure by any person to comply with an express or implied warranty;
(3) any unconscionable action or cause [sic] of action by any person; or
(4) a failure by any person to comply with the provisions of Chapter 2, 3,
4, 5, or 7, Title 79, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended (Arti-
cles 5069-2.01 et seq., Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), or the rules or regula-
tions promulgated under these chapters.
Tex. H.B. 417, 63d Leg. (1973) (superseded bill found as first item in Texas Legislative
Reference Library's microfilm file on H.B. 417).
289. Id.
290. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.01 (Vernon 1987).
291. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-4.01-.04 (Vernon 1987).
292. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-5.01-.05 (Vernon 1987).
293. "Consumer" was defined in the original bill as "an individual who seeks or ac-
quires by purchase or lease, any goods or services for persona family, or household pur-
poses." Tex. H.B. 417, 63d Leg. (1973) (§ 17.45(4); emphasis added).
294. DTPA House Hearings, supra note 282, at 5.
295. CONSUMER PROTEcriON: REPORT OF THE SENATE INTERIM COMMITTEE TO THE
62D LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 39 (1971).
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mittee-State Senator Jack Hightower-now is a member of the Texas
Supreme Court.296
It also appears from records of the debate that the decision to exclude
loans from the DTPA's ambit was intended to accomplish more than just
a prohibition on a private cause of action. Extensive discussion of the
division of regulatory responsibilities makes it clear that the Attorney
General's office was never meant to have enforcement powers against
lenders through the DTPA.297 A colloquy that occurred during Senate
debate is instructive on the intended regulatory effect of the DTPA, as
well as the act's application to lenders in general. The question was
whether the Attorney General, or the Antitrust and Consumer Protec-
tion Division of the Attorney General's office, should be designated to
296. The composition of the Texas Supreme Court presents a strange problem for those
interested in arguing legislative intent, to wit: Two current and two former members of the
Texas Supreme Court were involved in the original enactment of the DTPA. As president
of the Texas Consumer Association, former Justice Lloyd Doggett helped draft the DTPA.
John L. Hill, Introduction, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 612 (1977). Justice (then Senator) Jack
Hightower was vice-chair of the Senate Interim Committee on Consumer Protection. TEX.
SENATE INTERIM COMM. ON CONSUMER PROTECTION MINUTES 2, 61st Leg. (Nov. 21,
1969). Former Justice (then Senator) Oscar Mauzy was the DTPA's Senate floor sponsor.
Hill, supra, at 612. Justice (then Senator) Bob Gammage was present during Senate floor
debate. Debate on Tex. S.B. 45 on the Floor of the Senate, 63d Leg. 6 (Apr. 13, 1973)
(transcript available from Senate Staff Services Office).
In theory, whether some members of the court who were involved in the DTPA's pas-
sage should be of no real importance. Texas historically has recognized a clear division
between the different branches of government, with an explicit "separation of powers"
provision enshrined in the Texas Constitution. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. In addition, "legis-
lative intent" is not the intention of individual legislators, but a "fiction or figure of
speech," 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.06 (4th
ed. 1984 rev. & Supp. 1991) (describing the process of determining the intent of the legisla-
ture, not the subjective intent which may be entertained by individual legislators). See, e.g.,
James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 886 (1930).
Ideally, then, members of the Texas Supreme Court who were involved in the DTPA's
passage as legislators or lobbyists would respect their new role as members of the judicial
branch and carefully base their decisions on comparatively objective indices of legislative
intent. Regrettably, one former member of the court deliberately and publicly deviated
from the ideal. Concurring with a decision to extend the DTPA's provisions to implied
warranties, Justice Mauzy drew on his personal knowledge as Senate sponsor of the bill to
discuss a "political agreement" and "horse trading" whereby Attorney General John Hill
agreed not to include implied warranties in the bill to secure passage. Melody Home Mfg.
Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 361 (Mauzy, J., concurring). Justice Mauzy felt this exclu-
sion of language from the bill should not bind the court, explaining: "I fail to see how
those political compromises that were so necessary to achieve a worthwhile result in the
legislative process 14 years ago can in any way be construed as 'an improper excursion into
the legislative arena.' " Id. Justice Mauzy continued, explaining the majority's decision to
deviate from the doctrine of stare decisis by reversing a two-year-old decision:
The simple truth of the matter is that the dissent was right in 1985 and the
majority was wrong. The people, speaking through the elective process, have
constituted a new majority of this court which has not only the power but the
duty to correct the incorrect conclusion arrived at by the then-majority in
1985 on this question.
Id. One would hope that in a future case properly presenting the issue, the current Texas
Supreme Court would honor the Texas Legislature's decision to exclude lending practices
from the DTPA's original scope, whether that decision was the result of a political horse
trade or not.
297. The Attorney General's office does not appear to share this view in its enforce-
ment activity. See infra notes 473-74 and accompanying text.
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enforce the DTPA. The interchange was between Senator Oscar
Mauzy,298 the Senate sponsor of the DTPA, and an unidentified senator:
SEN. MAUZY: Well, you see, for example, there has been a Con-
sumer Protection Division created over in the Consumer Office in
the Consumer Credit Commission by statute.
UNIDENTIFIED: Yes, Senator, but I don't believe they are in-
volved in this bill.
SEN. MAUZY: No, no, I know...
UNIDENTIFIED: They have been eliminated from this bill.
SEN. MAUZY: All I am saying is that this concept of a special divi-
sion to enforce these rights is really nothing new.
UNIDENTIFIED: Well, I realize that you are talking about the
Consumer Credit, Consumer Protection-no, the small loans, regula-
tory, they are the ones that are out of this bill. They are not involved
in this. So really we are just addressing ourselves to the Attorney
General and his agency.
SEN. MAUZY: That's correct.299
Such a statement by the sponsor of a bill during floor debate is rightly
regarded as "the clearest possible expression"300 of legislative intent.301
298. Big H Auto Auction, 665 S.W.2d at 758 (identifying Senator Mauzy as a participant
in the Senate floor debate).
299. Debate on Tex. S.B. 45 on the Floor of the Senate, 63d Leg. 11 (Apr. 13, 1973)
(transcript available from Senate Staff Services Office) (emphasis added). The quoted ex-
change differs slightly from the "official" Senate transcript. One of the authors personally
audited the original tapes at the Texas State Archives, added several words omitted from
the transcript, and changed two words that were incorrectly transcribed. The substance of
the exchange is not affected, however, regardless of whether one consults the transcript or
the original tapes.
300. Ex parte Byers, 612 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
301. This exchange is not, of course, the only evidence of legislative intent to exclude
lenders from the DTPA, and from the Attorney General's regulatory authority. For exam-
ple, the House hearing record contains a telling exchange between Robert Sneed, an attor-
ney testifying on behalf of an insurance industry group, and Representative Temple. The
dispute was over the question of whether the proposed DTPA regulation of insurance
practices would conflict with the State Board of Insurance's regulations.
REP. TEMPLE: Again, we come to the subject of dual regulation, which I
am not ready to admit this is, but let's assume for a moment it is .... Now, I
don't know how many different agencies regulate the banking industry, but
right offhand, I can think of state bank, for example, is very closely regulated
by the FDIC, the Department of Banking of the State of Texas, it comes
under the Commercial Code, I believe. I don't feel that this has weakened
their banking system. I feel that it probably strengthened it. ...
MR. SNEED: Well, I think that you have-you cannot compare it from the
standpoint of apples and oranges. You have the primary jurisdiction, and the
operation of the FDIC in connection with the state is an auditing basis only,
not a policy making decision. ...
REP. TEMPLE: But maybe a clear example would be-I don't necessarily
agree with that either, but-let's go with the comparison between the banks
being under the ... Consumer Credit Code, and let's assume that the Texas
Department of Banking is the primary-
MR. SNEED: But see, Mr. Temple-
REP. TEMPLE: I'm saying, you've got two very comfortable types of things
there and it hasn't seemed to have worked a very hardship on the banking
industry.
It is difficult to imagine this exchange occurring without some mention of the fact that
banks were to be regulated under the DTPA, as well as under the Consumer Credit Code
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Senator Mauzy's floor comments, in particular, already have been consid-
ered by the Texas Supreme Court to be instructive in determining the
intent of the legislature in enacting the DTPA.
There is no indication in the Riverside opinion or in the briefs of coun-
sel (or in any subsequent decision, for that matter) that the deliberate
deletion of consumer loans from the draft DTPA ever was called to the
attention of the Texas Supreme Court. It is interesting to speculate on
what the vote total would have been in Riverside had the court known the
statute's legislative history. In fact, one need not go far to discover a
striking parallel. Just one week after the Texas Supreme Court granted
the application for writ of error in Riverside, the court issued a unani-
mous decision on a question of statutory construction-whether a 1971
amendment to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act permitted recovery
for mental trauma.302 The court, in an opinion written by one of the jus-
tices who later joined in the Riverside dissent, placed great emphasis on
the fact that the word "mental" was included in the original bill, but was
excised before passage. 30 3 The court declared that "[t]he deletion of a
provision in a pending bill discloses the legislative intent to reject the
proposal," and concluded: "Courts should be slow to put back that which
the legislature has rejected. '30 4 Using the same reasoning, Riverside also
should have been a unanimous decision.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT OF THE DTPA:
POST-RIVERSIDE
One minor mystery in this area of the law is the question of why, de-
spite frequent amendment of the DTPA and other consumer statutes, no
Texas Supreme Court case since Riverside has examined the legislative
intent underlying the DTPA, or the possible impact of post-1973 amend-
ments to the DTPA. Flenniken, for example, was decided under the 1975
version of the act,305 Knight,30 6 Ogden3° 7 and La Sara30 8 under the 1977
and FDIC regulations, had that in fact been the Legislature's intent. This committee his-
tory may not be controlling, but it certainly should be viewed as persuasive of the legisla-
ture's intent. Cf National Carloading Corp. v. Phoenix-El Paso Express, 178 S.W.2d 133,
149 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), aff'd, 176 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 747
(1944) (stating that committee report is "persuasive and ... entitled to great respect as
reflecting the legislative intent").
302. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979).
303. Id. at 337-38.
304. Id. at 338. The same reasoning has been used by the Texas Supreme Court to
conclude that buyers for resale can maintain a DTPA action because the 1973 legislature
deleted the word "final" from the original phrase "purchased for final use" before the
DTPA was enacted. Big H Auto Auction, 665 S.W.2d at 757-58.
305. Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d at 706 n.1.
306. The contract in Knight was signed and the suit was filed in 1978. See Knight, 627
S.W.2d at 384.
307. The operative facts in Ogden occurred in 1978. See Ogden, 662 S.W.2d at 334,
308. Part of the wrongful acts complained of in La Sara involved the 1975 version of the
DTPA; part involved the 1977 version. See La Sara, 673 S.W.2d at 565.
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act, and Home Savings after the 1983 amendments.3 9 Yet not one of
these decisions explored the language of subsequent amendments, or the
legislative history accompanying those amendments. This is unfortunate
because several legislative enactments and revisions since Riverside con-
firm the intended exclusion of loan transactions from the ambit of the
DTPA.
1. The 1977 Venue Amendment to the "Laundry List"
A 1977 amendment adding a new line item to the DTPA "laundry
list" 310 is probably the single most interesting change in the DTPA since
its enactment, so far as lenders are concerned. The 1977 amendment,
now found as "laundry list" item 22,311 prohibits, in relevant part, the
practice of:
filing suit founded upon a written contractual obligation of and
signed by the defendant to pay money arising out of or based on a
consumer transaction for goods, services, loans, or extensions of
credit intended primarily for personal, family, household, or agricul-
tural use in any county other than in the county in which the defend-
ant resides at the time of the commencement of the action or in the
county in which the defendant in fact signed the contract .... 312
The significance of a legislative list in the DTPA that adds "loans or ex-
tensions of credit" to "goods or services" is intuitively obvious. The fact
that it has escaped the attention of courts struggling with the issue of
whether the DTPA applies to lenders perhaps can be attributed to the
fact that subsection (22) is a "seldom-used provision" 313 of the laundry
list.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, already has recognized the signifi-
cance of such a variation from the "goods or services" restriction on the
statutory definition of a "consumer," 314 although in a slightly more atten-
uated fashion. In Riverside, when the court initially determined that a
loan was not a "good or service" under the DTPA, the Texas Supreme
Court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that the same legislature which
passed the DTPA also enacted the Home Solicitations Transactions
Act.315 In contrast to the DTPA, the legislature defined "consumer" in
the Home Solicitations Act as "an individual who seeks or acquires real
or personal property, services, money, or credit for personal, family or
309. The operative facts in Home Savings arose in 1984. See Home Savings, 733 S.W.2d
at 134.
310. Act of May 19, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 336, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 892.
311. The amendment originally created item 21 in the DTPA "laundry list." See id. A
1979 amendment made minor changes, relating to population of counties subject to the
amendment, and renumbered the provision. Act of June 13, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 603,
§ 3, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1327, 1329.
312. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(22) (Vernon 1987) (emphasis added).
313. ALDERMAN, supra note 34, at 77.
314. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
315. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-13.01-13.07 (Vernon 1987).
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household purposes. ' 316 The legislative intent to exclude "money" and
"credit" from the DTPA, so far as consumer actions were concerned, was
clear to the Texas Supreme Court:
Obviously, the Legislature knew how to include the extension of
credit and borrowing of money within the scope of coverage of pro-
tective legislation, when it intended to cover such transactions. The
simple addition of the words "money or credit" within the definition
of "consumer" in the DTPA would have accomplished such a pur-
pose in the DTPA. The Legislature's exclusion of these terms from
the DTPA, in light of its contemporaneous inclusion of the same
terms in the Home Solicitations Transactions Act, evidences a clear
legislative intent that the extension of credit was not to be covered
under the DTPA.317
The fact that the Texas Legislature defined "consumer" to include
"loans" in one statute passed in 1973 yet did not include "loans" in the
similar definition contained in the 1973 DTPA is certainly strong evi-
dence of legislative intent to exclude loans from DTPA coverage. 318 The
1977 amendment of the DTPA itself, referring to "goods, services, loans
or extensions of credit," surely is entitled to even more weight as an ex-
pression of legislative intent. The Texas Supreme Court has counseled
that, in interpreting the DTPA, "[liegislative intent should be determined
from the language of the entire Act and not isolated portions. '319 Use of
the disjunctive "or" in subsection (22) makes it very clear that "goods"
and "services," as used elsewhere in the same act, should not include
"loans" or "extensions of credit. '320
316. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 13.01(2) (Vernon 1987). The emphasis was added
in the Riverside court's quotation. See Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
317. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
318. Accord Eastern Texas Elec. Co. v. Woods, 230 S.W. 498, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1921, writ dism'd) (two acts passed at same legislative session, and within a few
days of each other, presumed to be imbued with the same legislative spirit and should be
construed in light of one another).
319. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1980) (emphasis added).
320. See generally Bayou Pipeline Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 568 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex.
1978). But see Maurice B. Kirk, Ambiguity of "And" and "Or," 2 TEx. TECH L. REV. 235,
237 (1971).
This interpretation also is in line with the Texas Legislature's apparent intent. An ex-
change on the Senate floor between Senator Farabee and the bill's Senate sponsor, Senator
Clower, prior to passage of the 1977 amendment, demonstrates legislative concern that the
amendment should in no way be seen as an indication that lenders are generally subject to
the DTPA:
SEN. FARABEE: My concern is the expansion of consumer transactions. I
have no problem with the problems of contracting for a vacuum sweeper, or
an ice box, or something of this nature. But what about a $100,000 loan?
SEN. CLOWER: That's fine.
SEN. FARABEE: And has that, has consumer transaction, through the
cases been expanded to a point that it reaches, in effect, commercial loans?
SEN. CLOWER: I don't think it would touch it.... I don't think it will.
People that were objecting to the bill, we got together and we worked this
out. And people that practice law in this area on a daily basis say that this
amendment cures that problem. It will not go to a commercial transaction.




Considered in full context, then, the addition of subsection (22) to the
laundry list of DTPA violations demonstrates clearly that the Texas Leg-
islature did not intend loans, per se, to be consumer transactions under
the DTPA. It is a specific amendment, deliberately considered, that one
precise type of lender abuse is peculiarly amenable to DTPA enforce-
ment. However, were lenders already generally subject to the DTPA, as
has been argued by some, use of the words "loans" and "extensions of
credit" simply would not have been necessary.
2. The 1983 Amendments to the DTPA, the Home Solicitations
Transactions Act, and the Texas Debt Collection Act
As just described, when the Texas Supreme Court in Riverside consid-
ered the difference between the definition of "consumer" found in the
DTPA and the much broader definition of the word contained in the
Home Solicitations Transactions Act, the court suggested that "[t]he sim-
ple addition of the words 'money or credit' within the definition of 'con-
sumer' in the DTPA" would have sufficiently indicated the legislative
intent to include loan transactions within the scope of DTPA consumer
actions. 321 The Texas Legislature has amended the DTPA definition of
"consumer" since Riverside,322 yet has not taken the Texas Supreme
Court up on its suggestion to add "money or credit" to the definition.
This raises a presumption that the Texas Legislature approves of the
Texas Supreme Court's construction of the term "consumer" in
Riverside.323
Legislative action since Riverside does more than raise a mere formal
presumption, however. The actions of the 1983 Texas Legislature in par-
ticular demonstrate some very serious thought to the question of DTPA
consumer status, and a clear determination that loans are not meant to be
within the DTPA's general coverage. The legislature did amend the
DTPA definition of "consumer" in 1983, by restricting that definition in
two respects. First, the provision granting consumer status to a "govern-
mental entity" was replaced with language restricting possible consumer
status to "this state, or a subdivision or agency of this state. ' 324 Second,
the legislature denied consumer status to "business consumers," persons
Debate on Tex. H.B. 2059 on the Floor of the Senate, 65th Leg., R.S. (May 19, 1977) (tape
available from Senate Staff Services Office).
321. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175; see also supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
322. Act of May 19, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 883, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4943, 4943.
323. See, e.g., Patton v. American Home Mut. Life Ins. Co., 185 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex.
1945) (reenactment without change after judicial construction impliedly approves that con-
struction); Brackenridge v. Roberts, 267 S.W. 244, 247 (Tex. 1924), reh'g denied, 270 S.W.
1001 (Tex. 1925) (stating that "[wjhen a statute has been construed by the court of last
resort of a state, and the same is substantially re-enacted, the presumption prevails that the
Legislature adopted such construction"); Hilliard v. Wilkerson, 492 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ granted, dism'd as moot) (stating that "[w]here, after a
statute has been construed by a state's highest court, the legislature reenacts the statute,
whether by adoption of revised statutes or by amendment, the act of the legislature carries
with it the construction previously placed upon the law by the court").
324. Act of May 19, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 883, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4943.
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or entities with assets of $25 million or more seeking goods or services for
commercial or business use.325
The 1983 legislature also beefed up the remedies available under the
Home Solicitations Transactions Act,326 making a violation of the act ac-
tionable under the DTPA, with language incorporating the venue and
remedies provisions of the DTPA.327 A parallel amendment to the Texas
Debt Collection Act 328 accomplished the same result in that statute. 329
Thus, a person who is extended credit in a home solicitation transaction
may seek DTPA remedies for a violation of an enumerated item in the
list of "deceptive trade practices" set out in the Home Solicitations Trans-
actions Act, even though that same person does not qualify as a DTPA
"consumer" in general.330 The 1983 legislature therefore implicitly331 de-
clined the Texas Supreme Court's invitation in Riverside to rewrite the
general definition of "consumer" in the DTPA to conform to the broader
definition of "consumer" in the Home Solicitations Transactions Act.332
The 1983 amendment of the Texas Debt Collection Act also has a bear-
ing on the Legislature's intended scope of the DTPA. Advocates of ex-
panding the DTPA to lending transactions argue that the act should reach
false or deceptive practices in the course of debt collection by lenders. In
Thompson v. First Austin Company,333 for example, the debtors argued
the lender should be subject to DTPA liability for first promising that it
did not intend to foreclose, then foreclosing anyway.334 The Texas Debt
Collection Act addresses a number of specific prohibited acts that lenders
sometimes commit in the course of debt collection, including wrongful
325. Id. §§ 2, 3.
326. Act of May 24, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 564, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3259, 3259-
60.
327. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-13.03(e) (Vernon 1987).
328. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01-11.11 (Vernon 1987).
329. Act of June 19, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 490, § 2,1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2883, 2884.
The amendment added provisions virtually identical to those in the Home Solicitations
Transactions Act, making offenses actionable under the DTPA and giving the Attorney
General injunctive power. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.10(b), 11.11(a)
(Vernon 1987).
330. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
331. Legislative history on this amendment is sparse. The only person speaking for the
bill was a representative of the Texas Attorney General's office, who explained that the bill
"puts to rest some of the arguments that have been recently raised with respect to the
relationship of these two statutes [the Home Solicitations Transactions Act and the Debt
Collection Act] and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act." Hearings on Tex. S.B. 668 Before
the Senate Jurisprudence Comm., 68th Leg., R.S., (May 3, 1983) (taped statement of David
A. Talbot, Jr., chief of the Consumer Protection Division, Attorney General's office) (tran-
script available from Senate Staff Services Office). Riverside is not mentioned in the very
brief discussion on the bill. The bill analysis in the House simply states that "[c]urrent law
is ambiguous regarding the prohibition of double recovery under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act." HousE COMM. ON Bus. & COMM., BILL
ANALYSIs, Tex. S.B. 668, 68th Leg., R.S., (1983).
332. See Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
333. 572 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also supra
discussion at notes 111-18.
334. Id at 81.
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threats of repossession and sale.335 The statute also spells out several
specific "unconscionable" 336 and "deceptive" 337 debt collection activities.
The Texas Debt Collection Act was passed at the same legislative ses-
sion as the DTPA.338 It strains credulity to think that unconscionable or
deceptive activities of lenders in their debt collection efforts needed a
separate statute if these activities already were considered by the legisla-
ture to be subsumed within the general prohibition on "unconsciona-
ble" 339 or "deceptive" 340 acts contained within the DTPA. It would be
even more odd for the legislature to have confined a cause of action for
unconscionable or deceptive debt collection practices only to debts con-
tracted for "personal, family, or household purposes,"'341 while simultane-
ously expanding the DTPA far beyond these limits.342 Moreover, had the
Texas Legislature intended the DTPA to apply to all debt collection prac-
tices, all lenders, and all loans, it could have accomplished that purpose in
1983 simply by amending the definition of "consumer" within the DTPA.
Instead, the legislature kept the restrictions on the type of loan and par-
ticular prohibited acts already contained within the Texas Debt Collec-
tion Act and simply appended DTPA relief to the existing statute.343 As
a result, the statutes explicitly permit the Attorney General's enforce-
ment powers to be used to curb violations of the Debt Collection Act and
Home Solicitations Transactions Act,344 while leaving consumer remedies
largely unaffected.
Taken in conjunction, the decision of the 1983 legislature to tighten the
general definition of "consumer" within the DTPA, the decision to permit
335. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.02(g) (Vernon 1987).
336. Id. § 11.04.
337. Id. § 11.05.
338. Act. of May 21, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 547, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1513.
339. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon 1987).
340. Id. § 17.50(a)(1).
341. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01(d) (Vernon 1987).
342. The 1973 DTPA did not contain, nor does it contain today, any such restriction on
the definition of a "good." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon 1987). The
1973 act's definition of "services" did contain a proviso that the services be "for other than
commercial or business use." This restriction was removed, however, by a 1977 amend-
ment. See Act of May 21, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 323,
amended by Act of May 10, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 216, § 1, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 600.
343. Act of May 24, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 564, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3259.
This view of the intent of the 1983 amendments is supported by the fact that the sole
witness speaking on the bill was David A. Talbot, Jr., chief of the Consumer Protection
Division of the Attorney General's office. As he explained the bill:
Basically, it declares that these two statutes-a violation of those two stat-
utes-are a violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. It clarifies our
role in terms of enforcement of these two related consumer laws, and it's our
opinion right now that these two acts are within the purview of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, but this clarifies, I think puts to rest some of the argu-
ments that have been recently raised with respect to the relationship of these
two statutes and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
Hearings on Tex. S.B. 668 Before the Senate Jurisprudence Comm., 68th Leg., R.S., (May 3,
1983) (taped statement of David A. Talbot, Jr.) (emphasis added) (transcript available
from Senate Staff Services Office).
344. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-13.03(c) (Vernon 1987).
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DTPA relief for the narrowly defined categories of "consumers" under
the Home Solicitations Transactions Act, and the similar decision to pro-
vide DTPA remedies for violations of the Texas Debt Collection Practices
Act, argue most strongly against any legislative intent-before or during
the 1983 legislative session-that lending activities in general be actiona-
ble under the DTPA. This set of amendments, however, is far from the
only indication of legislative intent.
3. The 1987 Credit Services Organizations Act
In Riverside, the plaintiff's primary complaint was that Riverside Na-
tional Bank's loan officer promised to lend him money, although the of-
ficer knew, or should have known, that no money would be
forthcoming.345 To the four dissenting justices, these facts should have
been sufficient to demonstrate DTPA "services" in the lending process. 346
Even the majority decision reserved judgment on the question of whether
"services existed in the lending of money, and in the process of determin-
ing whether to lend money," commenting that the argument was not sup-
ported by trial evidence and therefore "merely hypothetical."' 347
The theoretical validity of this view, and of the "collateral services"
doctrine, will be examined in slightly more detail later.348 The answer to
this question, however, should first be determined, if at all possible, by
reference to legislative intent. The Credit Services Organizations Act349
provides some valuable insight into the legislature's intent, so far as
"services" associated with lending are concerned. The Credit Services
Organizations Act was passed in 1987350 and is codified as Chapter 18 of
the Texas Business & Commerce Code-immediately following the
DTPA. The purpose of the legislation was to crack down on so-called
"credit repair" companies-organizations that promise to get credit or
eliminate bad credit references for a fee. 351 The language of the act, how-
ever, is arguably broad enough to cover the precise "services" supposedly
rendered by Riverside National Bank's loan officer.
The act extends to "a person who, with respect to the extension of
credit by others and in return for the payment of money or other valuable
consideration" provides, or promises to obtain "an extension of credit for
a buyer. '352 The act prohibits "false or misleading representations" 353 or
345. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 171.
346. Id at 178 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 175.
348. See infra notes 696-704 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 109-42, and
252-64 and accompanying text.
349. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 18.01-.15 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
350. Act of June 19, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 764, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2716.
351. Credit Services Organizations Act: Hearings on Texas H.B. 742 Before the House
Bus. & Commerce Comm., 70th Leg., R.S., (Mar. 23, 1987) (taped statement of Rep. Con-
nelly, House sponsor) (tape available from the author).
352. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 18.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1987).
353. Id. § 18.03(3) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
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engaging in a "fraudulent or deceptive act" 35 4 regarding the credit serv-
ices. Violation of the act can subject a credit services provider to criminal
penalties3 55 and punitive damages.356 Violation of the Credit Services
Organizations Act also is a violation of the DTPA.357
Based on this information, one might conclude that the Texas Legisla-
ture had determined not only to repeal Riverside legislatively, but also to
add some enforcement "teeth" that go beyond even the harshest DTPA
penalties. 358 Three provisions in the Credit Services Organizations Act,
however, would have prohibited its application to create DTPA liability
in Riverside or limited its applicability in similar situations. First, and by
far the most important, the legislation specifically exempts any regulated
lender, FDIC or FSLIC-insured bank or thrift, or credit union.359 River-
side National Bank thus would have been exempt by statute. Second, the
act is definitionally limited to extensions of credit "offered or granted
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. ' 360 While the Riv-
erside borrower's Cadillac El Dorado361 would have passed muster under
this standard, many other transactions, such as the dump truck in
Knight,362 the computer software system at issue in Qantel,363 or the radi-
ator equipment in Kinerd,364 would not. Finally, the statute extends only
to those who offer assistance in obtaining extensions of credit "from
others," not those who extend credit directly. 365
The Credit Services Organization Act does use the word "services" in
regard to the extension of credit in almost exactly the same context as the
Texas Supreme Court considered in Riverside. For that matter, from the
description in the case, the Riverside borrower would undoubtedly have
been a prime candidate for basic credit repair services as well.366 Far
from showing any legislative intent that lending "services" be subject to
the DTPA, however, the limitations and exclusions in the Credit Services
Organizations Act indicate that services associated with the extension of
credit are not contemplated as within the purview of the DTPA. To state
the obvious, the Texas Legislature would have had little need to make a
violation of the Credit Services Organizations Act a violation of the
DTPA if the DTPA was already intended to apply to such activities by its
354. Id. § 18.03(4).
355. Id. § 18.09(b) (Vernon 1987).
356. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 18.13 (Vernon 1987).
357. Id. § 18.11.
358. One section of the Texas Penal Code, the Deceptive Business Practices Act pro-
vides criminal sanctions for deceptive representations made in connection with a sale of
services for a fee. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.42 (Vernon 1989).
359. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 18.02(b)(1)-(3) (Vernon 1987).
360. Id. § 18.01(3).
361. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 171.
362. Knight, 627 S.W.2d at 383.
363. Qantel, 761 S.W.2d at 303.
364. Kinerd, 800 S.W.2d at 188.
365. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN § 18.02(a) (Vernon 1987).
366. The Riverside borrower failed to make his first payment on time, bounced a check
for the late payment and put down gross income, not net, on his loan application at River-
side National Bank. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 171.
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own terms. Equally as obvious, it would not make sense to restrict the
scope of services covered under the Credit Services Organizations Act to
"personal, family, or household" credit, or to exempt traditional lenders,
if lenders were already subject to the DTPA, and if services associated
with all loans, not just these "consumer" loans, were already actionable
under the DTPA.
One familiar precept of statutory construction is that "the Legislature
is never presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a stat-
ute. '367 For this reason, "[a] construction should not be adopted, if it can
be avoided, that will render any part of the act inoperative, negatory or
superfluous."' 368 It may be possible to explain how the legislature could
have perceived some need to adopt the Credit Services Organizations
Act even if lending "collateral services" were already included in the
DTPA. It may also be possible to explain the exclusion of traditional
lenders from this act in such a way that the exclusion would logically
mesh with a theory of general lender liability under the DTPA. This
writer, however, knows of no such way. The simplest explanation of the
Credit Services Organization Act's language is that lenders in general,
and at least some services collateral to lending activities, are not meant to
be covered by the DTPA. And in legislative construction, as with the
philosopher's guide of "Occam's razor," the simplest explanation gener-
ally is the best. 369
C. LENDING AS DISTINCT FROM A "PURCHASE OR LEASE":
AN UNTRIED STATUTORY ARGUMENT
To date, Texas courts and commentators struggling with the application
of the DTPA to lenders have focused almost exclusively on the question
of whether money is a "good" or "service." The DTPA definition of
"consumer," however, contains another restriction that has not yet been
addressed by a Texas court. The DTPA requires that goods or services be
acquired "by purchase or lease."'370 Put simply, acquisition of money by
loan should not give rise to a private cause of action under the Texas
DTPA because a loan is neither a purchase nor a lease.
The point is intuitively obvious. The DTPA contains no special defini-
tion of "purchase or lease." When a statute contains no specific defini-
tion, words in the statute are to be given their common and accepted
meaning. 371 No sane person would walk into a bank and announce: "I
367. State v. City of Dallas, 319 S.W.2d 767, 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1958), aff'd
sub nom. State v. City of Austin, 331 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1960).
368. Orsinger v. Schoenfeld, 269 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord Spence v. Fenchler, 180 S.W. 597 (Tex. 1915).
369. Cf. Donlon v. Jewett, 26 P. 370 (Cal. 1891) (preferring a construction that affords
"a simpler and more probable explanation of the discrepancies in the statute than any
other").
370. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
371. Big H Auto Auction, 665 S.W.2d at 758 (specific application to DTPA); see also
Satterfield v. Satterfield, 448 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. 1969).
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want a car. Who do I talk to about leasing some money to get it?" In
short, financial institutions do not sell or lease money; they make
loans.372
The basic legal distinction between a loan and a purchase or lease was
perhaps best set out in a federal decision, United States v. Investors Diver-
sified Services, Inc.373 The Clayton Act makes it unlawful to "lease or
make a sale or contract for sale" on the condition that the lessee or pur-
chaser not deal with a competitor.374 A very similar provision is found in
the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act.375 The Minnesota District
Court faced the question of whether a borrower's complaint that a real
estate lender requiring borrowers to purchase required insurance solely
from the lender stated a cause of action under the Clayton Act. The
court's reasoning, holding lenders to be excluded, is worth setting out at
some length.
It is difficult to conceive of a transaction for a loan of money as being
a lease, sale, or contract for sale of a commodity. Certainly, the loan
is not a sale in the usual business sense. A sale is an absolute trans-
fer of property or something of value for a consideration from the
seller to the buyer .... A loan of money, on the other hand, is an
advance of money or credit upon an understanding that an
equivalent is to be returned to the lender by the borrower on de-
mand or within a specified time. In the United States money is
merely a medium of exchange, not something which is bought and
sold in exchange for something else. One does not "sell" money in
the usual business sense. Money is used to "purchase" other articles
or things. That is, other articles or things are sold in exchange for
money. Money is not sold in exchange for other articles or things.
Nor is money "leased" in the usual sense of that term. When money
is loaned, only its equivalent, not the article or thing loaned, is to be
returned.376
372. This author disagrees with the strained language used by the Texas Supreme Court
in Riverside, suggesting that the interest rate can be looked at as the "purchase price of the
loan." Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
One scholarly commentary offers a succinct example of the distinction between
purchases, leases and loans, so far as an ordinary person is concerned:
[S]uppose a person wishes to obtain the use of an automobile for business
purposes. She goes to a car dealer, who explains that she may buy a car for
cash, she may finance the purchase, or she may lease the car. Depending
upon the terms of the transaction, the economic result will be different.
Upon consultation with her accountant and attorney, she will decide in what
form she wishes to acquire the use of the car. Her economic position will be
different depending upon which transaction she chooses. To her, these are
distinct transactions.
Corinne Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property Lease Under the UCC, 49 OHIo STATE
L.J. 195, 198 (1988).
373. 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951).
374. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988).
375. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05(c) (Vernon 1987).
376. Investors Diversified, 102 F. Supp. at 647.
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Another court construing the Clayton Act has concluded that the words
"lease," "sale" and "purchaser" are "so clear that they require no
construction. '377
The fact that Texas courts have not addressed the question of whether
a loan is a purchase or lease for DTPA purposes is not surprising. Once
the Riverside court determined that money is not a "good or service," it
would have been superfluous to decide whether a loan could be consid-
ered a "purchase or lease" of money. When the issue has become rele-
vant, however, Texas courts have repeatedly recognized that the
"purchase or lease" requirement is a real restriction on the scope of the
DTPA. Thus, contests,378 games of chance, 379 goods delivered on con-
signment, 380 services for which no money was paid381 or gratuitous bor-
rowings382 have been held not to constitute the "purchase or lease" of
goods or services sufficient to establish consumer status. If the soundness
of the Riverside reasoning is being questioned, however, as a growing
number of courts and writers seem to be doing, it seems fair to examine
alternative grounds on which Riverside could have been sustained. In
consequence, some further discussion is warranted.
1. The Difference Between a Loan and a Purchase
The fundamental distinction between loans and sales is reflected in
Texas and national law. The Texas Consumer Credit Code, for example,
repeatedly distinguishes between credit sales and loans. Chapter 6, gov-
erning retail installment sales, explicitly provides that
377. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 270 F. 881, 904-05 (3d Cir. 1921), aff'd,
260 U.S. 568 (1923) (quoted in Investors Diversified, 102 F. Supp. at 647).
378. Hall v. Bean, 582 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ) (boat
race contestant held not to have purchased the prize).
379. Rutherford v. Whataburger, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (contest winner not a consumer because contest not linked to purchase of
merchandise).
380. Mannon v. G.S.W. Petroleum, Inc., 594 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1980, no writ) (owners of service station accepting gasoline shipments on consignment not
consumers).
381. Tri-Legends Corp. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Cal., No. A14-93-00946-CV, 1994 Tex.
App. LEXIS 2336, *21 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 22, 1994, writ req.) (holding
that a title commitment provided without charge is not actionable under the DTPA); Long-
view Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Nabours, 673 S.W.2d 357, 362 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984),
aff'd on other grounds, 700 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1985) (holding no liability because "[a] gratui-
tous act is not a purchased service within the meaning of the Act"); Bancroft v. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 616 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (no cause of action because no fee paid for omitted yellow pages advertisement);
Exxon v. Dunn, 581 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ) (no cause of action
because services of an automobile repair shop had not been obtained "by purchase or
lease."). The Bancroft decision, it should be noted, has been overruled to the extent that
good faith prospective purchasers, persons whose "objective was to purchase or lease," can
recover under the DTPA. Martin v. Lou Poliquin Enter., Inc., 696 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasis added).
382. Kitchener v. T.C. Trailers, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 798 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (original seller
not liable to gratuitous borrower of a horse trailer); Russell v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 548
S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("loaner" car after accident not
covered because plaintiffs neither purchased nor rented the car).
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[n]one of the provisions of this Chapter shall affect or apply to any
loans or to the business of making loans under or in accordance with
the laws of this State, nor shall any of the provisions of the loan or
interest statutes of this State affect or apply to any retail installment
transaction. 383
Identical language is contained in the chapter on motor vehicle install-
ment sales.384 The general definition of "interest" in the Consumer
Credit Code also excludes "any time price differential however denomi-
nated arising out of a credit sale." 385 In short, the clear scheme of the
Consumer Credit Code is that installment loans and retail installment
sales are "mutually exclusive concepts. '386
The distinction between a "purchase" and a "loan" also becomes im-
portant in the context of financing transactions involving accounts receiv-
able. Businesses commonly will finance ongoing operations through the
sale-or through loans based upon the security of-accounts receivable.
Since a business may wish to retain some control over the collection of
these accounts, and a lender or buyer may prefer this in any event, sales
of accounts receivable often may end up resembling secured loans, and
vice versa. As Judge Learned Hand once put it, "[s]uch transactions are
somewhat ambiguous and admit of definitions as loans or sales on slight
differences .... It is possible, as we have suggested, to construe these
transactions either way."'387 The drafters of the Uniform Commercial
Code likewise recognize that "[c]ommercial financing on the basis of ac-
counts ... is often so conducted that the distinction between a security
transfer and a sale is blurred. ''388 In consequence, accounting stan-
dards389 and court decisions39° sometimes must go to great pains to dis-
tinguish between "sales" and "secured loans" involving accounts
receivable.
383. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.08 (Vernon 1987).
384. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.09 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
385. Id. art. 5069-2.01(h).
386. Espinoza v. Victoria Bank & Ttust Co., 572 S.W.2d 816, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
387. Elmer v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 568, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1933).
388. U.C.C. §§ 9-102 cmt. 2 (1990).
389. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has published standards regarding the
balance sheet treatment of transfers of accounts receivable. See REPORTING BY TRANSFER-
ORS FOR TRANSFERS OF RECEIVABLES WITH RECOURSE, Statement of Financial Account-
ing Standards No. 77, § 1 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1983). These criteria, and the
problems of distinguishing between secured lending and sales of accounts receivable, are
ably discussed by Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhoff, Characterization of a Transfer
of Receivables As a Sale of a Secured Loan Upon Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 181, 198-200 (1991).
390. See, e.g., Southern Rock, Inc. v. B & B Auto Supply, 711 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1983);
Blackford v. Commercial Credit Corp., 263 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 825
(1959); In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1557 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio July
26, 1990).
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2. The Difference Between a Loan and a Lease
Leases also are legally distinct from installment sales and loans. A mo-
ment's attention to the Texas Uniform Commercial Code is instructive. 391
The Texas UCC contains an explicit list of factors which constitute "the
test for deciding whether a lease is really a secured loan for the purpose
of determining the applicability of Article 9 of the U.C.C.' '392 The 1993
legislature added a new chapter to the Texas UCC to govern personal
property leases, as well as amendments to provide more specific defini-
tional distinctions between leases and security interests. 393 Criteria for
identifying a "true" lease are also set out in tax law and accounting
standards. 394
The legal distinctions between loans, purchases, and leases are not se-
mantic. "[T]he legal consequences that follow from each such characteri-
zation are extremely different and will, in the final analysis, determine the
rights of the parties regardless of their actual intentions. '395 For exam-
ple, the distinction between a true lease and a secured loan or sale is all-
important in bankruptcy law. A lease may be assumed or rejected by a
bankruptcy trustee.396 Under any circumstances, however, the lessor re-
tains rights to the goods. 397 If the transaction is an installment sale or a
secured loan, the consequences are very different. The seller or lender
may exercise rights in the goods only to the extent of the perfected secur-
ity interest.398 If the security interest is not perfected, the seller or lender
is relegated to the status of a general unsecured creditor, with no specific
rights to the goods.399
The distinction between a loan and a lease also has very dramatic
lender liability consequences, in particular, for the application of usury
law. Usury requires the loan of money;400 a sale, no matter what the
price, does not give rise to a usury claim.401 The Texas Supreme Court's
391. In this particular context, reference to the Texas UCC also is highly appropriate.
After all, in Riverside, interpreting the DTPA, the Texas Supreme Court turned to the
Texas UCC's definitions of "money" and "goods" for guidance. See Riverside, 603 S.W.2d
at 175; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text.
392. Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. of Ga. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 626 F.2d 401,
412 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981). The UCC
definition of "security interest" logically includes both installment sales and loans. See
Alan C. Winick & Jeffrey N. Rich, Personal Property Leasing: A Primer for Financial
Institutions, 18 UCC L.J. 30, 35 (1985).
393. See generally Laura J. Paglia, Note, U.C.C. Article 2A: Distinguishing Between True
Leases and Secured Sales, 63 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 69 (1988).
394. See, e.g., Winick & Rich, supra note 392, at 33-34.
395. Id. at 35. The Winick & Rich article contains several charts setting out differing
legal consequences depending upon whether a transaction is a lease, an installment sale, or
a loan.
396. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1993).
397. See, e.g., Sanders v. National Acceptance Co. of Am., 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967).
398. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1993).
399. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1993); see also Sommers v. International Business Mach.,
640 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Miller, 545 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1977).
400. Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982).
401. Rattan v. Commercial Credit Co., 131 S.W.2d 399, 399-400 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1939, writ ref'd).
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decision in Kinerd v. Colonial Leasing Company,4°2 previously discussed
in some detail,403 is illustrative of the pains that Texas courts are required
to take to determine the "true" nature of an ambiguous transaction, for
usury purposes.
To reiterate, the Kinerd decision involved a "dollar lease." Colonial
Leasing bought some radiator equipment from a supplier and "leased" it
to Kinerd for a fixed term. The lease could not be canceled or prepaid;
Kinerd had the "option" to purchase the equipment for one dollar at the
end of the lease term.404 The parties evidently conceded that, despite the
document's title, the transaction was not a lease.405 The question was
whether the arrangement was an installment sale subject to the Texas
DTPA or a loan in violation of Texas usury law. The Texas Supreme
Court, in a version of an argument characterized by one justice as "schiz-
ophrenic,"406 decided that Colonial Leasing was liable under the DTPA
as a seller and liable under Texas usury law because it financed the
sale.407
Reasonable minds certainly can differ on the legal soundness of the
result in Kinerd, and the fact that the court found it necessary to with-
draw and rewrite its original opinion indicates the difficulty of the is-
sues.408 The decision, however, certainly illustrates the practical
importance of distinguishing between a true lease, a true sale, and a true
loan. The Texas Supreme Court's observation that Colonial Leasing's
DTPA defense "might have merit if it had acted only as a lender in [the]
transaction" 40 9 also comes tantalizingly close to explicit recognition of the
definitional distinction between a "loan" and a "purchase or lease" for
DTPA purposes. In an appropriate case, the Texas Supreme Court might
well extend the Kinerd reasoning to its logical conclusion, disallowing a
private cause of action for lender liability under the Texas DTPA on a
ground other than that recognized in Riverside. This would be appropri-
ate since, if the Texas Legislature sees fit to add "loans" to "purchases"
and "leases," it can always do so, just as it has done with other statutes.4 10
3. Precedent from Other Jurisdictions
While no Texas court has yet addressed the specific distinction between
a loan and a DTPA "purchase or lease" directly, decisions from other
402. 800 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1990).
403. See supra notes 237-47 and accompanying text.
404. Kinerd, 800 S.W.2d at 188.
405. The Texas Supreme Court noted that the trial court instructed the jury, without
objection, that "although the agreement ... is called a lease, the transaction is actually a
sale and the instrument is a security agreement, securing a sale of goods." Id. at 191 n.7.
406. Id. at 192 n.1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring and dissenting).
407. Id at 191.
408. The original, withdrawn, opinion can be found at 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 585 (June 20,
1990).
409. Kinerd, 800 S.W.2d at 191.
410. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.53, § 2(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (defining
"debtor," for purposes of credit life, health, and accident insurance, as "a borrower of
money or a purchaser or lessee of goods, services, property, rights or privileges").
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jurisdictions with analogous statutes are instructive, particularly since the
DTPA now permits Texas courts to consider "relevant and pertinent" de-
cisions from other jurisdictions.411 Oregon's deceptive trade practices
statute, for example, applied to the "sale or offering for sale" of goods or
services. 412 In Haeger v. Johnson413 the Oregon Court of Appeals deter-
mined whether a lender was required to comply with a civil investigative
demand issued by the attorney general's office. The Oregon court held
that "sale" is "a word of precise legal meaning" and that the lending of
money was not a sale of a good or service.4 14 Oregon courts have ad-
hered to this reading of the statute, despite changing language and unsuc-
cessful legislative attempts to include loans specifically within the
statute's ambit.4 15
In Murphy v. Charlestown Savings Bank,416 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts interpreted a Massachusetts statute 41 7 that contained
limiting language virtually identical to portions of the Texas DTPA's
"consumer" definition.4 18 The scenario in Murphy is familiar.419 Home-
owners sued a bank for unfair or deceptive acts in servicing their mort-
gage and foreclosing on their home. The borrowers argued that payment
of interest is consideration for the use of money, that they had
"purchased" the use of money,4 20 and they thus were entitled to a private
cause of action under the Massachusetts deceptive trade practices statute.
The court, while recognizing that the argument had "some intuitive ap-
peal"421 and that the Massachusetts statute had a mandate for broad con-
struction,422 rejected the argument. The court stated that the plaintiffs
presented no authority for the proposition that a loan was a "purchase"
of the use of money423 and that "[f]or that reason alone, we question that
the Legislature had home loan mortgages in mind" when it wrote the
411. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
412. The cited language is from the version of the Oregon act in effect in 1976. See OR.
REv. STAT. § 646.605(1) (1976). The statute was later amended; the current version refers
to "sale, rental or otherwise." OR. REv. STAT. § 646.605(1) (Supp. 1993).
413. 548 P.2d 532 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
414. Id at 534; see also Roach v. Mead, 709 P.2d 246, 249 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
415. See, e.g., Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp., 605 P.2d 730 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
416. 405 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 1980).
417. The statute had already been amended at the time of the Murphy decision. Id. at
957. The result would not be the same today. See infra notes 438-39 and accompanying
text.
418. The statute in effect at the time of acts complained of in Murphy gave a private
cause of action to "[a]ny person who purchases or leases goods, services or property, real
or personal." Murphy, 405 N.E.2d at 957.
419. The fact setting in Murphy is very similar to that in Ogden v. Dickinson State
Bank, 662 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1983), Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d
705 (Tex. 1983), and Thompson v. First Austin Co., 572 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). These decisions have been discussed in some detail earlier in
the article. See supra notes 111-18, 171-210 and accompanying text.
420. Murphy, 405 N.E.2d at 957.
421. Id




word "purchases" into the statute.424 The court then turned to "analo-
gous statutory material and relevant case law,"'42 5 including the UCC and
federal consumer credit law, to make some of the same distinctions that
have just been set out here.42 6
While it cannot be said that there is no possible way in which a loan
could be considered a "purchase or lease," 42 7 it seems far more reason-
able to view a loan as distinct from a sale or lease. In view of the general
understanding of those terms4 2 8 the careful distinctions drawn between
loans and installment sales in the Texas Consumer Credit Code429 (a
predecessor statute to the DTPA43°), and the legal tightrope the Texas
Supreme Court walked in Kinerd, it makes no sense to abandon the dis-
tinction between loans, sales, and leases when construing the DTPA.
D. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AIDS IN THE DTPA: LITTLE AID IN
LENDER DISPUTES
1. Out-of-State Authority431
Every state, as well as the District of Columbia, has some sort of decep-
tive trade practices legislation. 432 Since 1979, the DTPA has provided
explicitly that "[i]n construing this subchapter the court shall not be pro-
hibited from considering relevant and pertinent decisions of courts in
other jurisdictions. '433 Nonetheless, no Texas court has yet undertaken
424. Id. at 958-59. The fact that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts chose to
predicate its decision on the "purchase or lease" distinction rather than on the "goods or
services" distinction drawn by the Texas Supreme Court in Riverside is explained by an
important distinction between the two states' statutes. The Massachusetts statute extended
to "goods, services or property." Id. at 957 (emphasis added). The court, therefore, con-
cluded that "the right to the use of money is, in some settings, a valuable property right."
Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, therefore, addressed an issue the Texas Supreme
Court never found necessary to consider in Riverside.
425. Murphy, 405 N.E.2d at 959.
426. Id. at 959-61.
427. The United States Fifth Circuit observed, in a somewhat similar context, that a
transaction "could be a true lease for federal tax purposes and a loan for state usury law
purposes." Woods-Tucker, 626 F.2d at 414.
428. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 372, at 196 (stating that "sales, leases, and security
interests are distinct transactions and are not different terms for the same rights. Each
transaction has its own true nature.").
429. See supra notes 383-86 and accompanying text.
430. The Declaration of Legislative Intent accompanying the 1967 Texas Consumer
Credit Code, of which the original Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act was a part, repeat-
edly distinguishes between sellers and lenders. For example, the declaration of intent cites
"a need for a comprehensive code of legislation to clearly define interest and usury, to
classify and regulate loans and lenders, [and] to regulate credit sales and services." Act of
May 8, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 274, § 1(5), 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 608, 609 (emphasis
added).
431. The collection of case authority in this section draws heavily on Cox, supra note
278, and to a lesser extent on JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE AcTs &
PRACTICES § 2.1 (1986).
432. Dunbar, supra note 6, at 427.
433. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994). The rationale
for including an explicit provision permitting Texas courts to look to out-of-state analogies
was explained in true Texas fashion by the amendment's senate sponsor, responding to a
question posed by state Senator (later a supreme court justice) Lloyd Doggett: "Senator,
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such an inquiry, at least so far as lenders are concerned. Commentators
on the DTPA, however, have observed in general terms that, "when ad-
dressing whether borrowing money is tantamount to seeking or purchas-
ing a 'good' or a 'service,' the majority of courts in other jurisdictions
have answered the question affirmatively. '' 43 So far as the author can
tell, it appears to be something close to a tie, if one considers just the raw
numbers. While courts in at least eight states have found banking or
lending activities to be subject to their state's deceptive trade practices
act, in cases in which the issue of lender coverage was raised,435 at least
eight other states, 436 including Texas,437 have weighed in on the other
in my experience, I find the thread of reason occasionally sparked by even such far away
places as New York City." Debate on Tex. S.B. 357 on the Floor of the Senate, 66th Leg.,
R.S., (May 19, 1977) (tape available from Senate Staff Services Office). This excerpt is also
printed in Michael Curry, The 1979 Amendments to the Deceptive Trade Practices-Con-
sumer Protection Act, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 51, 57 n.34 (1980).
434. Marziotti & Couch, supra note 18, at 38 (citing SHELDON, supra note 431, § 2.1
(1986)).
435. See, e.g., Smith v. Commercial Banking Corp., 866 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1989) (mort-
gage transactions; Pennsylvania law); In re Dukes, 24 Bankr. 404 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982)
(loan brokering; Michigan law); Villegas v. Transamerica Fin. Servs., Inc., 708 P.2d 781
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Financial Fed. Sav. Bank v. Breen, No. CV 90-378105, 1990 WL
283133 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1990); Poquonnock Ave. Assocs. v. Society for Say., No.
238670 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 1980) (unjustified threat to foreclose); Stephan v. Broth-
erhood Bank & Trust Co., 649 P.2d 419 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (home mortgage); Baird v.
Norwest Bank, 843 P.2d 327, 334 (Mont. 1992) (consumer loan); Johnson v. Phoenix Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 266 S.E.2d 610 (N.C. 1980) (loan brokering); Talbert v. Mauney, 343 S.E.2d 5
(N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (unjustified demand for loan repayment); Pennsylvania Retailers'
Ass'n v. Lazin, 426 A.2d 712 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (debt collection activities); Laviana v.
The Howard Bank, No. C400-75CnC (Chittenden Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1976) (Vermont law)
(This two-page unpublished opinion is not very informative. The core of the court's rea-
soning is as follows: "Service means to furnish or supply something needed or desired.
Money was desired by the Plaintiff. Thus, anyone supplying money, a need, would be one
who serves. The Plaintiff has stated a cause of action under the consumer fraud statute.").
436. See, e.g., George v. United Ky. Bank, Inc., 753 F.2d 50 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1018 (1985) (applying Kentucky law); Ailetcher v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Haw., 632
P.2d 1071, 1076 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981); First Fin. Bank, FSB v. Copeland, 492 So. 2d 503
(La. Ct. App. 1986); Kuntzelman v. Avco Fin. Servs. of Neb., 291 N.W.2d 705 (Neb. 1980);
Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp., 605 P.2d 730 (Or. 1980); Haeger v. Johnson, 548 P.2d 532
(Or. Ct. App. 1976); Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 P.2d 1089 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1982).
In Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 596 P.2d 429 (Idaho 1979), the Idaho Supreme Court
declined to extend the protection of the state's consumer protection act to a loan guaran-
tor. The court reasoned that "it would take a strained construction of the act to be able to
hold that the signing of a personal guarantee for a loan to a corporation was a 'purchase of
goods.'" Id. at 432.
The Idaho Supreme Court also concluded, however, that since the state statute ex-
pressed the legislative intent that "great weight shall be given" to FTC interpretations, and
since the FTC excluded banks from regulation, the guarantors' complaint was not within
the intended scope of the statute. Id. This would imply that an Idaho court would exclude
banks generally from coverage under that state's consumer protection act. This FTC-based
reasoning is subject to some doubt, however, particularly as applied to the Texas statute.
See discussion infra notes 466-71 and accompanying text.
437. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 174. At least one out-of-state commentator ranks Texas
in the loan-exclusion camp, although observing that "[t]he Texas courts, although ostensi-




side. Massachusetts courts have ruled both ways on the issue,438 with a
legislative amendment explaining the apparently inconsistent rulings.439
The legislative statement authorizing the use of out-of-state authority,
however, refers to "relevant and pertinent" court decisions. Unfortu-
nately, most decisions on the subject from other states-on both sides of
the issue-are based on statutory considerations that have no parallel in
Texas. 440 The principal problem with finding a reasonable analogy
among out-of-state decisions is that a number of deceptive trade practice
statutes, unlike consumer actions under the Texas DTPA, apply broadly
to any entities engaged in "trade or commerce." 441 A number of state
statutes, unlike Texas, also include intangibles in their definitions of
goods or property.442 On the other hand, some state decisions favoring
438. See Murphy v. Charlestown Sav. Bank, 405 N.E.2d 954 (Mass. 1980) (opining that
a loan is not a "purchase" of money); cf Raymer v. Bay State Nat'l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 515,
521 (Mass. 1981) (holding bank liable on the ground that it engages in "trade or com-
merce," and observing that Murphy "left the point open").
439. See Raymer, 424 N.E.2d at 521.
440. While this article does not attempt a comprehensive survey of state deceptive
trade practice statutes, these court decisions-both favoring and disfavoring lenders-and
the underlying statutes should be read and studied with great care before one tries to draw
any parallels to Texas. Cf Cox, supra note 278, at 226 ("[Any analysis of a consumer
protection or deceptive trade practice statute in the context of the business of banking
requires at least a scrutiny of the section containing the general prohibition of deceptive
practices, the definitional section, the exemption section, and the section granting private
remedies before it can be determined whether the challenged act or practice is subject to
the often harsh sanctions of the statute being invoked."); accord SHELDON, supra note 431,
§ 2.1, at 35 ("It is critical to examine closely the state UDAP statute to determine its
scope.").
441. See Cox, supra note 278, at 215. This distinction alone eliminates Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110b(a) (1993), Michigan, Phillips v. Dukes, 24 B.R. 404, 410
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982), North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (Michie 1994), Penn-
sylvania, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 73, § 201-02(3) (1993); see also, e.g., Smith v. Commercial
Banking Corp., 866 F.2d 576, 581 (3d Cir. 1989), and the current Massachusetts statute, see
Raymer v. Bay State Nat'l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 515, 521 (Mass. 1981), as reasonable parallels
to Texas.
A 1977 amendment to the North Carolina statute eliminated the term "trade" and de-
fined "commerce" to include "all business activities, however denominated." See Cox,
supra note 278, at 215 n.4. Under the amended statute, as might be expected, lenders have
been considered to be legitimate targets. See, e.g., Talbert v. Mauney, 343 S.E.2d 5 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1986).
The "trade or commerce" language is much like the Attorney General's broad authority
under the Texas DTPA, see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon 1987), but is
far broader than the "consumer" restriction on private causes of action under the Texas
DTPA.
442. The Kansas statute, for example, defines "goods" to include intangible personal
property, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-624(g) (Supp. 1993), and the judicial decision to include
lending transactions relies upon legislative history unique to Kansas. See State v. Brother-
hood Bank & Trust Co., 649 P.2d 419,422 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982). The Arizona definition of
"merchandise" similarly includes intangibles, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521(5) (1994)
(defining "merchandise" as "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real es-
tate, or services"), although the principal Arizona case on the subject is more broadly
based. See Villegas v. Transamerica Fin. Serv., Inc., 708 P.2d 781, 783 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(viewing loan as a "sale").
See also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110a(4) (1993) (referring to "any property, tangi-
ble or intangible . . ."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2511 (1993) (defining "merchandise" as
"any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real estate, or services"); GA. CODE
ANN. § 10-1-392(9) (Harrison 1994) (defining "trade" or "commerce" as "the advertising,
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both lenders and borrowers are subject to easy criticism as subjects for
analogy because of specific statutory language including or excluding
lending activities.443
When one limits inquiry to "relevant and pertinent" decisions, the
pickings are relatively slim. Oregon and Massachusetts decisions contain
interesting discussions of whether lending is a "purchase or lease," based
distribution, sale, lease, or offering for distribution, sale, or lease of any goods, services, or
any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 815,
para. 505/1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993)) (defining "merchandise" as including "any objects,
wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real estate... or services"); IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-
2 (1991) (stating that "consumer transaction" means "a sale, lease, assignment, award by
chance or other disposition of an item of personal property, real property, a service, or an
intangible . . ."); IowA CODE § 714.16(1)(i) (1994) (defining "merchandise" as including
"any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, securities, bonds, debentures, stocks,
real estate or services"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 206(3) (West 1989) (defining "trade"
and "commerce" as including "the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any
services and any property, tangible or intangible"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.902(d) (1989)
(defining "trade" and "commerce" as "advertising, solicitation, offering for sale or rent,
sale, lease or distribution of a service or property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or
mixed"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-3 (1991) (defining "trade" and "commerce" as "the
advertising, offering for sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or
intangible, real, personal or mixed"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-102(6) (1993) (same lan-
guage as Mississippi); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:1(II) (1984) (same); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 51-15-01(3) (Supp. 1993) (defining "merchandise" as "any objects, wares, goods,
commodities, intangibles, real estate, or services"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A)
(1993) (defining "consumer transaction" as including "a sale, lease, assignment, award by
chance, or other transfer of an item of goods, a service, a franchise, or an intangible"); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73 § 201-2(3) (1993) (defining "trade" and "commerce" as "the advertising,
offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangi-
ble, real, personal or mixed"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-1(4) (1994) (same); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 39-5-10(b) (Law. Co-op 1985) (same); Wyo. STAT. § 40-12-102(a)(vi) (1993) (de-
fining "merchandise" as "any service or any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal
or mixed").
443. Louisiana has a specific statutory exclusion for lenders. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:1406(1) (West 1993) (excluding "[aictions or transactions subject to the jurisdiction of
... the commissioner of financial institutions"). Nebraska has a more generic exclusion
that has been construed to accomplish the same result. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-
1617 (Supp. 1993) (stating that the statute's provisions "shall not apply to actions or trans-
actions otherwise permitted, prohibited, or regulated under laws administered by ... any
other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United
States"); McCaul v. American Say. Co., 331 N.W.2d 795 (Neb. 1983).
At least six other states' deceptive trade statutes exclude lending activities in whole or in
part. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-101(3) (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993) (excluding from
coverage activities permitted by Arkansas Bank Commissioner); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.212(4) (West 1988) (excluding "banks and savings and loan associations regulated by
the Department of Banking and Finance or banks or savings and loan associations regu-
lated by federal agencies"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-111 (1988) (excluding "acts or
transactions required or specifically authorized under the laws administered by, or rules or
regulations promulgated by, any regulatory bodies or officers acting under the authority of
this state or of the United States"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-2-1, 13-5-1 and 13-11-1 (1992);
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-199(D) (Michie 1992) (excluding "[blanks, savings and loan as-
sociations, credit unions [and] small loan companies").
On the other hand, at least two states explicitly include lending or credit transactions
within the statutory ambit. See MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW I § 13-101(c)(1) (1990) (defin-
ing a "consumer" to include "an actual or prospective ...recipient of ... consumer
credit"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D) (1987) (defining "unfair or deceptive trade prac-
tice" to include false statements "in connection with the ... loan of goods or services in the
extension of credit or in the collection of debts").
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on similar statutory language, and have already been discussed. 4" The
Kentucky decision is intriguing, but inconclusive. At least two commen-
tators have listed Texas and Kentucky as the only states to derive their
deceptive trade practice statutes from the model Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law.445 The Kentucky statute is indeed like
Texas in that a private cause of action is limited to one who "purchases or
leases goods or services."" 6 Kentucky decisions would therefore seem to
be particularly useful. One federal court applying Kentucky law has held
that the statute "is inapplicable to commercial lending institutions."'4" 7
Unfortunately, this decision gives no hint as to the rationale for the
court's conclusion." 8
While California law also is tempting, it ultimately offers no real an-
swers. One Texas commentator, writing soon after the DTPA was en-
acted, stated that "conversations... with some of the principal drafters of
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, indicate inspiration for some of the
Act's provisions may have stemmed from California law."449 A compari-
son of the two statutes bears out the truth of this report. The California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act a5 0 contains so many points of similarity
to the Texas DTPA that it seems clear that the Texas DTPA was either
modeled in part on the California statute or both acts share a common
source. For example, the definitions of "consumer," "goods," "services"
and "person" are very similar.451 The similarity approaches identity
when one compares the original language of the California statute with
the DTPA bill originally introduced in the Texas House of Representa-
444. See supra notes 411-26 and accompanying text.
445. SHELDON, supra note 431, § 3.4.1.2, at 78 n. 99; Dunbar, supra note 6, at 428.
446. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 367.220 (Baldwin 1992); see also Cox, supra note 278, at
217.
447. George v. United Ky. Bank, Inc., 753 F.2d 50, 53 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
George v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Louisville, 471 U.S. 1018 (1985).
448. Accord Cox, supra note 278, at 217 n.17 (describing the George decision as holding
"without discussion" that lenders are not subject to the Kentucky statute).
449. Eugene M. Anderson, Jr., The Uniform Commercial Code and the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 725, 725 n.3 (1976).
450. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1994).
451. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1)-(4) (Vernon 1987) with CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1761(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1994). The California statute, in relevant part, cur-
rently reads as follows:
§ 1761. Definitions.
As used in this title:(a) "Goods" means tangible chattels bought or leased for use primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, including certificates or coupons ex-
changeable for such goods, and including goods which, at the time of the sale
or subsequently, are to be so affixed to real property as to become a part of
such real property, whether or not severable therefrom.
(b) "Services" means work, labor, and services for other than a commercial
or business use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or
repair of goods.
(c) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other group, however organized.
(d) "Consumer" means an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or
lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761 (West Supp. 1994).
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tives.452 In addition, the first thirteen items of the Texas "laundry" list
match, in order, the corresponding items of the original California stat-
ute,453 and the two statutes originally contained similar or identical provi-
sions for the title,454 consumer waivers, 455 cumulative remedies,456 the
exception for media defendants,457 and construction and application.458
Judging from the reported decisions, California financial institutions
are frequent defendants under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act.459 In
no decision found by this writer, however, does it appear that the ques-
tion of whether financial institutions were subject to the statute was even
raised.460 While the reason for this lack of decisions is not known, it is
452. The comparable portion of the original version of H.B. 417 read as follows:
Sec. 17.45. DEFINITIONS. As used in this subchapter:
(1) "Goods" means tangible chattels bought for use primarily for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes, including certificates or coupons ex-
changeable for such goods and including goods which, at the time of the sale
or subsequently, are to be affixed to real property as to become a part of the
real property whether or not severable.
(2) "Services" means work, labor, and services for other than commercial
or business use, including services furnished iin connection with the sale or
repair of goods.
(3) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other group, however organized.
(4) "Consumer" means an individual who seeks or acquires by purchase
or lease, any goods or services for personal, family or household purposes.
Tex. H.B. 417, 63d Leg. (1973) (superseded bill found as first item in Texas Legislative
Reference Library's microfilm file on H.B. 417).
453. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(1)-(13) (Vernon 1987) with
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1770(a)-(), (m)-(o) (West Supp. 1994). Subsections (k) and (I) of the
California statute were inserted by a 1975 amendment. See id., Historical Note.
454. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (Vernon 1987) with CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1750 (West 1985).
455. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42(a) (Vernon 1987) with CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1751 (West 1985). The California statute now correlates to the first phrase of
Texas § 17.42(a). Prior to a 1989 amendment to the Texas statute, the two provisions
would have been identical. There are now some significant differences between the two
provisions, including the ability of consumers buying goods worth more than $500,000 and
represented by legal counsel to waive the DTPA's provisions. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.42(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
456. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon 1987); with CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1752 (West 1985). The two provisions contain some very similar language, but are
not identical. The California statute has been heavily amended since its enactment.
457. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(a) (Vernon 1987) with CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1755 (West 1985). The provisions are highly similar, and contain some identical
phrasing, but they are not identical.
458. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1987) with CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1760 (West 1985). The Texas statute contains some minor additions and substitu-
tions in language but is, on the whole, substantially identical to the California provision.
459. Claims include improper handling of impound accounts, Kagan v. Gibraltar Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 676 P.2d 1060 (Cal. 1984), and supposedly improper provisions in mortgage
forms; Altman v. Manhattan Say. Bank, 148 Cal. Rptr. 100, (Cal. Ct. App. 1978), question-
able trustee fees on individual retirement accounts; Cooper v. American Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 127 Cal. Rptr. 579, (Cal. Ct. App. 1976), failure to pay property tax for home loans;
Trotsky v. Los Angeles Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. Rptr. 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
460. Another California statute, passed at the same session as the Consumer Legal
Remedies Act, defined "consumer" as "any individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase
or lease, any goods, services, money or credit." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 302(c) (West
1990) (the California Consumer Affairs Act) (emphasis added). For this reason, if a Cali-
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possible that California lenders have not bothered to contest the issue
because the Consumer Legal Remedies Act is simply cumulative of po-
tential liability under many other statutes, and a legal fight therefore
would be useless.461 All in all, other than suggesting specific statutory
arguments, out-of-state authority sheds little light on the problem of
lender liability under the Texas DTPA.
2. FTC Rulings
In addition to language permitting courts to consider authority from
other jurisdictions, the DTPA also points courts to interpretations issued
by the Federal Trade Commission and court decisions construing the FTC
Act.462 While this language also deserves some brief exploration, it sheds
little light on the question of private DTPA causes of action against lend-
ers. While the language has mutated over the years, 463 the current ver-
sion of the DTPA permits courts to look to judicial decisions interpreting
the FTC Act and that such decisions are "relevant and pertinent"
authority.464
fornia court ever addresses whether the Consumer Legal Remedies Act applies to lenders,
the court might respond in the same way, and for the same reason, as the Texas Supreme
Court did in Riverside.
461. California lenders reportedly are subject to regulation by as many as twenty state
agencies. Dunbar, supra note 6, at 438. Other California statutes applicable to lenders,
governing unfair business practices, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 1987
& 1994 Supp.), and deceptive advertising, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500-17930 (West
1987 & 1994 Supp.), have been described as "far-reaching and unorthodox" and "perhaps
the area of greatest legal exposure for financial institutions facing consumer action." WAL-
TER R. SEVERSON & JAMES B. WERSON, DEFENDING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AGAINST
CALIFORNIA UNFAIR BUSINESS PRAC'nCES CLAIMS 2, 1 (1990) (privately printed by the
Severson & Werson law firm of San Francisco) (available from the author).
462. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(1) (Vernon 1987).
463. As originally enacted, the DTPA required both the Attorney General's office and
potential private claimants to look to interpretations of the FTC Act for guidance. See
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 17.46(c),
1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 324, amended by Act of May 10, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 216,
1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 600, 601, further amended by Act of May 16, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch.
603, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1327, 1329. This essentially duplicated language in old Chapter
10 of the Consumer Credit Code. See Act of May 29, 1969, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 452, 1969
Tex. Gen. Laws 1504, 1505, repealed by Act of May 21, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, 1973
Tex. Gen. Laws 322, 324. In 1977, apparently bowing to pressure from business groups, see
Gaddy Wells, Comment, What Hath the Legislature Wrought? A Critique of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act as Amended in 1977, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 525, 533 (1977) (detailing
business group objections to liberal FTC interpretations), the legislature cut back the lan-
guage, providing that in private actions only interpretations given to the DTPA by the
federal courts-not the Federal Trade Commission-would be taken as guidelines for
Texas courts. See Act of May 10, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 216, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 600,
601, amended by Act of May 16, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 603, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1327,
1329. In 1979, the process was completed when the legislature limited express reference to
FTC interpretations only to the Attorney General's enforcement efforts. After the amend-
ment, FTC interpretations thus are only relevant to enforcement actions brought by the
Texas Attorney General's office. See, e.g., Edmond R. McCarthy, Jr., An Analysis of the
1979 Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Possible Ramifications of Recent Amend-
ments: Is the Act Still Consumer Oriented?, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 885, 896-97 (1980).
464. Accord Philip K. Maxwell, 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS CONSUMER LAW FOR
GENERAL PRACTITIONERS A-4 (1979).
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Due to federal restrictions on the FTC's enforcement authority and re-
sulting regulatory convolutions,465 the legislative suggestion that courts
look to FTC interpretations is difficult to implement in the case of bank
loans. Courts, therefore, have developed widely varying views of the ap-
plication of state DTPA statutes to lending. A Texas appeals court has
concluded that the Texas legislature's failure to include a specific exemp-
tion for banks in the DTPA, similar to that contained in the FTC Act,
implies that banking activities are included in the Texas act.466 The Texas
Supreme Court, however, reversed on another ground without mention-
ing the lower court's reasoning on this point. 467 In contradiction, the
Idaho Supreme Court construed similar language directing courts to give
"great weight" to FTC interpretations of the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act468 as mandating a conclusion that a loan guarantee was not meant by
the statute's framers to be within the statute's purview.469 In further con-
trast, a Connecticut court has distinguished between the FTC's "enforce-
ment powers," which do not include banking activities, and its
"interpretive powers," which supposedly do.470 The latter view appar-
ently would exclude banking activities from the range of permitted con-
sumer actions under the Texas DTPA.471
3. Attorney General Enforcement Activities
Even if FTC interpretations offer little real assistance, one might argue
that the enforcement efforts of the Texas Attorney General's Office shed
light on the issue of the DTPA's role in lender disputes. After all, courts
often defer to the interpretations given a statute by the agency charged
with its enforcement. 472 The Texas Attorney General's office has given
465. The FTC's enforcement authority does not extend directly to banks, due to a spe-
cific exemption in the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1988). The Federal Reserve Board,
however, is specifically empowered to control "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" by
banks, as is the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for savings institutions. 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a(f)(1) (1988). This enforcement authority, however, is severely trammeled by the
stricture that Federal Reserve and FHLBB regulations must be substantially similar to
their FTC counterparts. Id. And this restriction is tempered further by the proviso that
the Federal Reserve and FHLBB can decline to adopt FTC regulations if the acts in ques-
tion are not unfair or deceptive in the banking context or enforcement would conflict with
basic banking policies. Id.; see also Robert P. Chamness & Walter E. Zalenski, Banks
Come Under the Reach of the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Rule, 6 ABA BANK
COMPLIANCE 20 (1985).
466. Farmers and Merchants State Bank of Krum v. Ferguson, 605 S.W.2d 320, 325
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 617 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1981).
467. The Texas Supreme Court was of the view that the plaintiff was a "business con-
sumer" barred from recovery under the version of the DTPA in effect at the time of the
operative acts. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 617 S.W.2d at 919.
468. IDAHO CODE § 48-604 (1977).
469. Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 596 P.2d 429, 432 (Idaho 1979).
470. Financial Fed. Say. Bank v. Breen, No. CV 90-378105, 1990 WL 283133 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1990).
471. This conclusion would follow from the 1979 legislature's decision to excise FTC
"interpretations" from the sources of judicial guidance in DTPA consumer actions. See
supra note 463 and accompanying text.
472. See, e.g., Dodd v. Meno, 870 S.W.2d 4,7 (Tex. 1994). "Construction of a statute by
the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to serious consideration, so long as the
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some indication in the past that it considers lending activities to be within
its enforcement powers.473 One problem with drawing any larger conclu-
sions from such declarations, however, is that unlike private consumers,
the Texas Attorney General's office operates under the DTPA's broad
"onmibus clause," generally prohibiting "[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. . . . -474 A
more serious problem is the legislative history, tending to show that such
enforcement authority was not contemplated by the legislature when the
statute was enacted.475
In short, neither the Texas Attorney General's Office, FTC interpreta-
tions, or out-of-state judicial decisions offer much help in determining the
intended bounds of the Texas DTPA. In any event, the best evidence of
intent is the words of the statute, its legislative history, and subsequent
amendments. These sources do offer a comparatively rich and as yet unu-
tilized lode of interpretive material. Analysis of this material leads to the
clear conclusion that the Riverside decision was far more limited than
needed; lenders were simply never contemplated by the Texas Legislature
as legitimate DTPA targets.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY AND COMMON SENSE
This section briefly examines some implications of extending the DTPA
to lending transactions. While much of this material might appear more
appropriate for presentation to the Texas Legislature than for an article
examining judicial interpretations of the DTPA, it also is worth consider-
ing here. First, if application of the DTPA to lending transactions would
not produce the results the act was designed to accomplish, this lends
some credence to the conclusion that the Texas Legislature's excision of
loans from the DTPA was deliberate. Second, if significant negative con-
sequences could result from applying the DTPA to lenders, as the author
suggests, any such extension of the act ought to be accomplished through
the legislature, a body better designed to weigh and balance public policy
considerations.
The discussion that follows makes a series of related points, first gen-
eral, then specific. The first subsection reviews the banking debacle of
construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute." Id.
(quoting Tarrant Appraisal Dist. v. Moore, 845 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. 1993)).
473. The Texas Attorney General's Office issued a policy enforcement statement in re-
action to complaints that lenders were setting interest lock-in periods for intervals too
short to be useful to loan customers. See JACK C. HARRIS, SHOULD MORTGAGE RATE
COMMITMENTS BE ENFORCED? 4-5 (Texas A&M Real Estate Center, January 1991). The
Attorney General's Office also filed an amicus curiae brief in Riverside, arguing unsuccess-
fully that "Section 17.46(a) [of the DTPA] was clearly violated by Riverside," though no
explanation of the ground for this conclusion was evident. See Brief of State of Texas as
Amicus Curiae at 18, Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980).
474. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon 1987). A number of courts in
other states have concluded that similar language includes banking practices. See, e.g.,
Cox, supra note 278, at 215; see also supra note 441.
475. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
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the late 1980s and the current recovery, demonstrating the volatility of
the current Texas lending environment. The second subsection provides
an overview of the extensive system of consumer lending regulation al-
ready in place, and the third spotlights one important consequence of that
regulation: federal preemption of some applications of the DTPA to con-
sumer loans. The final subsections draw on prior material and predicts
specific consequences of a decision to extend the DTPA to lending trans-
actions: co-option by sophisticated business litigants, credit flight, and
the thwarting of state and federal regulatory functions.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF TEXAS LENDING
1. The Economic Environment
Texas banking, particularly as experienced during the last decade, truly
is "a world unto itself. '476 Detailed analysis of the collapse of the Texas
lending industry in the late 1980s is beyond the scope of this article and,
at this late date, superfluous. The lessons learned in the Great Depres-
sion, and forgotten temporarily by borrowers and lenders alike during the
oil and real estate boom of the 1970s and early 1980s, were brought home
forcefully to Texans through a series of institutional failures that beggars
description. An FDIC publication does as well as any:
In 1980 the phrase "the Texas economy" evoked images of surging
oil prices and boundless possibilities; by 1990 those images had been
replaced by the reality of vacant office buildings and bankruptcy
court. In the interim, nine of the ten largest Texas banking organiza-
tions were recapitalized with FDIC or other outside assistance, 425
Texas banks failed or were assisted by the FDIC, and the FDIC in-
curred insurance losses of nearly $11 billion in Texas.477
It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that "[n]o other area in the
world has experienced anything like the financial holocaust visited upon
Texas." 478
On the bright side, financial analysts now proclaim that "[n]o industry
has undergone a more dramatic turnaround than Texas banking. '479 In
1990, Texas banks480 earned the first overall yearly profit in five years.481
476. Arnold G. Danielson, Impact of Nationwide Banking in the South May Not Be
Dramatic, BANKING POLICY REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 11, 17.
477. A Letter From the Editor, 3 FDIC BANKING REV. i (Winter 1990).
478. Frederick E. Rowe, Jr., As Goes Texas...?, FORBES, Dec. 7, 1992, at 114.
479. Robert T. Clair & Fiona Sigalla, The Texas Economy: Positive Signs at Last, J.
COM. LENDING, Oct. 1993, at 42.
480. The discussion focuses on banks because thrifts are no longer a significant portion
of the Texas lending picture. See, e.g., Danielson, supra note 476, at 11, 17 (stating that as
of March 31, 1994, the savings and loans' share of Texas deposits was only about 13% and
falling). Those thrifts that remain also enjoy substantial profits. See Exec Under Cloud,
N.O. TIMES-PIcAYUNE, Dec. 13, 1994, at D1 (reporting third-quarter earnings for savings
and loans nationwide of $1.52 billion); S&L Profits Up Despite Rate Hikes, Hous. POST,
Sept. 10, 1994, at C3 (reporting second-quarter 1994 profits for Texas-based thrifts of $97
million, down from $158 million during the same period in 1993).
481. Earl Golz, Texas Banks Rebound for 1990 Profit, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Mar. 5, 1991, at D8.
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December 1994 figures show record profits for banks nationwide 482 and
healthy profits for Texas banks as well.4 83 Between 1988 and 1992, the
percentage of bank assets held by "healthy" banks in Texas rose from 38
to 81 percent.48 Perhaps even more telling, there were no Texas bank
failures during first three quarters of 1994.485
One should, however, be cautious about painting too rosy a picture. A
substantial portion of the favorable profit picture comes not from lending
activity, but from investments, 486 currently preferred by many banks over
the risks of the lending market.487 Moreover, for banks that are making
new loans, comparatively low risk consumer loans seem to be preferred
over business loans. 4
88
Since the Texas DTPA has not generally been applied to lenders in the
past, judicial interpretations of the statute bear little or none of the blame
for the industry collapse of the late 1980s.489 In at least two respects,
however, the recent history of Texas banking has some general implica-
tions for the wisdom of applying the DTPA to lenders. First, since "ex-
perts predict the Texas lending market will stay jittery for years," 490
anything that tends to increase bankers' "jitters" might be expected to
decrease Texas lending and harm the Texas economy. Second, for the
foreseeable future, Texas and federal regulators undoubtedly will be ex-
amining Texas lending practices more closely and with a more jaundiced
eye than in the past, particularly since the FDIC apparently believes that
482. In the News, Hous. POST, Dec. 16, 1994, at D2 (reporting the FDIC's announce-
ment that the earnings of U.S. banks had reached an all-time high of $11.8 billion in the
third quarter, and profits were headed toward another record for the year).
483. Loan Competition Pares Profits for Texas Banks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec.
16, 1994, at 13D. "To date this year, Texas banks have earned $1.47 billion, down from
$1.9 billion through the same period a year earlier... [and] [blanks charged off $2.4 billion
in loans in the third quarter, the smallest level since the first quarter of 1985." Id
484. Clair & Sigalla, supra note 479, at 47.
485. Terrence O'Hara, Small Texas Banks Outshine Big Rivals as State Rebounds, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 30, 1994, at 6 (citing this fact as "perhaps the clearest sign of the new stabil-
ity" in the Texas banking industry).
486. See, e.g., Robert B. Cox, Profits Sparkle at Small Banks in Texas, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 30, 1993, at 6 (stating that "[m]any Texas banks, confronted with bone-dry loan de-
mand, had loaded up on bonds-and the value of those investments soared as rates
plunged").
487. As two commentators recently explained the situation:
Faced with problems of asset quality and a weak regional economy, banks
chose investing in securities over granting loans. Even after the Texas econ-
omy began its recovery in 1987, the banks continued this pattern of securities
expansion and lending contraction. The securities holdings of Texas banks
increased at more than a 10% annual rate for every year from 1988 to 1991;
lending contracted in each of these years.
Clair & Sigalla, supra note 479, at 48.
488. Beverly L. Hadaway, Some Perspectives on the Banking Environment 1988-1992,
TEx. Bus. REv., Feb. 1993, at 2 (stating that "commercial and industrial lending have de-
clined more than consumer lending").
489. A possible exception might be the LeMaire decision against MBank, wherein the
bank failed while a $69 million lender liability decision based in part on the DTPA was on
rehearing in the Houston Court of Appeals (Fourteenth District). See supra note 9.
490. Steve Klinkerman, Hunkering Down in the Lone Star State, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12,
1990, at 1.
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fewer bank examinations during the mid-1980s contributed, in some mea-
sure, to the severity of the Texas crisis. 491
Beyond the obvious purpose of assuring stable and sound financial in-
stitutions, increased regulatory scrutiny has both good and bad effects.
On the negative side, bankers492 and borrowers493 alike complain that
increased regulation has decreased loan availability. On the positive side,
since one purpose of bank examinations is "to investigate whether the
bank is abiding by a variety of measures designed to protect consumers,
such as truth-in-lending requirements, civil rights laws, and community
reinvestment regulations," 494 Texas lenders undoubtedly are paying more
attention than ever before to proper compliance with consumer law. This
makes the additional threat of DTPA liability less useful today than it
may have been in the past. The pervasive scope of federal and state regu-
lation of consumer lending practices, however, has some additional impli-
cations, discussed in the subsections that follow.
2. The Regulatory Environment
Consumer lending usually is done on a volume basis. Each home or
auto loan produces a very small profit for a financial institution. In con-
sequence, standard forms and loan "packages" are the norm and individ-
ually negotiated deals a rarity. This fact has been criticized by some as
showing an imbalance of bargaining power.495 More realistically, how-
491. John O'Keefe, The Texas Banking Crisis: Causes and Consequences 1980-1989,
FDIC BANKING REVIEW, Winter 1990, at 9-13.
492. See, e.g., Bankers Believe Overregulations Cause Credit Crunch, TEXAS BANKING,
June 1991, at 24 (reporting the conclusion of Texas Bankers Association president Robert
Harris that "tougher regulatory scrutiny" is a principal reason for the Texas credit crunch);
Local Bankers Wiser, Healthier as Financial Industry Rebounds, Hous. Bus. J., Sept. 26,
1992, at 511 (quoting Walter Johnson, president of Southwest Bank of Texas: "The biggest
challenge we face today is government regulations. Federal regulators are trying to kill the
banks. Consumer banking laws passed in December of 1991 are very onerous, time-con-
suming, expensive and counter-productive."); see also Klinkerman, supra note 490, at 1
(stating that "[a] tightened regulatory environment has spooked banks into ever-more cau-
tious lending practices").
493. Beverly L. Hadaway, The Texas Economy: Financing Availability, TEX. Bus. REv.,
June 1991, at 2 (reporting from a survey that business borrowers blames "overly zealous
regulators" for difficulty in securing loans).
494. O'Keefe, supra note 491, at 10.
495. For example, in a case involving the specificity required for waiver of notice of
acceleration, a concurring opinion originally drafted by Justice Franklin Spears, but issued
after his retirement by Justice Oscar Mauzy, argued that all such clauses should be held
void as a matter of public policy:
The maker's rights to demand for payment, notice of intent to accelerate and
notice of acceleration are valuable rights that this court should protect from
skillful drafters who routinely insert waivers of these rights into pre-printed
forms. If we waited for the lenders of this world to provide for these rights in
their forms, or for borrowers to achieve the bargaining power to negotiate
these terms, these equitable rights simply would not exist. The court's opin-
ion ignores reality. Borrowers do not stand in an equal bargaining position
with their lenders. In pretending that they do, the court abdicates its tradi-
tional function as guardian of these equitable rights.
Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 896 (Tex. 1991) (Mauzy, J.,
concurring).
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ever, both lenders and borrowers profit by the economies of scale that
can result from standardized consumer loan packages.
The fact that most consumer loans fall into a small number of standard
formats with relatively standard terms also makes these transactions par-
ticularly amenable to government regulation. Over the past two decades,
an extensive array of state and federal regulations has developed to pro-
tect the interests of consumers in small, and even some large, loan trans-
actions. These regulations span the entire life cycle of a loan: from
advertising, through the loan application, through the minutiae of loan
documentation, to default and foreclosure. In the aggregate, consumer
borrowers already enjoy an umbrella of protection that even the most
vigorous individual enforcement of the DTPA could not hope to match.
Federal law sets out many disclosure requirements for consumer loans.
The federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts496 and the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987,4 9 7 all implemented by the
Federal Reserve Board through "Reg Z,' 498 set out many requirements
related to credit advertising.499 Federal law imposes significant additional
disclosure requirements for purchase money home loans. Under the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) 500 and resulting HUD regu-
lations,501 specific disclosures, together with good faith estimates of clos-
ing costs, must be provided to a loan applicant within three business
days.50 2 RESPA also prohibits a number of questionable lender activi-
ties, including kickbacks or unearned fees, excessive escrows, and tie-ins
with title insurers.5 03 The Flood Disaster Protection Act5°4 imposes yet
another layer of special disclosure requirements for lenders financing
homes in flood hazard areas.
Lending institutions also are restricted in the reasons for which con-
sumer credit legitimately may be denied. The Equal Credit Opportunity
Act,505 implemented by the Federal Reserve Board through "Reg B,' 50 6
496. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
497. 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
498. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1993).
499. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.4, 226.16 (1993). Reg Z's stated purpose is to "promote the in-
formed use of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its terms and cost." 12
C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (1993). To accomplish this purpose, lenders must provide detailed infor-
mation for loan transactions in which the amount of the loan is not greater than $25,000 or
is secured by a lien on the borrower's home. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(3) (1982 & Supp. 1994). For
"open end" credit transactions, such as credit card debts and lines of credit, federal law
requires an initial written disclosure of the finance charge and other charges, a statement
of the consumer's billing rights and responsibilities, and a disclosure of security interests in
the debtor's property that will be required. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5 (1993). "Closed end" credit
transactions, such as the typical installment credit sale, require a similar disclosure of as
many as eighteen categories of required information. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17 (1993).
500. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
501. 24 C.F.R. pt. 203 (1993).
502. 12 U.S.C. § 2604 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
503. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2607-2609 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
504. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
505. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691a-f (1988 & Supp. 1993).
506. 12 C.F.R. pt. 202 (1993).
[Vol. 48
LENDERS AND THE DTPA
prohibits lenders from discriminating in any aspect of a credit transac-
tion.507 The Federal Trade Commission also exercises a great deal of con-
trol over some aspects of lending, by directly or indirectly prohibiting
"false or deceptive" lending practices508 and, by abrogating the "holder in
due course" doctrine for certain consumer transactions, thereby making
lenders partly responsible for the consequences of sellers' misconduct.509
The Federal Reserve Board has extended these requirements to banks
through amendments to Reg AA.510 The Bank Tying Act5 prohibits the
conditioning of credit on the purchase of bank services or requirements
that loan customers not do business with the bank's competitors. The
Community Reinvestment Act 51 2 addresses the practice of "redlining" 513
by encouraging established lending institutions to extend credit to low-
income neighborhoods, decreasing the opportunities available to the un-
scrupulous. In addition, the Fair Credit Reporting Act,514 while not spe-
cifically regulating lenders, protects potential borrowers from inaccurate
or obsolete credit information, thereby providing substantial remedies
515
for consumers who are denied credit based on false information.
Texas law supplements and significantly expands upon federal require-
ments. The Texas Consumer Credit Code contains detailed regulations
and required disclosures for certain small loans, installment loans and
sales, revolving loans and secondary mortgage loans, as well as mobile
home and auto loans. 516 Home solicitations also receive special treat-
507. This includes information requirements, investigation, procedures, standards of
creditworthiness, terms of credit, revocation or termination of credit and collection proce-
dures. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.4 (1987).
Under this legislation, as implemented, lenders cannot legitimately consider race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, receipt of public assistance, or good faith
exercise of rights under the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act as factors in denying
credit. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(2) (1987). The ECOA and Reg B require lenders to follow de-
tailed procedures in processing applications for credit. Lenders cannot request certain in-
formation in a credit application, must take action on an application within 30 days from
the time it is complete, and must provide applicants with timely notice of action. 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.5-202.9 (1987). Enforcement "teeth" include individual and class actions for actual
and punitive damages, costs and attorney's fees in many cases. 12 C.F.R. § 202.14 (1987).
508. The general framework of these regulations has already been described. See supra
notes 462-74 and accompanying text; see also Reg AA, 12 C.F.R. pt. 227 (1993).
509. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
510. See generally Chamness & Zalenski, supra note 465.
511. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1971-78 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
512. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902-07 (1988 & Supp. 1991); see Jonathan P. Tomes, The "Commu-
nity" in the Community Reinvestment Acv A Term in Search of a Definition, 10 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 225 (1991).
513. This term comes from the practice among some lenders of drawing a red line on a
map around those neighborhoods judged to be poor credit risks. See Gene A. Marsh,
Lender Liability for Consumer Fraud Practices of Retail Dealers and Home Improvement
Contractors, 45 ALA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993).
514. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988 & Supp. 1994).
515. These remedies include actual damages and attorney's fees for negligent noncom-
pliance, plus punitive damages upon proof of willful violations. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n-o
(1988).
516. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.01 (Vernon 1987) (limiting application of
Chapter 3 of the Consumer Credit Code to loans of $2500 or less); §§ 4.01-.04 (Vernon
1987 and Supp. 1994) (installment loans); §§ 6.01-.11 (installment sales); §§ 15.01-.11 (re-
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ment.517 The Texas Consumer Credit Code provides a variety of remedies
for violations, including cease and desist orders, injunctions, civil penal-
ties, and consumer class actions.518 Finally, an entire chapter of the
Credit Code, passed at the same legislative session as the DTPA, is de-
voted to abuses in debt collection practices. 519 Similar legislation, the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,520 has been enacted at the federal
level, although the federal statute does not apply to creditors collecting
their own debts.521 Both laws are aimed at abusive and harassing debt
collection practices, including fraudulent or deceptive representations by
collection agents.522
This array of protective legislation in the area of consumer loans bewil-
ders many lenders and daunts even those attorneys who specialize in fi-
nancial institution law. Testifying at interim hearings, the former chair of
the Texas state bar's consumer law section described the job of keeping
up with regulatory requirements as "a never-ending task," concluding
that "we have reached in my view a saturation point in the proliferation
of consumer laws and regulations at the state and federal level. ' 523 This
view is supported by a 1991 survey of Texas bankers: 64 percent of the
bankers surveyed believe that there is a "credit crunch" in Texas and 93
percent of those who believe there is a credit crunch attribute the prob-
lem to excessive government regulation. 524 Some credibility is added to
bankers' claims by Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen's recent warning
that "failure to streamline the hodgepodge system of federal banking reg-
ulation risks another financial crisis. '525
Leaving the wisdom of extensive regulation of lending practices to one
side, it seems clear that consumers enjoy a significant degree of statutory
protection in this area, even without adding the DTPA's provisions to the
top of the heap. In light of the fact that the Texas Legislature deliberately
excluded the business of lending from the DTPA in 1973, and that many
statutory restrictions on consumer lending have been enacted since that
time, there would seem even less reason now for courts to extend the
DTPA to lending transactions than there was at the time of the Riverside
decision.
volving loans); §§ 5.01-.05 (secondary mortgage loans); §§ 6A.01-.18 (mobile home loans);
§§ 7.01-.11 (auto loans).
517. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-13.01-.07 (Vernon 1987).
518. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2.03(7) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994) (cease
and desist orders, injunctions); 8.05 (Vernon 1987) (civil penalties); 8.04(b) (consumer class
actions).
519. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01 to .12 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
520. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
521. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1988).
522. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (1988).
523. Interim Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 88-89
(Aug. 12, 1988) (testimony of J. Scott Sheehan) (transcript available from Senate Staff
Services Office).
524. Bankers Believe Overregulations Cause Credit Crunch, 80 TEX. BANKING 24 (June
1991).
525. Bentsen Says Banks May Face New Crisis, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 2, 1994, at 3B.
[Vol. 48
1995] LENDERS AND THE DTPA
3. The Possibility of Preemption
The pervasiveness of federal regulation of consumer loans leads natu-
rally to the question of whether an attempt by Texas courts or the legisla-
ture to apply the DTPA to lending transactions could run afoul of the
preemption doctrine. The answer is relatively clear: As a general matter,
federal law would not preempt state action. A caveat to that answer,
however-that application of the DTPA to certain classes of loans may
be preempted-makes a brief examination of the question useful.
In general, a state statute can be preempted in one of three ways: Con-
gress can expressly preempt state law; Congress can implicitly preempt
state law through a comprehensive scheme of regulation; or an actual
conflict between state and federal law can make compliance with both
sets of laws difficult or impossible. 526 There is a presumption against fed-
eral preemption of state law.527 As a practical matter, to a Texas state
court, this presumption may be strengthened by the Texas Supreme
Court's recognition that the DTPA stems from "a deeply rooted state
interest. "528
The possibility that Congress has occupied the entire field of regulation
of consumer lending is easily dismissed, so far as banks are concerned. 529
Congress can preempt a particular field of law through explicit statutory
language or through a comprehensive scheme of regulation so pervasive
as to justify a logical inference that Congress left no room for additional
state action.530 No specific language in the federal laws governing con-
526. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982); see
also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (holding punitive damages
not preempted by federal law).
527. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963).
528. Brown v. American Transfer and Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1980); see
also BRAGG, ET AL., supra note 94, at 52, § 2.05. This deference to state interests is, of
course, far from complete. "The relative importance to the State of its own law is not
material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitu-
tion provided that the federal law must prevail." Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962);
see also Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1981) (holding Maine law did not pre-
empt life insurance beneficiary).
529. The general preemption argument may have some validity when applied to a fed-
erally chartered savings and loan. In contrast to banks, federally chartered thrifts are sub-
ject to a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation that has been described as "covering
all aspects of every federal savings and loan association from its cradle to its corporate
grave." Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir.
1974) (citing People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951)).
Federal regulations governing thrifts certainly give the impression that the regulatory
scheme preempts the field, referring to the "plenary and exclusive authority of the [Federal
Home Loan Bank] Board to regulate all aspects of the operations of Federal associations,"
and stating that "[tihis exercise of the Board's authority is preemptive of any state law
purporting to address the subject of the operations of a federal association." 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.2 (1989). One Washington court, in fact, deciding whether that state's deceptive
trade practices act applied to a federally chartered savings and loan, has found preemption.
Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 656 P.2d 1089, 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). A
similar argument, however, has failed in Massachusetts. Morse v. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n of Whitman, 536 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Mass. 1982).
530. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158-60 (1978).
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sumer lending expresses an intent to exclude state action.531 Nor does
the history of federal regulation of banking suggest any general preemp-
tion of the field by implication.5 32 Accordingly, those who suggest that
the law governing nationally chartered banks generally preempts state
deceptive trade practice statutes can expect to have a difficult time ofit.533
The final type of preemption argument, that specific federal regulations
may preempt specific applications of the Texas DTPA, is an entirely dif-
ferent matter. In the field of lending, specific preemption arguments
have succeeded in displacing such venerable and deeply-seated restric-
tions on Texas lending as the usury534 and homestead535 laws. The Texas
DTPA already has been held to be preempted in specific situations by the
Federal Arbitration Act536 and by the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA). 537 It is easy to envision many other situa-
tions in which specific preemption challenges might be leveled against the
531. Accord BRAGG, supra note 94, at 50.
532. The point was clearly articulated by the Third Circuit:
Whatever may be the history of federal-state relations in other fields, regula-
tion of banking has been one of dual control since the passage of the first
National Bank Act of 1863 .... In only a few instances has Congress explic-
itly preempted state regulations of national banks. More commonly, it has
been left to the courts to delineate the proper boundaries of federal and state
supervision. The judicial test has been a tolerant one.
National State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980).
533. The general preemption argument has not fared well in the courts. The Supreme
Court of California, for example, dealing with a preemption question in dicta in a bank
service charge case, observed that "although many federal statutes and regulations deal
with the subject of unfair competition and deceptive practices, such statutes and regula-
tions generally co-exist peacefully with state laws regulating the same activity." Perdue v.
Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 525 n.44 (1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
On the rare occasions that the subject has arisen to date in Texas, the general preemp-
tion argument has not been successful. The Riverside majority did not address the preemp-
tion question, possibly because any discussion of preemption would have been dicta. The
four dissenting justices of the Texas Supreme Court, however, rejected an argument based
on the division of regulatory responsibility between the FTC and the Federal Reserve
Board, reasoning that "[t]he denial of authority to the [FTC] to regulate national banks
concerning unfair or deceptive practices in no way precludes the Texas Legislature from
setting up its own mechanism to regulate deceptive practices of national banks." Riverside,
603 S.W.2d at 179 (Campbell, J., dissenting). In broader terms, the dissenting justices con-
cluded: "There is nothing in the Texas [DTPA] which interferes with the purposes of the
creation of national banks or which would tend to impair or destroy their efficacy as fed-
eral agencies." Id. A somewhat similar preemption argument likewise has failed to im-
press a Texas appeals court. See Farmers and Merchants State Bank of Krum v. Ferguson,
605 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1980), modified on other grounds, 617 S.W.2d
918 (Tex. 1981). All in all, the argument that federal regulation generally preempts appli-
cation of the Texas DTPA to lenders is unlikely to be successful.
534. Seiter v. Veytia, 756 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1988).
535. Briercroft Serv. Corp. v. De los Santos, 776 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1988, writ denied); Gutierrez v. Gulf Coast Builders, 739 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1987, writ denied).
536. Coonley v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 404, 406 (W.D. Tex. 1985) (upholding
binding arbitration agreements against the DTPA's "non-waiver" provision); Marley v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 333, 335 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (same); Jack B.
Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. 1992) (same).
537. Giles v. TI Employees Pension Plan, 715 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejecting a DTPA challenge to a pension plan provision).
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Texas DTPA should the statute be applied by courts to lending transac-
tions. For example, a lender making all disclosures required by Reg Z538
would have a persuasive argument against a borrower claiming to have
been deceived by the lender's failure to make further disclosures. A
lender denying credit for reasons not prohibited by the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act could make similar claims,539 and so forth.
In one very significant area of potential lender liability under the
DTPA, namely, the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine, the Texas
Supreme Court already has dealt with some cases. Two cases, which have
been discussed earlier,5 40 presented a potential conflict between the
DTPA and federal law. These cases involved claims that a lender should
be found to be "inextricably intertwined" with a consumer transaction,
and thus liable under the DTPA, when the lender was an assignee of con-
sumer paper containing a required FTC disclosure that preserves con-
sumer defenses while limiting lender liability to amounts paid under the
contract. 541 In none of these cases did the Texas Supreme Court explic-
itly discuss the possibility of preemption.542 On the other hand, in each
case, the Texas Supreme Court favored the FTC rule, not the DTPA, in
reaching a result. In the process, as will be discussed shortly, the "inextri-
cably intertwined" rule may have been restricted to the point of trivial-
ity. 54 3 Thus, in at least one area,5 44 federal regulation already may be
influencing the development of Texas judicial doctrine on the potential
interface between lending transactions and the DTPA.
B. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING THE DTPA TO LENDING
TRANSACTIONS
It is difficult to assess the impact of the DTPA on the Texas economy.
The statute, appropriately described as "a grand experiment, ' 545 has now
been an important part of the Texas business scene for over two decades.
Yet little attention has been given to the purpose of this experiment,
much less the collection of hard data on the results. In consequence, "we
538. See supra notes 496-99 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 505-07 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
541. See Perez v. Briercroft Serv. Corp., 809 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1991); Home Say. Ass'n
v. Guerra, 733 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1987); Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1985); see
also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cook, 840 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ
denied).
542. At least one commentator suggests that the FTC rule was not intended to preempt
state remedies. See Marsh, supra note 513, at 51 (stating that "the decisions to date dealing
with the FTC Rule where debtors are using it affirmatively, as well as the guidance coming
from the FTC staff in the mid-1970s, suggest no such limited liability was intended if the
plaintiff's theory was based on independent state law grounds and not on the FTC rule").
543. See infra notes 615-16 and accompanying text.
544. Conversely, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held in a recent case that the
Federal Ship Mortgage Act does not preclude a DTPA action against a lender, when the
borrower's claims relate to the loan's structure and events at closing. See Ocean Transport,
Inc. v. Greycas, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 256, 272 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, n.w.h.).




know little about the costs and benefits of the Texas DTPA."' 46 A fur-
ther complication for any attempt to judge the DTPA's effect is a lack of
any consensus on what the statute is intended to accomplish, extending
even to disagreements between the drafters on the original intent of the
statute.547 For these reasons, any discussion of the public policy implica-
tions of extending the DTPA to lending transactions necessarily is tenta-
tive and idiosyncratic.
Nonetheless, some reasonable guesses can be made. The subsections
that follow describe the likelihood that extending the DTPA to lending
transactions will favor sophisticated consumers disproportionately, de-
crease credit availability and frustrate efforts to monitor the soundness of
banking institutions, while solving no problems that could not be handled
better by state agencies.
1. Perverting Public Policy: The DTPA as the Exclusive Tool of the
Rich
While the intent of the Texas Legislature to exclude loans from the
DTPA's ambit is clear, and has been documented in some detail,548 the
original reason for the exclusion is not so clear. Comments made during
discussion on the original bill, however, suggest that the Texas Legislature
may have felt that lenders already were subject to sufficient regulation to
protect consumers.5 49 Whatever may have been the legislature's original
intent, the regulatory explosion that has occurred during the past two de-
cades makes the wisdom of applying the DTPA to loans extremely ques-
tionable today. Condensed to one sentence, development of a judicial
doctrine that makes lenders liable under the DTPA primarily will favor
large business litigants, not small consumers.
The DTPA has never by its terms been limited solely to small consum-
ers. The original draft of the DTPA contained a definition of "consumer"
that would have restricted a private cause of action to "an individual who
seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal,
family, or household use."1550 The restriction to purchases of goods for
"personal, family, or household use" dropped out of the bill that was en-
546. Stewart Macaulay, Address: Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts
Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Statutes, 26 Hous. L. REV. 575, 594 (1989).
547. See, e.g., Lynn, supra note 545, at 868.
548. See supra notes 266-304 and accompanying text.
549. As discussed earlier, one senator mentioned during floor debate that "small loans,
regulatory, they are the ones that are out of this bill." See supra text accompanying note
301. During committee debates, Rep. Temple indicated that he was aware of the extensive
regulatory system governing banks, commenting: "Now, I don't know how many different
agencies regulate the banking industry, but right offhand, I can think of state bank, for
example, is very closely regulated by the FDIC, the Department of Banking of the State of
Texas, it comes under the Commercial Code, I believe." See supra note 301.
550. Tex. H.B. 417, § 17.45(4), 63d Leg., R.S. (1973) (superseded bill found as first item
in Texas Legislative Reference Library's microfilm file on H.B. 417).
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acted;551 a later amendment removed the requirement that "services"
must be "for other than commercial or business use. '552
Nonetheless, in light of the overall history of the DTPA, it seems fair to
say that the "primary aim" of the statute was to protect small consum-
ers.553 One of the statute's drafters, in the foreword to a co-authored
treatise on the subject, explained that before the DTPA's enactment
many consumer complaints "involved only small amounts of money
which a lawyer could not economically pursue. '554 Much of the structure
of the DTPA reinforces the conclusion that its primary focus is the pro-
tection of individuals against the excesses of the marketplace. 555 The
trebling of damages in general,556 and the mandatory trebling of damages
under $1000,557 obviously is designed to encourage small claims. 558 The
provision for attorneys fees to any successful litigant 559 accomplishes
much the same result.
Since the DTPA was drafted with small consumers primarily in
mind,560 and since there evidently was little conscious attention given to
551. Texas DTPA, § 17.45(4), Act of May 21, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 143, 1973 Tex.
Gen. Laws 322, 323.
552. Id § 17.45(2), amended by Act of May 10, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 216, § 1, 1977
Tex. Gen. Laws 600, 600; see also Wells, supra note 463, at 543-44 (criticizing 1977 amend-
ment as being undertaken by the legislature with "virtually no discussion or investigation
to determine whether such entities actually require the easier burden of proof and treble
damage incentive to sue.").
553. Interim Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 9 (Aug.
12, 1988) (testimony of Karen Neeley) (transcript available from Senate Staff Services
Office).
554. BRAGG, supra note 94, at v (introduction to the first edition).
555. Accord Curry, supra note 433, at 52 (1980); John R. Harrison, Jr., The Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act: The Shield Becomes a Sword, 17 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 879, 912-13 (1986).
556. Former Attorney General John Hill, in whose office the DTPA originated, ex-
plained that the treble damage provisions in the DTPA were designed to give consumers
effective remedies in cases commonly considered too small to warrant the expense of litiga-
tion. See Hill, supra note 296, at 614. He described his personal reasons for sponsoring the
DTPA as follows:
Prior to being elected to the Office of Attorney General of Texas, I was con-
cerned about the state of the law in the consumer area, since, in many in-
stances, justice was not being afforded our citizens purely because of the
economic imbalance between the costs of litigation and the generally small
amounts in controversy. While in private practice, I saw many types of inju-
ries and damage that could befall a consumer which simply could not be re-
dressed in the courts due to the economic reality of spending more money on
court costs and attorney's fees than could ultimately be recovered from the
defendant wrongdoer.
John L. Hill, Foreword to the First Edition, BRAGG, supra note 94, at iii.
557. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
558. See, e.g., Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 690 (Tex. 1980); McCarthy,
supra note 463, at 892-93.
559. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 1987).
560. The utility of the DTPA as a remedy even for small consumers is not an issue that
the author proposes to tackle. In general, however, deceptive trade practice statutes may
well not have as beneficial an effect as might be hoped. In an address at the University of
Houston, Professor Stewart Macauley of the University of Wisconsin observed: "Appel-
late cases suggest ... that middle class and rich consumers are the usual beneficiaries of
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its merits when applied in more sophisticated commercial settings,561 it is
not surprising that the fairness and utility of applying the DTPA in "com-
mercial" or business-versus-business settings has become the subject of
considerable debate. This debate is far from theoretical. Some hard evi-
dence, both anecdotal562 and empirical, 563 supports the conclusion that
the DTPA is being used frequently by large commercial plaintiffs. To
pick but a few examples, reported litigation includes purchasers of used
dump trucks and complex computer software, already discussed,564 as
well as a Saudi Arabian bulk buyer of soft drinks.565
Those who advocate use of the DTPA as a weapon for sophisticated
litigants suggest that businesses should have the same rights as individu-
als, and that the availability of DTPA remedies to business consumers is
"a form of consumer protection, one step removed. ' 566 Detractors claim
that the DTPA's provisions are fundamentally unfair when applied in a
commercial setting.567 The DTPA generally favors plaintiffs, 568 a feature
that has been criticized as unnecessary, in view of the relatively greater
these [deceptive trade practice] statutes. The poor consumer seems protected only margin-
ally." Macaulay, supra note 546, at 586.
561. As one commentator has observed, "it has never been clear why the commercial
consumer needed the protection of the DTPA." Harrison, supra note 555, at 882. Nor
does the legislative history of the DTPA or its amendments provide any real insight. Ac-
cord Bragg, supra note 40, at 8 (1976) (referring to 1975 amendments); Wells, supra note
463, at 527 (referring both to original enactment and 1977 amendments).
562. Two attorneys with one of Texas's more prominent commercial litigation firms
have written an article extolling the DTPA's "future utility in assisting a litigator's business
and commercial clients," and assessing the legislation as providing "some fairly powerful
ammunition to commercial victims of misrepresentations and other unfair practices."
Rowland & Wilson, supra note 2, at 28.
563. A study of the DTPA's use in Harris County (Houston) supports the conclusion
that the DTPA is having a significant effect on litigation far removed from the typical
"consumer" complaint. The data indicates that, while small claims still constitute the bulk
of DTPA litigation, litigation between businesses now accounts for more than one-quarter
of all DTPA suits. Nancy F. Atlas, et al., DTPA in the Courts: Two Empirical Studies and
A Proposal For Change, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 611 (1990).
564. See Knight v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982)
(dump truck) and Qantel Business Sys., Inc. v. Custom Contfols Co." 761 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.
1988) (computer software). The cases have been discussed in some detail earlier in this
article. See supra text accompanying notes 147-68 and notes 232-36.
565. Bamujally v. MacDonough, 508 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
566. Bragg, supra note 40, at 8.
567. The point was made well in one empirical study:
The value and utility of the DTPA's special protections for the plaintiff may
be debated in these large recoveries. The amount at issue itself plus tradi-
tional contract, warranty, and tort theories provide adequate bases for insti-
tuting the litigation and for attorneys undertaking representation; there is no
real need for the additional incentives of the DTPA. Where defendant in
such cases acted maliciously, grossly negligent or recklessly, damage en-
hancement as a form of punishment is available under traditional exemplary
or punitive damages standards. Otherwise, recovery of actual, foreseeable
damages on traditional, more balanced theories should be sufficient.
Atlas, supra note 563, at 647.
568. A statistical analysis of Harris County (Houston) district court verdicts shows that
DTPA actions strongly favor plaintiffs: Plaintiffs win DTPA suits more often than any type
of suit other than workers' compensation claims. Id. at 638.
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sophistication of business consumers.569 The DTPA also has been criti-
cized as being contrary to most commercial law as it tends "to discourage
litigation and encourage settlement. ' 570 The large sums of money typi-
cally involved in business litigation make it unlikely that the treble dam-
age provisions of the DTPA are really required to encourage legitimate
litigation. Moreover, in an ironic twist, the cost of business-versus-busi-
ness litigation ultimately will be borne by the "real" consumer, the end
user of the product, 571 resulting in "an unjustifiable hardship on the indi-
vidual consumer through much higher prices. '572
In addition to specific questions about the utility of the DTPA in com-
mercial settings, a growing body of literature has raised questions about
the economic benefits of lender liability suits in general.573 One theoreti-
cal piece, for example, states that suits for breach of contract, lenders'
concern for reputation and the ready availability of alternative sources of
credit all argue against any great abuses of lenders' power.574 Damages
should be limited to the cost of securing alternative credit, it is suggested,
since any greater amount creates "perverse incentives" for debtor misbe-
havior as well as increasing the cost of credit.575
What makes these concerns about use of the DTPA by sophisticated
consumers unique, when considered in the lending context, is the fact that
small consumers-those who, in the language of the original draft of the
DTPA, use loan money to purchase "goods or services for personal, fam-
ily, or household use" 576-would to a very large extent be excluded from
whatever benefits the DTPA otherwise might offer them vis-a-vis their
lenders. Consumer lending, commonly defined by statute or regulation
as loans intended for "personal, family, or household purposes," 577 is reg-
ulated pervasively at both the state and federal level.5 78 Individual con-
sumers, to a much greater extent than businesses, therefore would find
569. Harrison, supra note 555, at 911; Wells, supra note 463, at 527.
570. Harrison, supra note 555, at 912-13. The author also criticizes the DTPA's settle-
ment provisions as encouraging excessive demands and discouraging settlement offers. Id.
at 913 n.208.
571. Id. at 882.
572. Id. at 921.
573. See, e.g., Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward
a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775 (1986); Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of
Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131 (1989); James R. Borders, Note, The Growth of Lender
Liability: An Economic Perspective, 21 GA. L. REV. 723 (1987); Jon D. Meer, Note, Of
Good Faith and Lenders: The Harm of the Extended Application of Lender Liability, Am.
REV. BANKING L. 5338 (1989); Mark Snyderman, Comment, What's So Good About Good
Faith: The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CH. L. REv.
1335 (1988). But see Cecil J. Hunt II, The Price of Trust: An Examination of Fiduciary
Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 719 (1994).
574. Fischel, supra note 573, at 138 (noting while these three factors "weaken the incen-
tive for a lender to behave opportunistically, they do not eliminate it altogether").
575. Id. at 148, 151.
576. See supra note 550 and accompanying text.
577. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(h) (1993) (Reg B; defining "consumer credit" as "credit
extended to a natural person primarily for personal, family, or household purposes"); 12
C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(12) (Reg Z; same).
578. See supra notes 495-525 and accompanying text.
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their DTPA lending complaints preempted by federal statute or regula-
tion.579 Small consumers, but not business consumers, would find their
remedies severely limited when their credit agreements are acquired by
lenders in the due course of business; the Texas Supreme Court already
has ruled to this effect.58 0 The extension of the DTPA to lending transac-
tions, then, would have the practical effect of creating a weapon that
would be used disproportionately by those who were not the principal
concern of the DTPA's drafters. This effect hardly seems a worthwhile
social goal.
2. Killing the Goose: Impact on Credit Availability and Terms
Another likely effect of extending the DTPA to Texas lenders is the
loss of credit, or credit availability only at higher rates. Lending is a busi-
ness. To an increasing extent, particularly in Texas, lending also is becom-
ing an interstate business. The banking debacle of the late 1980s wreaked
havoc on Texas-owned banks. Of the top ten independent banks in Texas
a decade ago, only one survives; about half of the total bank market now
is controlled by out-of-state banks. 581 The new multistate flavor of Texas
banking will be accentuated in the near future. Congressional passage of
the Interstate Banking Efficiency Act in December 1994 will permit inter-
state branching and consolidation, effective June 1, 1997.582
Texas lawmakers already are concerned that one effect of out-of-state
control of Texas banks will be a loss of lending capital. A special commit-
tee of the Texas Legislature recently has criticized the lending practices of
the larger banks, recommending that Texas should opt out of the federal
interstate branching act.583 Rep. Kim Brimer, co-chair of the House Spe-
cial Committee on Small Business Access to Capital, stated in a Decem-
ber 6, 1994 press release that "all banks owe reinvestment to the
community and they are NOT responding to the call." Representative
Brimer went on to characterize the larger banks as "sump pumps, taking
boat and car and home improvement loans, but not taking a chance on
small businesses that create jobs and valuable services. '584 The state's
five largest banks, according to the committee report, have more than
one-half of all loan assets, but make only one-third of small business
loans and eight percent of agricultural loans. 585
579. See supra notes 495-544 and accompanying text.
580. See supra notes 216-27 and notes 540-44 and accompanying text.
581. Daniel Kaplan, M&A: Positioning for a Texas Merger Boom, AM. BANKER, Dec.
6, 1994, at 22.
582. This act, 108 Stat. 2338, is known officially as the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. The act contains a provision permitting states to
individually opt out before that date. Interstate Banking Becomes Reality, TEx. BANKERS
ASS'N, LEGAL BRIEFS, Sept. 30, 1994, at 2.
583. Texas Legislative Committee Urges Opting Out of Interstate Branching, 63 BNA's
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Without debating the factual merits of the credit flight complaints in
any detail, it is reasonable to expect that application of the DTPA to
lenders would have a negative impact on the availability of credit. After
the widely-criticized result in the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation, the Wall
Street Journal opined that "[a] state that increases the cost of doing busi-
ness by institutionalizing legal uncertainty is a state in danger of losing
business. '' 586 If the Texas court system is perceived by businesses as the
biggest barrier to investment in Texas, as one widely-cited study claims,587
then it is a small stretch to conclude that lenders could be influenced by
judicial developments making it more difficult to lend in Texas than it is
in other states.
It probably is not possible to predict the precise effect that judicial de-
cisions subjecting lenders to DTPA liability would have on credit availa-
bility in Texas. In the aggregate, other legal and business considerations
might swamp the effect of the DTPA. Moreover, since several other
states have applied their deceptive trade practice statutes to lenders, 588
Texans would not be placed at a unique disadvantage in the interstate
lending market, though the Texas DTPA is likely to be perceived as more
of a threat than most.589 Nonetheless, some negative effect is likely. The
combined effects of the banking collapse of the 1980s and the rise of
lender liability suits surely have made financial institutions sensitive to
litigation-associated risks of lending. That risk undoubtedly will be dealt
with in some way, whether by not making loans at all,590 by making loans
in more congenial jurisdictions,5 91 or by increasing the price of credit.592
In any event, Texas consumers ultimately would underwrite the costs of
DTPA litigation and judgments.
586. Texas Trials and Tribulations, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1987, at 10.
587. See id. (reporting the result of a study at SMU's Center for Enterprising, that
"Texas's civil justice system [is] the biggest barrier to attracting business to the state").
588. See generally supra notes 432-61 and accompanying text.
589. As stated earlier in this article, Texas generates about half of all reported DTPA
litigation. See Dunbar, supra note 6; see also J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applica-
tions of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 347, 358 (1992) (describing Texas as one of the states that have been
"among the most active" in applying consumer protection statutes to "fringe cases").
590. See, e.g., Ebke & Griffin, supra note 573, at 812 (suggesting that a possible re-
sponse to the uncertainties of lender liability litigation might be a refusal to lend).
591. See, e.g., Meer, supra note 573, at 556 n.136 and 556 (stating that "lenders may
move from states applying good faith standards to express lending terms" and "[rielaxed
interstate banking restrictions could ... serve to make substantial separation of borrowers
and lenders a reality").
592. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AN ECONOMiC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 395-96 (4th
ed. 1992) (stating that the interest rate on a loan reflects the risk at the time the loan is
made); Bruce G. Stevenson & Michael W. Fadil, Why Lending Crises Occur So Frequently,
J. COMM. LENDING, Nov. 1994, at 43 (stating that "[r]isk-adjusted pricing must become the
norm for commercial lending"); Fischel, supra note 573, at 135-36 ("[L]enders anticipate
the various forms of debtor misbehavior and factor them into their decisions of whether
and on what terms to lend. The greater the amount of anticipated debtor misconduct, the
greater the compensation (i.e., the higher interest rate) that a lender will demand."); Bor-
ders, supra note 573, at 751 (stating that "[l]enders must increase their interest rates to
cover the increased risks they must bear").
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3. No Way to Run a Business: Impact on Regulation and Banking
Practices
Application of the DTPA to lenders would implicate public policy con-
cerns in another way that might not at first blush be apparent. Bankers
and bank regulators rely to a great extent on loan paper to set out the
extent of a bank's liability. The parol evidence rule, however, generally
does not apply to DTPA claims.593 Thus, assuming that the DTPA were
applied to loans, a lender can be held liable for representations not re-
flected in, or even contrary to, the language of the loan documents. How-
ever, a judicial doctrine that holds lenders liable for promises that are
contrary to the express language of loan documents could create great
difficulty for bank examiners who try to assess the stability and soundness
of lending institutions, as well as for loan officers who may take over a
file after a previous loan officer quits or retires. Moreover, the post facto
case-by-case nature of DTPA litigation makes it a tool particularly ill-
suited to the purpose of curbing lender misconduct.
The interaction between parol evidence and the DTPA is somewhat
more complex than just stated. Application of the DTPA to lenders
would not always give an unscrupulous borrower carte blanche to invent
oral commitments contrary to a loan's express terms. While the parol
evidence rule does not apply to DTPA claims, the statute of frauds is a
defense. Thus, DTPA claims based on loans secured by real estate, 594 or
that cannot be performed within a year595 (such as multi-year line of
credit or revolving loans) would still be restricted to the written terms of
an integrated loan agreement. Perhaps most important, 1989 legislation
excludes evidence of oral agreements for certain loans in excess of
$500,000 when required disclosures are made.596 Moreover, although the
law on the subject is "muddled" 597 at best, a borrower could not avoid the
statute of frauds simply by recasting a claim for breach of contract as one
for fraud or misrepresentation. 598 If the fraud or misrepresentation claim
593. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988) (parol evidence admis-
sible in DTPA cases involving breach of warranty); Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600
(Tex. 1985) (parol evidence admissible in DTPA cases involving oral misrepresentations);
see generally Karen S. Guerra, Note, DTPA Precludes Use of Merger Doctrine and Parol
Evidence in Breach of Warranty Suit: Alvarado v. Bolton, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 373 (1989).
594. 21 Turtle Creek Square, Ltd. v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 425
F.2d 1366, 1371 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971); Edward Scharf Assoc.,
Inc. v. Skiba, 538 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
595. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987); Benoit v. Polystar
Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (ap-
plying statute in an oral employment contract case).
596. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
597. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Gonzales, J., con-
curring); see also Clisham Mgt., Inc. v. American Steel Bldg. Co., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 150,
155 (D. Conn. 1992) (noting also that "Texas law is unclear as to whether the ... statute of
frauds requirements of a contract claim apply in a DTPA action predicated on breach of
warranty").
598. See, e.g., Wade v. State Nat'l Bank, 379 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("We fail to see how there could be any recovery for fraud involving
the breach of an unenforceable contract. To hold otherwise would be to create an anom-
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is independent of the contract, however, a matter that is subject to case-
by-case interpretation, the statute of frauds would not bar the admission
of parol evidence. 599
Federal regulators are severely hampered in carrying out their duty of
assessing the safety and soundness of financial institutions when signifi-
cant lending commitments are not reflected in the loan documents. To
some extent, the FDIC, acting as receiver for a failed bank, is protected
by the D'Oench, Duhme6°° doctrine, which bars the use of unrecorded
agreements between the borrower and the lender as a basis for claims or
defenses against the FDIC.601 The purpose of this seemingly harsh doc-
trine 60 2 is made clear in many decisions. "Unwritten representations...
would naturally mislead an outside examiner, simply because they were
unwritten. ' '60 3 Thus, borrowers who have unrecorded deals with their
lenders are participating in a" 'scheme or arrangement' by which bank-
ing authorities are likely to be misled." 604 The public interest, particu-
larly seen against the backdrop of the massive Texas bank failures of the
past decade, is clear: "Unrecorded agreements-those rooted in the
loose soil of casual transactions as much as those that spring from the
malodorous loam of outright fraud-are a threat to the ecology of the
banking system that we can ill-afford. '60 5
A judicial doctrine that permits DTPA actions to be asserted against
lenders would result in the creation of liabilities that could not be judged
from the face of loan documents. An examiner reviewing a bank's files
could not know whether the collateral, guaranty agreements and loan
provisions were "real," or whether there was some side deal with the bor-
rower that defaults would be ignored, that collateral and guaranties were
"just formalities," or "what-have-you." While these side deals could not
be enforced against the receiver of a failed bank, the principal purpose of
aly, and allow one to do indirectly what he could not by law do directly."); see also Keriotis
v. Lombardo Rental Trust, 607 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (quoting Wade).
599. McClure v. Duggan, 674 F. Supp. 211, 224 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (permitting DTPA
action to proceed when the claim is based on "a factual misrepresentation independent of
the alleged unenforceable agreement"); Sibley v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 36 S.W.2d 145,
146 (Tex. 1931) (holding claim for fraud in the inducement of a land contract not barred by
statute of frauds); Streller v. Hecht, 859 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1993, writ denied) (holding claim for fraud in the inducement of a guaranty not barred by
statute of frauds).
600. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
601. See Bowen v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1013, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1990).
602. The attitude of many plaintiffs' lawyers toward D'Oench, Duhme, is typified by the
seminar speaker who justified its inclusion in a speech on the DTPA by stating that "much
lender liability is within the ambit of the DTPA except for the unjust creation and applica-
tion of the D'Oenche [sic], Duhme Doctrine and its statutory progeny." Walter P. Wolf-
ram, A Strategic Grasp of the DTPA, in SouTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW, ADVANCED
CIVIL TRIAL LAw-1993 H-6 (1993).
603. Kilpatrick v. Riddle, 907 F.2d 1523, 1527 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083
(1991).
604. Bowen, 915 F.2d at 1015 (quoting Beighley v. FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 784 (5th Cir.
1989)).
605. Id. at 1017.
19951
SMU LAW REVIEW
regulatory inspections is to insure that lending institutions are engaging in
sound lending practices, so that they do not fail.
While much of this concern still is theoretical, because the DTPA has
not yet been applied to lenders in many cases, reported decisions give
some hint of the potential conflict between the DTPA and sound regula-
tory practices. In Riverside itself, for example, the borrower's basic claim
was that the bank should have been forced to make a loan because the
Riverside loan officer and the borrower connived to falsify a loan applica-
tion, 6°6 a felony under federal law.6°7 In Security Bank v. Dalton, a Fort
Worth appellate court decision in which the DTPA was applied to a
lender, at least one of the loans that the borrowers contended the bank
wrongly refused to extend, apparently was in excess of the bank's legal
lending limit.60 8 In both these cases, the DTPA cause of action was based
on an attempt to force the bank to violate federal law.
Admittedly, keeping the DTPA out of the arsenal of legal actions avail-
able to individual borrowers would not be a panacea. Other legal doc-
trines (such as fraud 6°9 and negligent misrepresentation 610 ) are available
to borrowers under current law, and could create much the same
problems in cases to which they apply. This situation would hardly justify
a judicial decision to make things worse by adding the DTPA to the mix;
particularly at a time when the Texas Legislature seems anxious to restrict
the circumstances under which unrecorded agreements can be used to
vary lender's obligations. 611 Conversely, if the DTPA truly were needed
to curb lender abuses, a decision not to permit individual actions would
not affect the Texas Attorney General's arguable power to proceed under
its provisions.612 This result would be preferable to individual actions be-
cause the DTPA could be used prospectively on an industry-wide basis,
rather than afterwards through the happenstance of litigation.
606. The bank's application for writ of error in Riverside makes this point clear, arguing
that "[i]n the wake of the collapse of the Sharpstown State Bank and a number of smaller
Texas banks in recent years, of which this Court can and should take judicial notice, it is
particularly incongruous for the Court of Civil Appeals to hold that Riverside should be
penalized under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, because one of
its officers prevented it from making a loan predicated on a false loan application." Appli-
cation for Writ of Error at 6 n.4, Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980)
(No. 8046).
607. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1979 & Supp. 1994) (declaring it a felony to knowingly give false
information on a loan application to a federally insured bank).
608. Security Bank v. Dalton, 803 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ
denied).
609. See, e.g., Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co. of Dallas, 516 S.W.2d 138(Tex. 1974) (promise to do future act without intention of performing is actionable);
Mumphord v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 605 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1980, no writ) (same).
610. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1991).
611. See supra note 596 and accompanying text; see also Gall & Bowen, supra note 11,
at 0-11 (characterizing this legislation as "an effort to stem the flow of litigation over loan
commitments").
612. The role of the Attorney General's office has been treated briefly earlier in this
article. See supra notes 472-75 and accompanying text.
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V. DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN
THE DTPA AND LOANS
Earlier in this article, the development of three different lines of judi-
cial assault on the Riverside rule-"collateral services," the "inextricably
intertwined" doctrine and the "financial intermediation" theory-was
traced.613 Each approach is based upon a possible "exception" left open
in Riverside;614 each approach has the potential for reducing the Riverside
rule to triviality. In each situation, however, the Texas Supreme Court
has not yet spoken on the most important questions. Accordingly, there
still is room for some realistic line-drawing. The final section of the arti-
cle will re-examine the exceptions to Riverside to determine whether
there is any graceful way out of the current state of disorder.
A. DISENTANGLING THE "INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED" DOCTRINE
As described earlier, 615 most restrictions on the Riverside doctrine oc-
curred in cases creating an exception to Riverside's general rule of non-
liability when a lender is "inextricably intertwined" in a consumer trans-
action. These decisions-primarily Knight, Flenniken, and La Sara
Grain-also generated what some now view as a "special test," 616 some-
times termed the "borrower's objective" test, for consumer standing in
lending cases. If there is no such "special test" in the lending context-
and this writer suggests that there is none, and should be none-then
most potential plaintiffs will not qualify as DTPA consumers vis-a-vis
their lenders. In the first subsection, it will be demonstrated that there is
no legal basis for such a separate test; and in the second, that the unthink-
ing development of such a test by intermediate courts leads to nonsensi-
cal legal consequences.
1. The Possibility of Restricting the "Borrower's Objective" Test
The Texas Supreme Court has set out a two-pronged general test to
qualify a person as a DTPA "consumer." First, the person must seek or
acquire goods or services by purchase or lease.617 Second, "the goods or
services purchased or leased must form the basis of the complaint. 618
The first element of this test is statutory;619 the second involves an ele-
ment of judicial interpretation.620 Nonetheless, both aspects of the basic
613. See supra notes 109-264 and accompanying text.
614. See supra notes 58-108 and accompanying text.
615. See supra notes 143-251 and accompanying text.
616. Reese, supra note 21, at 614.
617. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 SW.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981).
618. Id. (emphasis added).
619. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
620. See Larry D. Carlson, The DTPA in Litigation With Financial Institutions, in UNIV.
OF Hous. L. FOUND., DTPA, CONSUMER & INS. L. INST., at Q-15 (stating that "[t]he Act
imposes no such requirement").
The validity of the second prong seems to have been confirmed by implication in recent
statutory amendments. In 1989, the Texas Legislature amended the DTPA to make the
recoverability of damages conform to other aspects of "tort reform." One amendment
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test are deeply ingrained in Texas DTPA jurisprudence. 621 By contrast, a
respectable number of courts622 and commentators623 read the Texas
Supreme Court's DTPA decisions as modifying the second prong of this
restricted recovery in accordance with Chapters 33 and 41 of the Texas Civil Practices and
Remedies Code (dealing with comparative responsibility and punitive damages) for "dam-
age to property other than the goods acquired by the purchase or lease that is involved in
the consumer's action or claim." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1)(A)(iii)
(Vernon Supp. 1995). Thus, like the Texas Supreme Court, the legislature seems to con-
sider a problem with a particular good to be at the center of a DTPA claim.
621. See, e.g., Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. 1985) (citing Cameron with
approval); Carlson, supra note 620, at Q-15 (noting that Cameron "remains good law
today").
622. At least five courts of appeals-Corpus Christi, Dallas, Fort Worth, Texarkana,
and T yler-appear to have adopted some version of the "borrower's objective" test. See
Megason v. Red River Employees Fed. Credit Union, 868 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1993, no writ) (citing La Sara Grain and the borrower's objective test, and hold-
ing that a complaint about the sale price at foreclosure "relates directly to the good sought
and brings [the borrower's] counterclaim within the provisions of the DTPA"); FDIC v.
F & A Equip. Leasing, 854 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ) (citing La
Sara Grain and holding that the plaintiffs were consumers "because they used the loan
money to purchase goods"); Griffith v. Porter, 817 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1991, no writ) (citing La Sara Grain and stating that "[a] borrower can qualify as a con-
sumer as long as his purpose in the transaction is to acquire goods or services"); Security
Bank v. Dalton, 803 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied) (citing La
Sara Grain and holding that a lender's actions were actionable under the DTPA because
"the ... loans were clearly taken in connection with the purchase of the sale of a good or
service and thus qualify [the borrowers] as consumers"); First Tex. Say. Ass'n v. Stiff
Properties, 685 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (citing La Sara
Grain, decided while the appeal was pending, and holding that all persons who perform
unconscionable acts "in the context of a transaction in goods or services" are liable).
Still other courts of appeals-including Austin and El Paso-appear to be leaning to-
ward the "borrower's objective" reasoning, though not holding a lender liable, under the
facts. See Henderson v. Texas Commerce Bank-Midland, N.A., 837 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied) (not citing the borrower's objective test, but emphasiz-
ing that there was no evidence that the loan was sought for any other purpose than refi-
nancing existing bank debt); Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Commercial Fed. Bank, 834 S.W.2d
521, 529 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ) (not citing the borrower's objective test, but
apparently viewing as important the fact that the borrower "did not contract to buy prop-
erty, materials, or an apartment complex from the Bank; rather, the Venture contracted to
borrow money from the Bank using the completed project as security for the loan").
One Amarillo decision, Irizarry v. Amarillo Pantex Fed. Credit Union, 695 S.W.2d 91
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ), is more problematic. The plaintiff bought an auto,
financing the purchase through the credit union. After he became disabled, he sued the
credit union, complaining that the credit union had misrepresented the extent of its insur-
ance coverage. The Amarillo Court of Appeals, relying upon La Sara Grain, classified the
borrower as a consumer, apparently because the purpose of the loan was to purchase a car.
Id. at 92. This decision has been cited by other courts as support for the "borrower's objec-
tive" test. On the facts, however, it would appear that lender liability could have been
justified on the ground that the disability insurance was a collateral service. See supra note
122 and accompanying text.
623. See, e.g., Alderman & Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 501 (stating that "whenever the
underlying basis of the transaction is the purchase of goods or services, the collateral lend-
ing of money should be subject to the DTPA"); Sam Kelley, Some Recent Court Decisions
Relating to Art. 5069, V. T C.S. and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, in TEx. Ass'N
OF BANK COUNS., NiNH ANNUAL CONVENTION 14 (1985) (observing that "it seems clear
that the courts are going to apply the DTPA to loans of money if the proceeds are to be
used to purchase goods or services"); McCormick, supra note 253, at 727 (stating that "[a]
customer's intent to purchase or lease a good may be enough to qualify him or her as a
consumer under the DTPA"); J. Scott Sheehan, Applicability of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act to Banking and Real Estate Transactions, in TEX.
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basic test to permit DTPA standing in a lending context if the borrower's
objective in obtaining a loan is the purchase or lease of goods or services.
Even within this latter group, there may be a further split. While some
sort of "tie-in" relationship between lender and seller still is required
under one version of the "borrower's objective" test,624 another view is
that proof of some sort of tie-in between the lender and the seller "is not
an essential element for consumer status, but is merely evidentiary on the
question of joint liability. '625
In most lender cases, the version of the test used will be dispositive.626
Applying the standard "basis of the complaint" approach, some courts627
and commentators have concluded that a lender cannot be liable under
the DTPA unless the borrower has some complaint about the goods or
services that were purchased with the loan proceeds. Using the "bor-
rower's objective" approach, other courts and commentators take the po-
sition that a lender is liable under the DTPA for its misdeeds whenever
the borrower used, or intended to use, loan proceeds for the purchase or
lease of goods or services-even if the borrower has no complaint about
those goods and services. 628 This conflict forms the basis of the Texas
circuit split described at the beginning of this article.629
Under principles of adherence to precedent, intermediate state courts
are bound to respect the latest authoritative decision from the state
supreme court.630 Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts likewise are
bound on state law issues, unless convinced that the state common law
principle in issue is on the brink of change.631 While the Texas Supreme
Ass'N OF BANK COUNS. & TEX. TECH L. SCHOOL, EIGHTH ANNUAL BANKING LAW INSTI-
ThITE 3 (1985).
624. See, e.g., Holland Mortgage & Inv. Corp. v. Bone, 751 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wynn v. Kensington Mortgage and Fin.
Corp., 697 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
625. Megason, 868 S.W.2d at 873.
626. A well-written student note documented use of the two versions of the test in some
detail, although differing from this author's conclusion by suggesting that the Cameron
"basis of the complaint" test ought to give way to the La Sara Grain dicta. See Reese,
supra note 21, at 604.
627. See, e.g., Walker v. FDIC, 970 F.2d 114, 123 (5th Cir. 1992) (ruling that, though the
plaintiffs intended to use loan proceeds for the construction of a hotel, "they allege no
complaint pertaining to the Homotel itself"); Central Texas Hardware, Inc. v. First City,
Texas-Bryan, N.A., 810 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ de-
nied) (holding a lender was not liable for its actions under the DTPA because the plaintiff
did not complain about the inventory items it intended to purchase with the loan). The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals may be retreating from this position. In Baskin v. Mortgage
& Trust, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 743,748 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) the
court stated that a lender is not liable under the DTPA "[ulnless the lender has some
connection with the actual sales transaction or has committed a deceptive act related to
financing the transaction."
628. See supra notes 622-23.
629. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
630. See, e.g., Robertson & Paulsen, supra note 115, at 46-47.
631. In this view, Walker v. FDIC, 970 F.2d 114, (5th Cir. 1992), is rightly decided. As
mentioned at the beginning of this article, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text,
the Fifth Circuit noted that "[tlhe Texas courts of appeal are obviously split on this issue,"
but declined to apply the "borrower's objective" test on the basis that "Riverside has yet to
be expressly overruled." Id. at 123 n.16.
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Court's decisions are not altogether free from conflict, the better reading
of the cases is that the "basis of the complaint" test, not the "borrower's
objective" test, still is the true test of DTPA standing, whether in the
lending context or elsewhere. Decisions adopting the "borrower's objec-
tive" test therefore can be criticized as unreasonably anticipating a shift
in the Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of the DTPA rather than
applying the law as it exists.632
A brief review of the relevant Texas Supreme Court decisions, already
discussed in some detail,633 is a useful reminder of the fact that the "bor-
rower's objective" test occurs only in Texas Supreme Court dicta that is
arguably questionable. Virtually all courts and commentators invoking
the "borrower's objective" test rely on language found in the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in La Sara Grain.634 While the language is
clear,635 the context is highly questionable. First, the La Sara Grain lan-
guage is collateral since the lender was found not liable under the facts,636
and the opinion focused primarily on another issue.637 Second, while the
La Sara Grain language purports to summarize the holdings of Knight
and Flenniken,638 both of those decisions easily pass muster under the
more restrictive "basis of the complaint" test. The Flenniken borrowers
complained that the bank paid a contractor who failed to complete their
house; the Knight borrower complained of a DTPA-violating waiver pro-
vision inserted in a sales contract drafted by, and immediately assigned
to, the lender. 639 Finally, it probably is not coincidental that the broad La
Sara Grain dicta was written by Justice Franklin Spears, who indicated in
his dissent in Ogden v. Dickinson State Bank-issued only a few months
before La Sara Grain-that he had a much more expansive view of Flen-
niken than did the majority of the court.640
Finally, as already highlighted, if one ignores commentary and glosses
on the case law from intermediate courts, any recent trend in Texas
632. But see Reese, supra note 21, at 612 (agreeing that intermediate courts "must in-
terpret the DTPA consistent with the state's highest court" but stating that this would
require adoption of the "borrower's objective" test).
633. See supra notes 143-251 and accompanying text.
634. 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984).
635. The decision states that "[u]nder Knight and Flenniken, a lender may be subject to
a DTPA claim if the borrower's 'objective' is the purchase or lease of a good or service
thereby qualifying the borrower as a consumer." Id. at 567.
636. The court stated that there was no evidence that the proposed loan in question was
for the purchase or lease of goods or services. Id.
637. The principal question was whether the bank was liable under the DTPA for mis-
handling a checking account-an issue on which there never has been any serious ques-
tion. See supra note 119; accord, First State Bank of Canadian, Texas, 861 S.W.2d at 286
(stating that La Sara Grain "was decided on other grounds").
638. See supra note 635.
639. See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text (discussing Flenniken); text accom-
panying notes 147-68 (discussing Knight); accord Walker, 970 F.2d at 123 ("In both cases,
... the goods or services sought by the borrower formed the basis for the DTPA com-
plaint"); First State Bank of Canadian, Texas, 861 S.W.2d at 286 ("In Knight, the basis of
the complaint was a truck purchased with the loan proceeds. In Flenniken, the basis of the
complaint was a house purchased with the loan proceeds.").
640. See supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court DTPA opinions is away from lender liability in DTPA
cases, both in result and in language. 6 ' Viewed from the perspective of
supreme court decisions alone, as any such decision ought to be viewed,
the 1983 Flenniken decision may have been the high point in lender liabil-
ity holdings, and the 1985 La Sara Grain opinion the high point in dicta,
not as way stations on some inexorable road that will end with dissolution
of the Riverside rule.
A requirement that borrowers must meet the same "basis of the com-
plaint" test that any other potential consumer would meet-that is, that
the borrower must have some complaint relating to the quality of the
goods or services purchased with the loan proceeds-would in itself elim-
inate the majority of DTPA claims brought against lenders on an "inextri-
cably intertwined" theory. Application of yet another requirement, set
out by the Texas Supreme Court in the specific context of the "inextrica-
bly intertwined" line of cases, would eliminate most of the rest.
In Qantel, already discussed in detail,642 the Texas Supreme Court
ruled that" '[i]nextricably intertwined' is not an additional theory of vica-
rious liability under the DTPA."'643 The DTPA defendant is held respon-
sible only for its own conduct or under some recognized theory of
derivative liability.6 4 One surely can envision a situation in which a bor-
rower stops making loan payments because of complaints about the qual-
ity of the goods or services purchased with the loan proceeds, then sues
the lender because of some misdeed in the process of foreclosure. Simul-
taneous application of the Cameron "basis of the complaint" test and the
Qantel "no vicarious liability" requirement should eliminate even such
lender suits, because the "basis of the complaint" against the lender
would be the foreclosure, not the defective goods or services.
The observation that strict and simultaneous application of the Cam-
eron and Qantel requirements would eliminate most645 lender suits
brought on "inextricably intertwined" DTPA grounds is not original with
the author,646 although the limitation does not yet appear to have been
641. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
642. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
643. Qantel, 761 S.W.2d at 305.
644. Thus, as the Austin Court of Appeals properly held in Wynn v. Kensington Mort-
gage & Fin. Corp., 697 S.W.2d 47,49-50 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ), a lender cannot
be held liable for excessive levels of formaldehyde in a mobile home simply for acting as
the lender.
645. One might still envision suits on grounds much like those present in Knight, when
the lender committed a violation of the DTPA during the original sale, or in a seller-financ-
ing arrangement such as the Texas Supreme Court might have found to exist under facts
similar to Kinerd. See also Griffith v. Porter, 817 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no
writ) (seller financing).
'646. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 620, at Q-16.
[tihe interplay between Cameron and Qantel in these type[s] of cases places
the consumer in a quandary. If the consumer focuses his complaint on the
good or service purchases, he satisfies the Cameron requirement, but risks
failing to establish liability on the part of the lender under Qantel. On the
other hand, if the consumer focuses his complaint on deceptive acts of the
lender, he risks running afoul of Cameron.
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recognized by the courts. To reiterate, contrary to the oft-quoted dicta in
La Sara Grain that Riverside has been "twice limited... to its facts," 647
the truth of the matter might be that in decisions over the past decade it is
the "inextricably intertwined" language of Knight, not Riverside, that has
been limited to its facts. This reading of the case law also would explain
the Texas Supreme Court's apparent lack of enthusiasm for the "inextri-
cably intertwined" doctrine in its last decision using those words.648 By
eliminating the "special test" of lender liability under the DTPA, the
DTPA's coverage would be kept at something approximating the limits
originally intended by the legislature. 649 Moreover, a decision to set
some strict limits on use of the "inextricably intertwined" test would
avoid the need for making the bizarre distinctions that now are develop-
ing in the case law.
2. The Wisdom of Restricting the "Borrower's Objective" Test
Those who would push the "inextricably intertwined" doctrine to its
limit suggest that one need only to look at the purpose of the loan to
determine potential DTPA liability for lender misconduct: If loan pro-
ceeds are used to purchase goods or services, then the lender is poten-
tially liable. Conversely, if the purpose of securing a loan is not the
purchase of specific goods or services, but the refinancing of an existing
loan or the establishment of a general line of credit, then there is no
DTPA liability for the lender's bad acts.
If this were the true distinction between Knight, Flenniken and River-
side-that the Knight and Flenniken borrowers bought a dump truck or a
home, while the Riverside borrower merely refinanced a Cadillac, then it
is a strange and delicate distinction indeed. In Riverside, after all, the
borrower defaulted in the very first payment on his consumer loan.
While Riverside Bank was indeed "refinancing" the loan, the loan was for
Another commentator has stated that under the restrictive version of the test,
[o]nly the small minority [sic] of borrowers who have actually acquired goods
and know of a defect in the goods will be able to assert DTPA claims. In
addition, the borrowers who have valid DTPA claims based on defective or
deficient goods will not be able to assert the claim against the lender unless
the lender personally violated the DTPA.
Id.; Reese, supra note 21, at 613.
647. 673 S.W.2d at 566.
648. The last decision from the Texas Supreme Court to use the words "inextricably
intertwined" in the context of a DTPA action was Qantel, 761 S.W.2d at 305. The decision
noted that the phrase "finds its recent origins in connection with the DTPA in Knight," and
explained that decision in some detail, but did not mention either Flenniken or La Sara
Grain. Id. As already discussed, the holding in Qantel was that "inextricably intertwined"
is not an additional ground of DTPA liability.
649. A student article, arguing for expansion of the "borrower's objective" test, can-
didly (though perhaps unintentionally) assessed the history of the "inextricably inter-
twined" doctrine as an intrusion on the legislature's prerogative, stating that "[t]he Texas
Supreme Court has attempted to correct the legislature's exclusion by making a special test
for determining the consumer status of a borrower." Reese, supra note 21, at 614 (empha-
sis added). To reiterate, however, this encroachment on the legislature's domain has oc-
curred only in dicta at the Texas Supreme Court level.
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the purchase of a consumer good, the loan amount represented the entire
purchase price of that good, and Riverside Bank knew these facts. 650 It is
difficult to imagine any sound legislative policy that would seek to punish
the misconduct of Riverside's loan officer whenever he made false state-
ments in the course of financing the purchase of an auto, but would not
punish that officer for making precisely the same false statements while
refinancing a car sale. It is equally difficult to imagine a sound policy that
would punish lender misrepresentations when a loan is sought for the
purpose of buying a specific good, but not when a line of credit is
sought-even though the purpose of securing the line of credit may be
the purchase of many such goods over time. One would, after all, sup-
pose that a line of credit generally is sought for the purpose of buying
something. Yet these are precisely the kinds of highly artificial distinc-
tions Texas courts now appear to be making while trying to thread their
way through the "inextricably intertwined" maze.651
A recent case, First State Bank of Canadian, Texas v. McMordie,65 2
makes evident one aspect of the intrinsic arbitrariness of the "borrower's
purpose" test. McMordie, a rancher, sued the bank on DTPA grounds
for breach of an oral commitment to make a loan. The purpose of the
loan, according to McMordie, was twofold: to refinance a preexisting
debt for cattle purchases at another bank and to obtain a million dollar
line of credit for new cattle purchases. 653 The Amarillo Court of Appeals
held that McMordie did not qualify as a DTPA consumer because the
record was "devoid of any objective manifestation that McMordie sought
or acquired, by purchase or lease, cattle which form the basis of his com-
plaint. '654 Assuming that the borrower did provide proper evidence that
he sought to use the line of credit proceeds to buy cattle, one might then
need to prorate the damages: The lender would be liable for its conduct
to the extent of the percentage of the expected loan that would have gone
toward the purchase of new cattle, but not for that percentage of the ex-
pected loan that was earmarked for payment of preexisting debt, even
650. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 171.
651. Following Riverside strictly, at least a couple of appellate courts recently have de-
clined to hold refinancing arrangements subject to the DTPA. See Henderson, 837 S.W.2d
at 782 (observing that "[t]here is no evidence that Henderson sought to do anything other
than borrow money from TCB to refinance his debts at InterFirst"); First State Bank of
Canadian, Texas, 861 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ) (noting that
one purpose of the plaintiff's loan was "to refinance his debt"). Likewise, courts hold that
a line of credit loan is not enough to trigger DTPA liability. See, e.g., First Interstate Bank
of Bedford v. Bland, 810 S.W.2d 277,289 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ); Bank of
El Paso v. T.O. Stanley Boot Co., Inc., 809 S.W.2d 279, 289 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 847 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1992); see also Roberts v. Burkett, 802
S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (noting that "[t]he loan transac-
tion did not involve a good or service and [the plaintiff's] purpose was only to borrow
money"); Sheehan, supra note 623, at 23-24 ("There seems to be a trend to distinguish
purchase money loans and indirect dealer paper from the mere loan of money. Certain
type[s] of bank lending may therefore face the full brunt of the [DTPA].").
652. 861 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).




though the purpose of that debt was also cattle purchases. One might
envision other approaches than prorating to dealing with such multipur-
pose loans, but the inherent foolishness of the entire enterprise ought to
be self-evident.
Security Bank v. Dalton,655 a Fort Worth decision that is perhaps the
best known of the recent "borrower's objective" cases,656 illustrates other
difficult questions that might arise in trying to make sense out of the test.
Security Bank, successor in interest to Flower Mound Bank, was found
liable under the DTPA for refusing to renew loans. In holding that the
bank was liable under the borrower's objective test, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals emphasized that the original loan proceeds were used for the
purpose of building a funeral home and that "Flower Mound Bank knew
of this purpose when the loan was made, and the records obtained by
Security Bank when it purchased Flower Mound's assets so indicated this
purpose. '657 Suppose, however, that the original lender did not know
that the borrower's purpose was the purchase of goods and services. The
borrower, we may assume, had sufficient collateral to cover any possible
default and valued his or her privacy enough to refuse to divulge the
loan's purpose. Would the bank still be liable under the DTPA for its
misdeeds? The Fort Worth court seemed to assume that it would not.
Yet DTPA doctrine teaches that the transaction is to be looked at from
the consumer's point of view, and the very phrasing of the "borrower's
objective" test tends to reinforce this view. It might be, then, that a
lender could commit a DTPA violation without ever knowing that it was
involved in a DTPA transaction.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals also grappled with the question of
assignment of loans with unsatisfying results. Security Bank was not the
original lender; it acquired the assets of Flower Mound Bank when that
bank failed and its assets were sold by the FDIC.658 Since the original
loans were for the purchase of goods or services, the Fort Worth court
seems to have reasoned, Security Bank acquired a "consumer" loan with
concomitant risks of liability. Leaving unique questions involving bank
failure and FDIC powers to one side, there is more than one way in which
a lender could step into the shoes of another. The second lender can take
an assignment of the first loan and security agreement, or the second
lender can advance funds to pay off the first loan, taking a lien through a
new security agreement on the goods purchased with the first loan. From
the lender's point of view, the principal difference is that, if more than
one creditor has a security interest in the goods, the second lender has
655. 803 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
656. Security Bank v. Dalton was singled out by the Fifth Circuit in Walker v. FDIC as
an example of the circuit split in Texas intermediate courts on the "borrower's objective"
question. Walker, 970 F.2d at 123 n.16. This decision also was cited by the Montana
Supreme Court in its decision not to follow Riverside as an exemplar for Montana law. See
Baird v. Norwest Bank, 843 P.2d 327, 334 (Mont. 1992).
657. Security Bank, 803 S.W.2d at 452-53.
658. Id. at 445.
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better assurance of a favorable lien position with an assignment.659 For
this reason, the second approach usually is seen in refinancing transac-
tions in which security of lien position is not in question.660 From a
DTPA standpoint, the second approach would have great advantages.
The lender who simply advances funds to pay off the first loan, secured
with the goods purchased through the first loan, should not be liable for
lending misconduct under the DTPA; the lender who takes an assign-
ment, under the Fort Worth court's apparent analysis, would be liable for
the same misconduct.
In several respects, then, under the "borrower's objective" test, the ex-
tent of a lender's liability would depend primarily on the happenstance of
the structuring of the transaction, not on the quality of the lender's be-
havior. Initial financing is treated differently than refinancing, general
lines of credit and (perhaps) loans without a stated purpose differently
than loans for targeted purposes, and assignments differently than new
paper. This "Alice in Wonderland" series of distinctions would not make
any sense to a lender; such distinctions make even less sense if the DTPA
really was intended by the legislature to be a tool to correct lender mis-
conduct. The value of a restrictive reading of the "inextricably inter-
twined" doctrine, through applying more general tests of DTPA standing
to lending transactions, is that no such distinctions need develop. A
lender would be liable under contract and banking law for its actions as a
lender and liable under the DTPA if it chooses to step across the line into
active involvement in a consumer transaction that goes bad.
B. COLLATERAL AND NOT-SO-COLLATERAL SERVICES
Another major area of judicial encroachment on the Riverside exemp-
tion of lenders from DTPA liability is the "collateral services" doctrine.
While recognizing that lending transactions as such are not subject to
DTPA liability, courts characterize certain actions by lenders as collateral
to the loan transaction, and thus actionable. The fairness of some sort of
a collateral services doctrine is clear. Financial institutions do many other
things than lend money. It would not be reasonable to exempt a lender
from DTPA responsibility for actions that would subject a non-lender to
identical liability under identical circumstances. For example, the
purchase of insurance has been held to be a DTPA "service;"'66 ' viola-
tions of the Texas Insurance Code even are incorporated in the act as
659. An example of such an assignment, in a DTPA context, is found in Victoria Bank
& Trust v. Brady, 779 S.W.2d 893, 899 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 811 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991).
660. In refinancing auto purchases, for example, lien position would not be critical be-
cause the certificate of title would be held by the first creditor and transferred to the sec-
ond. The second lender, therefore, might wish to structure the deal as a new transaction,
perhaps because the lender prefers its own forms to those of the first lender.
661. See, e.g., McNeill v. McDavid Ins. Agency, 594 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1980, no writ); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
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DTPA violations. 662 It therefore would make little sense to exempt a
lender from DTPA liability, should that lender also provide insurance in
connection with a loan, and should that insurance be the basis of a con-
sumer's complaint.
Some recent DTPA decisions push the "collateral services" argument
much further, though. In Herndon v. First National Bank of Tulia,663 for
example, the Amarillo Court of Appeals determined (on its third try664 )
that a farmer stated a DTPA claim against a lender on a collateral serv-
ices theory through pleadings that recited, in relevant part:
The financial services purchased from the bank included but are not
limited to lending money to purchase [feed, seed, fertilizer, fuel, her-
bicides, pesticides, machinery, equipment, etc.], financial advice on
where and when to obtain financing, or abstain from borrowing, and
how to structure the various financial arrangements of the Jerry
Herndon farming operation.665
Herndon's pleading somewhat inartfully combines two questions left
open in Riverside: whether financial services necessarily exist in the lend-
ing of money and-in the second half of the paragraph-whether discus-
sions that commonly take place between a borrower and a lender in the
process of making a loan are "collateral" services. The Amarillo court
evidently relied on Herndon's latter claims, that lenders perform for bor-
rowers the "collateral services" of advising those borrowers on how and
where to get the best loan, whether to borrow, and how to arrange the
transaction. 666 Such claims, however, would arise to some extent in al-
most every loan. If the Amarillo court's decision in Herndon is cor-
rect,667 then expansion of the collateral services doctrine indeed has
swallowed up the Riverside rule.
The question, then, is where one draws the line. To the extent that
Herndon and other decisions668 are read for the conclusion that the mere
making or handling of a loan is a "collateral service" within the meaning
of the Riverside exception, they simply are wrong. The Riverside court
made a careful distinction between whether the loan of money could it-
662, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon 1987).
663, 802 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied).
664. The first decision was for the borrower, the second for the lender. Both were
superseded by the third, final opinion. Id. at 397.
665. Id. at 398.
666. In explaining its decision, the Amarillo panel quoted from the latter half of the
pleading paragraph reproduced in text. Id. at 399.
667. The Texas Supreme Court's decision to issue a "writ denied" in the Herndon case
says little about the decision's correctness. Assuming that a "writ denied" designation has
any real meaning, Herndon's pleadings were so vague that he might have pleaded at least
one collateral service under a more limited view of the case. Herndon, for example, con-
tended that he "purchased the financial services of the bank for the ... application of
various inputs to crop and livestock production." Id. at 398. What this means is not known
to the writer, but it might be a pleading of a collateral service sufficient to withstand dismis-
sal of a cause of action.
668. See, e.g., Baskin v. Mortgage & Trust, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 743,748 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (apparently stating in dicta that the "servicing" of a
mortgage loan is a "collateral service" actionable under the DTPA).
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self be considered a service, and whether "collateral" services could be
actionable. 669 Moreover, in view of the legislature's intent to exclude
lending from the DTPA,670 stretching the Riverside exemption to this ex-
treme would be a gross usurpation of the legislative function. A more
reasonable, though restrictive, collateral services doctrine could be de-
rived from the Texas Supreme Court's basic two-pronged test for con-
sumer status, just as has been demonstrated with the "inextricably
intertwined" doctrine. To reiterate, a person must seek or acquire goods
or services by purchase or lease. Those goods or services then must form
"the basis of the complaint."'671 So far as the "inextricably intertwined"
doctrine goes, the "basis of the complaint" test is the main sticking point.
With the "collateral services" doctrine, however, adaptation of the first
prong of the Texas Supreme Court's two-pronged test-in particular, the
question of whether services are acquired by "purchase or lease"-is the
most controversial aspect.
It is difficult for a typical borrower to prove, so far as many services
claimed as "collateral" to loan transactions are concerned, that those
services are acquired "by purchase or lease." One approach taken by
borrowers, and some courts, is to argue that the interest rate for a loan
necessarily includes not only the cost of borrowing money, but the cost of
services necessarily involved in making and "servicing" that loan.672
However, as the Fifth Circuit has recognized, this interpretation would
undermine the legislature's exclusion of intangibles from the DTPA's am-
bit.673 Moreover, it would equate a loan functionally with a "purchase"
or "lease," a result that is excluded by common-sense rules of statutory
construction already discussed in some detail earlier in this article.674
The requirement that a service be "purchased or leased," read literally,
should require a showing that the borrower paid for, or at least intended
669. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
670. See supra notes 266-304 and accompanying text.
671. See supra notes 617-21 and accompanying text.
672. See, e.g., Fortner v. Fannin Bank in Windom, 634 S.W.2d 74, 76-77 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1982, no writ) (approving the argument that payment of interest on a loan
"purchased" the bank's services in filing car title); but see Offerman, supra note 121 (criti-
cizing this reasoning). The Former court's reasoning is in marked contrast to that of the
court in Thompson v. First Austin Co., 572 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which went to some pains to explain that the payment of interest is
not sufficient consideration for forbearance in foreclosure, and that such "services" are
primarily for the benefit of the lender). The Fortner court evidently failed to consider
Thompson. Accord Offerman, supra note 121, at 881. The Thompson decision is discussed
in some detail supra at notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
673. See FDIC v. Munn, 804 F.2d 860, 863-64 (5th Cir. 1986).
[AJII transactions involve human service to some extent, the cost of which is
included in the price of the transaction. Arguably, then, all services in any
transaction are purchased 'services' under the DTPA. Under this approach,
any service involved in a stock purchase or loan transaction would give rise
to DTPA consumer status even though the actual stock purchase or loan
could not, thereby undermining the legislature's exclusion of sales of intangi-
ble chattels from the DTPA.
Id.
674. See supra notes 370-430 and accompanying text.
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to pay for, the service in question, separate and apart from the interest
paid on the loan, which by statute is compensation paid for the "use... of
money. '675 Indeed, some of the decisions make this distinction.676 In
Central Texas Hardware,677 for example, the court declined to find DTPA
liability based upon services involved in making the loan because the
services in question "were merely ancillary to the processing of the loan
application itself" and "no fee was charged. '678
Many services provided by financial institutions carry separate
charges679 or involve consideration other than the payment of interest on
a loan;680 complaints related to any of these services should not be barred
simply because the institution also is acting as a lender.681 Conversely,
those "services" which are simply part of the loan package, and for which
no separate charge is made, should not be considered to be "collateral"
services. This requirement would, in the writer's estimation, exclude a
number of services held to be "collateral" by some intermediate
courts.682 The risk that lenders would attempt to insulate themselves
from DTPA liability by including distinct and separate service charges
675. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon 1987).
676. See, e.g., Roberts v. Burkett, 802 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990,
no writ) (DTPA liability for legal services provided in connection with a loan transaction
rejected in part because "[tihe key element missing here is actual purchase or an agree-
ment that [the borrower] would purchase legal services"). But see, e.g., Irizarry v. Amarillo
Pantex Federal Credit Union, 695 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tex, App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ) (re-jecting the argument that "Irizarry cannot be a consumer because he paid no consideration
for the insurance," though basing DTPA liability primarily on an erroneous understanding
of the inextricably intertwined doctrine).
677. 810 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
678. Id. at 237.
679. One list of such charges includes check processing fees, monthly service charges,
activity fees, commissions on securities transactions, and escrow fees. Neeley, supra note
131, at G-15.
680. The writer does not argue, for example, that "free" checking really is free. The
institution received consideration for its services in the form of the opportunity to use the
funds on deposit until called for by the depositor. See FDIC v. Munn, 804 F.2d 860, 865(5th Cir. 1986) (characterizing the CD "hold" services in Ritenour as "financed ... through
revenue from [the bank's] accounts").
681. Accord Richard M. Alderman, Innovative Uses of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, 18 TEX. TECH L. REv. 45, 53-54 (1987) ("[Ilt is difficult to see how anyone, a bank or
other entity, can argue that it did not perform a service if it imposed a 'service charge.'
Therefore, any banking service accompanied by a fee clearly falls within the scope of the
DTPA."); Neeley, supra note 131, at G-15 ("Counsel's case will be significantly strength-
ened if the financial institution charges a service charge for the services which form the
basis of his client's cause of action. Such service charges furnish documentary proof that
the service was purchased.").
682. By way of example, this would include the financial advice in Herndon. See supra
notes 663-67 and accompanying text. As another example, in FDIC v. F & A Equipment
Leasing, 854 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ), the Dallas Court of Appeals
issued a very confused ruling, finding consumer standing on a version of the "inextricably
intertwined" or "borrower's objective" approach, then concluding that "any services pro-
vided in connection with adding [another party] to the notes and transferring the collateral
from F & A to [other party] were necessarily provided in connection with the original
loans in which F & A were consumers." Id. at 690-91. To the extent that the decision
intended to draw on the "collateral services" approach, it would be wrong under the au-
thor's suggested approach. To the extent that consumer status was found on a "borrower's
objective" theory, the quoted language would not be necessary.
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under the rubric of "interest" is minimal. "Fee income" is a principal
source of profit for lending institutions at the present time;683 moreover,
an attempt to combine charges for separate bank services under the
"loan" umbrella would risk running afoul of the Bank Tying Act684 at the
very least.
Even a "separate fee" test would have to be applied very carefully.
Take the example of cases involving loan brokers, claimed by at least one
set of commentators as being in conflict with the Riverside rule.685 In at
least two cases, 686 loan brokers have been held liable under the DTPA for
failing to produce a loan as promised. In each case, the court emphasized
that fees were paid to the brokers,687 and in each case the court distin-
guished Riverside on the basis of the collateral services doctrine. 688 Inter-
estingly enough, loan brokering transaction like this would be actionable
under the DTPA by virtue of the 1987 Credit Services Organizations
Act.689 These activities, however, would not be actionable under the
DTPA if engaged in by a "traditional" lender-that is, a regulated lender,
FDIC or FSLIC-insured bank or thrift, or credit union.690
Other aspects of the basic DTPA tests also would cause problems for
some of the more fanciful extensions of the "collateral services" doctrine.
For example, the services still must form the basis of the complaint. If the
bank's wrongful actions are not tied to the purchased services, then the
borrower should not be a DTPA consumer.691 In addition, the DTPA's
requirement that the consumer "seek" the services has been construed as
a requirement that the services have been an objective of the bor-
683. See, e.g., Banking: CFA Says Consumers Losing Millions in Interest Income at
Commercial Banks, DAILY REP. FOR EXECS., May 4, 1984, at A84 (quoting Steve Brobect,
executive director of the Consumer Federation of America, that "[t]here is widespread
consensus within and outside the [banking] industry that the principal reason for these
large profits are the great spread between cost of funds and loan rates, and the rise in fee
income"); Pamela Yip, Texas Commerce Prospering: First-Quarter Profits Surge 76 Per-
cent, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 20, 1994, at BI (reporting that fee income at Texas Commerce
"rose 14 percent to $106 million" and that "[ijncome from trust services increased 46 per-
cent, and deposit service charges were up 12 percent").
684. See supra note 511 and accompanying text.
685. See Krahmer, supra note 14, at 36-37.
686. Merchantile Mortgage Co. v. University Homes, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ); Lubbock Mortgage & Inv. Co. v. Thomas, 626 S.W.2d
611 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1981, no writ).
687. Merchantile Mortgage, 663 S.W.2d at 47 ("stand-by fees" totaling $6,200); Lubbock
Mortgage, 626 S.W.2d at 612 ("loan fees" totaling at least $3,500).
688. Merchantile Mortgage, 663 S.W.2d at 47-48 (adopting the Lubbock Mortgage rea-
soning); Lubbock Mortgage, 626 S.W.2d at 613 (noting that the Riverside court "refused to
pass upon the issue of whether a bank's misrepresentation concerning its collateral activi-
ties incidental to obtaining a loan could constitute a deceptive act").
689. See supra notes 345-69 and accompanying text.
690. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
691. Thus, in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westridge Court Joint Venture, 815 S.W.2d 327
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied), the court properly passed over the
question of whether services typically associated with a real estate loan (payment and col-
lection of ad valorem taxes, maintenance of insurance, and so forth) qualified the borrow-
ers as DTPA consumers, because they "failed to complain of any violation of the DTPA
emanating from the acquisition of the project or the financing of the project." Id. at 332.
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rower, 692 or for the primary benefit of the borrower.693 "Services" that
are for the primary benefit of the lender, but which have been argued as
actionable under the DTPA, such as encouraging a borrower to pay a
third party's debt694 or foreclosing on collateral,695 surely are not "sought
or acquired" by borrowers in any rational sense of those words. Any
sane borrower would rather not receive the benefit of such services. In
short, careful application of standard DTPA requirements, combined
with a requirement that the "services" at issue be accompanied by a
charge to the consumer, other than interest on the loan, would do much
to create some reasonable limits on the "collateral services" doctrine.
C. LENDING AS A SERVICE
The final "exception" left open in Riverside, that "services existed in
the lending of money,... and were necessarily a part of the interest rate
or purchase price of the loan,"69 6 while potentially the most dangerous to
lenders, is also the objection most easily answered-though not for the
reason given by the Riverside court. The Texas Supreme Court criticized
this financial intermediation argument as "merely hypothetical" since no
evidence in support of the theory had been presented at trial.697 As Pro-
fessor Krahmer has ably pointed out, and as has already been dis-
cussed,698 the business of lending could quite reasonably be viewed as a
series of interrelated services. However, even if evidence that the finan-
cial intermediation theory reflects actual banking practice were presented
in some future trial, such evidence ultimately would prove to be of little
consequence. The question is not whether lending could in some ways be
692. See, e.g., FDIC v. Munn, 804 F.2d at 865 (stating that the "key principle" for deter-
mining consumer status is whether the goods or services are "an objective of the transac-
tion," rather than "merely incidental to it"); Texas Cookie Co. v. Hendricks & Peralta, Inc.,
747 S.W.2d 873, 877 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (finding DTPA con-
sumer in a franchise purchase since the collateral services in question "were clearly an
objective of the transaction and not merely incidental to it").
693. To a certain extent, actions taken by the bank for its own benefit also could be said
to be "services" to the borrower. See, e.g., Fortner, 634 S.W.2d at 76 (going to great lengths
to explain how filing of car title by bank was a "service" to the borrower); see also Offer-
man, supra note 121, at 883 (commenting that "[miany activities which are normally per-
formed by a lender for its own benefit also indirectly benefit the borrower").
694. In Schmueser v. Burkburnett Bank, 937 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1991), for example, theFifth Circuit declined to find that the "services" provided to a third party by a bank which
encouraged a borrower to pay a third party's note (so that the bank would not be called on
to perform on a letter of credit in favor of the third party) were not actionable under the
DTPA. The claimed services "were, at best, gratuitous or merely self-serving, and under-
taken only in an attempt to avoid [the bank's] own liability on the letter of credit." Id. at
1029.
695. At least two decisions have held that a borrower could not complain of grossly
inadequate price at foreclosure sale, since a borrower is in the condition of a seller, not a
buyer. See Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1992); Resolu-
tion Trust, 815 S.W.2d at 332.
696. Riverside, 603 S.W.2d at 175.
697. Id.
698. See supra notes 252-64 and accompanying text.
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described as a service, but whether lending is, under settled principles of
statutory construction, encompassed within the DTPA.
The financial intermediation theory ultimately fails not because of any
failure in Professor Krahmer's banking theory, which is in the main unex-
ceptional, but because the language and legislative intent of the DTPA
and subsequent statutes exclude such an interpretation. To reiterate, the
legislative history of the DTPA indicates that the business of lending was
intentionally excluded. 699 A subsequent amendment of the DTPA, ad-
ding the words "loans, or extensions of credit" to the "goods or services"
language dealt with in Riverside, is persuasive evidence that the Texas
Legislature has used the word "services" in the DTPA more restrictively
than some banking law theorists might do in other contexts.7°° More-
over, the requirement that any "services" be acquired by "purchase or
lease," and the clear distinction drawn in law between purchases, leases,
and loans, raises yet another hurdle against the financial intermediation
approach.701
The Credit Services Organizations Act,702 passed by the Texas Legisla-
ture after Professor Krahmer's article appeared in print, perhaps is the
most persuasive argument against accepting the financial intermediation
theory of DTPA liability. 70 3 The "credit services" targeted in this statute
are indistinguishable from some of the "financial intermediation" services
discussed in Krahmer's work, and the statute imposes DTPA liability, yet
traditional financial institutions are exempted from the Credit Services
Organizations Act's provisions, an act that would be sheerest nonsense if
the DTPA were meant to include financial intermediation as a service. In
short, the financial intermediation approach to imposing DTPA liability
on lenders is-to paraphrase biologist T.H. Huxley-a beautifully simple
theory slain by a host of ugly facts.704
VI. CONCLUSION
In a perfect world, the writing of this article would be neither necessary
nor controversial. The question of whether lending activities, per se, are
encompassed within the Texas DTPA is not one that is intrinsically diffi-
cult to answer. The legislative history is clear and grounded in sound
considerations of public policy. The first Texas Supreme Court decision
on the subject came to the correct conclusion, though the reasoning may
leave something to be desired. Predictions of an inexorable drift in the
law toward repudiating Riverside-translated into anti-lender rulings by a
fair number of intermediate appellate courts-simply cannot be squared
699. See supra notes 266-304 and accompanying text.
700. See supra notes 310-20 and accompanying text.
701. See supra notes 370-430 and accompanying text.
702. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 18.01-.15 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
703. See supra notes 345-69 and accompanying text.
704. See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 505 (16th ed. 1992) (Justin Kaplan,
gen'l ed.) (quoting Thomas H. Huxley, in Biogenesis and Abiogenesis (1870), referring to
"[t]he great tragedy of science-the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact").
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with the holdings or even with the language of the most recent Texas
Supreme Court decisions on the subject.
Since the Texas Supreme Court has not yet spoken definitively on the
subject, no great harm has been done-other than to those lending insti-
tutions that already have been held liable or settled suits based on a mis-
taken theory of the DTPA. The real question is how such a
comparatively simple legal question, though one with very important con-
sequences, can have degenerated into its current muddled state. While
any answer to this question ultimately must be speculative, several factors
may enter into the mix: an unnecessarily tentative decision in Riverside,
persuasive dicta in later cases that obscured contrary holdings,705 uni-
formly critical academic reviews of Riverside, and perhaps even a touch of
collective paranoia occasioned by the "lender liability crisis."'706
The most important contributing factor to the wrong path the law has
taken, however, is one not unique to Texas. A recent study of seven
states characterized by expansive interpretations of consumer legislation
has counseled:
In determining whether these broad interpretations of statutory cov-
erage are indeed judicial expansions of the legislation or are applica-
tions consistent with legislative intent, the statutes themselves must
be examined, especially legislative responses to developing jurispru-
dence in the form of subsequent amendments and with respect to
available legislative history.70 7
To date, no Texas court has ever followed this advice and simply con-
sulted the legislative history of the DTPA or subsequent legislative ac-
tion. The reason for this omission may be no more complicated than
initial unfamiliarity with the tools for statutory construction, followed by
the later general assumption that "someone must have checked."
Whatever the reason for this omission, it would be a sorry state of affairs
if wholesale neglect by courts of the Texas Legislature's demonstrable
intent results, through inadvertence, in judicial activism of the worst sort.
If this article does no more than focus one court's attention on that sadly
neglected aspect of the DTPA debate, it will have served a useful
purpose.
705. The principal culprit on this ground is Justice Spears's oft-quoted recapitulation of
the post-Riverside decisions in La Sara Grain. See supra notes 211-15, notes 634-40 and
accompanying text.
706. For discussion of similar widespread misreading of case law in the lender liability
context, see James W. Paulsen, The "Fai' Value at Foreclosure" in Texas Banks, TEX.
BANKING, May 1990, at 13.
707. Franke & Ballam, supra note 589, at 361.
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